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The Victims’ Right to Review (VRR) was introduced in 2013. It provides a new 
mechanism through which victims can challenge decisions not to prosecute alongside 
the established routes of judicial review and private prosecutions.   
 
This thesis evaluates the extent to which these mechanisms, individually and 
collectively, provide victims with a coherent and principled framework for 
challenging decisions not to prosecute.   
 
The VRR is a simple, convenient mechanism which may improve victims’ perceptions 
of procedural fairness and provide an appealing alternative to judicial review.  
However, its utility is significantly limited by a narrow definition of ‘victim’ and the 
rigid qualifying criteria that confine this mechanism to non-prosecutions.  It offers 
victims only limited opportunities to participate in the pre-trial stage of the prosecution 
process.  
 
The requirement that victims use the VRR to challenge decisions not to prosecute 
limits access to judicial review thereby protecting the public prosecutor from the 
independent and transparent scrutiny of judicial review.  Private prosecutions are of 
limited value to victims as they are procedurally onerous and are fundamentally 
undermined by the CPS policy of applying the Code for Crown Prosecutors to private 
prosecutions.   
 
Individually, the VRR, judicial review and private prosecutions each have some value 
for victims, but they all have significant limitations.  Collectively, they do not provide 
victims with a coherent and principled framework for challenging decisions not to 
prosecute.  The VRR should be both expanded to include a wider range of cases and 
reformed to encourage victims to make representations creating a more meaningful 
right of review for victims whilst continuing to protect the rights of defendants.  The 
right of private prosecution for ordinary citizens, in contrast, should be abolished 
because it has the potential to conflict with the rights of defendants and the public 
interest. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction to the thesis 
 
 
1.1 Introduction  
 
This thesis examines the ways that aggrieved victims of crime may challenge a public 
prosecutor’s decision not to prosecute.  This research evaluates the Victims’ Right to 
Review (VRR), judicial review and private prosecutions individually, and 
collectively, against the set criteria of accessibility, participation, accountability and 
outcomes.  These mechanisms differ in the extent to which they allow victims to 
participate in the criminal justice system and the degree to which they hold the public 
prosecutor to account.  Although each of the mechanisms are of some value to victims, 
I argue that the law and policy in this area do not provide victims with a coherent or 
principled framework of rights.  I will argue that the rights of victims to challenge 
prosecutorial decisions should be developed further to strengthen the victim’s position 
in the prosecution process whilst ensuring robust safeguards for defendants and the 
wider public interest. 
 
 
1.2 Background – decisions to prosecute and victims 
 
Since the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 came into force the vast majority of 
criminal prosecutions in England and Wales have been brought by the Crown 
Prosecution Service (CPS).  As a result, the role of the prosecutor has been taken over 
by the State from individual victims who, prior to the creation of police forces and 
subsequently the CPS, would have brought prosecutions themselves.  Although the 
right to bring a private prosecution remains, these are rarely brought by individual 
victims of crime.  Therefore, victims have largely been marginalised from public 
prosecutions, generally being relegated to the role of witnesses.  Until the case of 




available to a victim aggrieved by a decision not to prosecute were to apply for judicial 
review or bring a private prosecution.1 
 
In Killick, the Court of Appeal confirmed that victims have an inherent right to have 
a decision not to prosecute reviewed and that there were deficiencies in the CPS 
system for handling requests for review: ‘As a decision not to prosecute is in reality a 
final decision for a victim, there must be a right to seek a review of such a decision, 
particularly as the police have such a right under the charging guidance.’2  The court 
invited the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) as head of the CPS to re-examine 
the procedure by which victims could seek a review of decisions not to prosecute 
indicating that it should be separate to the complaints system for dealing with issues 
relating to the service provided by the CPS.  Thomas LJ stated that a right of review 
‘is an integral part of the exercise of a prosecutorial discretion.’3  As a result of Killick, 
the CPS implemented the VRR which is an internal CPS scheme that allows victims 
to request a review of a prosecution decision not to prosecute.4   
 
The objective of this research is to examine the three mechanisms by which victims 
can now challenge decisions not to prosecute which are capable of resulting in a 
prosecution:  private prosecutions, judicial review and the VRR.  There are other ways 
in which aggrieved complainants can express their dissatisfaction with decisions not 
to prosecute including bringing a claim for damages against the CPS under section 8 
of the Human Rights Act 1998.5  Complainants may also apply for financial 
compensation from the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority as an 
acknowledgement that they have suffered harm as a result of a crime.6  Alternatively, 
they may register a complaint through the CPS Feedback and Complaints policy.7  
Families may also seek a conclusion of unlawful killing at an inquest as was the case 
 
 
1 R v Killick [2011] EWCA Crim 1608, [2012] 1 Cr App R 10 
2 ibid [48] 
3 ibid [57] 
4 Crown Prosecution Service, ‘Victims’ Right to Review Guidance’ (CPS, 2016)  
5 See D v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2018] UKSC 11, [2018] 2 WR 895 and NXB v 
CPS [2015] EWHC 631 (QB) 
6 Gov.uk, <www.gov.uk/government/organisations/criminal-injuries-compensation-authority> 
accessed 23 May 2021. 




following the death of Ian Tomlinson and other cases in which wrongdoing on the part 
of the authorities has been alleged.8  Potentially, an aggrieved complainant could also 
take the law into their hands by committing a criminal act against the person that they 
believed responsible for committing an offence against them.9  However, these forms 
of ‘challenge’ are not capable of directly leading to a reversal of a decision to 
prosecute.   Therefore, the scope of this research has been limited to the VRR, judicial 
review and private prosecutions.   
 
The thesis evaluates the three mechanisms individually, and examines the extent to 
which they collectively provide victims with a coherent and principled framework for 
challenging decisions of the public prosecutor not to bring proceedings.  These rights 
of review are then set in the wider context of an evaluation of the impact of the review 
mechanisms on the defendant and the public interest.  The next section of this 
introductory chapter provides an overview of the relevant literature to show where 
there are currently gaps in our knowledge that this thesis will fill.  
 
 
1.3 Conceptions of victimhood 
 
 
There is no single, fixed legal definition for the term ‘victim’.  Although legal 
definitions do exist, victimhood is arguably more of a social construction than a legal 
one.   As Rock states, there is a ‘conceptual void’ in terms of victim definition10 and 
that victimhood is ‘an identity, a social artefact’ which depends on interpretative 
process by those directly and indirectly involved in the case.11  Even though particular 
interpretations of victimhood are used in international and domestic legislation, the 
 
 
8 Paul Lewis, ‘Ian Tomlinson unlawfully killed, inquest finds’ The Guardian (London, 3 May 2011) 
<www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/may/03/ian-tomlinson-unlawfully-killed-inquest> accessed 23 May 
2021  
9 See David Miers, ‘Taking the Law into their Own Hands:  Victims as Offenders’ in Adam Crawford 
and Jo Goodey (eds), Integrating a Victim Perspective within Criminal Justice:  International Debates 
(Ashgate 2000) 
10 Paul Rock, ‘On Becoming a Victim’ in Carolyn Hoyle and Richard Young, New Visions of Crime 
Victims (Hart, 2002) 13 




concept remains nebulous in that it relies on interpretation in the particular 
circumstances of the case or situation.12  
 
There is also extensive academic literature on the nature of victimhood which 
identifies that there are conflicting interpretations on what amounts to victimhood.13  
It has been argued that victimhood can be contested with disagreement about whether 
a particular individual should be labelled as a victim.14  Christie’s concept of the ideal 
victim forcefully demonstrates that victimhood may depend on the presence of 
particular attributes that leads third parties to recognise their victim status.15  The 
converse of the concept of the ‘ideal victim’ is that of the non-ideal victim.    A good 
example of the ‘non-ideal’ victim is those involved in prostitution.16  Matthews argues 
that although they are high risk of victimisation, prostitutes may not be seen as suitable 
victims.17  There is evidence that the authorities have accepted prostitutes as victims 
in certain situations and that there is an increasing view that they are victims; an 
example of the aftermath of a series of prostitute murders in Ipswich when there was 
recognition that they needed support rather than punishment.18  Fattah has argued that 
socially excluded groups in society are at greater risk of becoming a victim of a crime, 
yet do not attract public sympathy in the same way as some ‘valued’ groups would.19  
Fattah contends that the public and authorities may be indifferent and unsympathetic 
to violence against ‘devalued’ citizens.  He argues that this can affect both the 
determination of the authorities to find the offender and the severity with which they 
are ultimately punished.20  Carrabine describes this phenomenon as a ‘hierarchy of 
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13 For an overview, see: Ross McGarry and Sandra Walklate, Victims: Trauma, Testimony and Justice 
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15 Nils Christie, ‘The Ideal Victim’ in Ezzat Fattah (ed), From Crime Policy to Victim Policy:  
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victimization’ in which some categories of victim are treated more seriously than 
others.21  He suggests that these groups are ‘“over-policed” as problem populations 
but “under-policed” as victims.’22   
 
Strobl argues that acquiring victim status depends on both self-identification as a 
victim and social recognition as a victim.23  If an individual identifies themselves as a 
victim, but then is not recognised as such by others they become a rejected victim.  
Strobl states that this could be because ‘the sufferer’s personal characteristics or the 
circumstances of the harmful incident may disqualify him or her from the victim role’ 
or his ‘involvement in illegal activities’.24 
 
1.3.1 The requirement of harm 
 
Most constructions of victimhood require an element of harm as a prerequisite.  Hall 
notes in his comparative study across nine common law jurisdictions that there is a 
‘growing tendency to define victims by reference to the harm they endure.’25  
 
Harm is a familiar concept in discussions of criminalisation in the substantive criminal 
law.26  One of the main proponents of the harm principle, Joel Feinberg, identifies 
three constructions of harm.  The first is derivative harm, where ones interest is harmed 
by the offender causing damage to his property.27  He describes the second sense of 
harm as ‘the thwarting, setting back, or defeating of an interest.’28  He further states 
that an individual’s interests, ‘consist of all those things in which one has a stake’ and 
a third party can ‘invade’ these interests putting them in a worse position.29  The third 
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22 ibid 158. 
23 Rainer Strobl, ‘Constructing the Victim:  Theoretical Reflections and Empirical Examples’ (2004) 
11 International Review of Victimology 295, 296 
24 ibid 296. 
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category is based on the notion of the offender wronging another by violating 
another’s rights even though harm may not have been caused.   
 
Stewart argues that a rights-based approach, separate to the harm principle, could be 
extended to attribution of victimhood:  the victim would be able to claim victim status 
if his rights had been violated.30  The difficulty with this approach is determining 
which rights should be protected in this way.  Regardless of the theoretical justification 
for criminalization of this conduct, the reality is that they do exist as criminal offences 
and so there is an acceptance within the criminal law that some offences do not require 
proof of harm, such as all inchoate offences.  However, these crimes are not 
necessarily victimless:  the charge or indictment is likely to particularise an 
identifiable individual as the victim of the offence (such as the owner of the property 
which the defendant attempted to damage). 
 
1.3.2 A working definition of victimhood. 
 
Despite the contested nature of victimhood, it is important to have a working definition 
as a normative anchor for the evaluation of the review mechanisms.  Strobl’s typology 
will therefore be adopted as a way of measuring the constructions of victimhood 
embedded within the individual review mechanisms.31  On the basis of this model, 
attribution of victimhood depends on both self-identification by the victim and social 
recognition.  This system of categorisation provides a useful foundation for evaluating 
the review mechanisms as it distinguishes between ‘actual’ victims, ‘designated’ 
victims and ‘rejected’ victims.  ‘Actual’ victims both self-identify as victims and are 
recognised as such by society.  Designated victims do not identify themselves as 
victims, but are recognised as such by society.  Rejected victims are those individuals 
who self-identify as victims, but are denied victim status by society.  
 
This working definition will also take into account both harm-based and rights-based 
constructions of victimhood.  This allows a distinction to be made between those 
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mechanism which adopted a narrow approach to victimhood which is based on the 
requirement of harm and those which would allow victim status as a result of an 
infringement of or threat to the rights of the individual concerned.  This working 
definition based on Strobl’s categorisation system and the harm/rights-based 
distinction will have significance when the accessibility of the individual review 
mechanisms are analysed in chapters three, four and five. 
 
 
1.4 Review of the literature on challenging decisions to prosecute 
 
There is not a large body of literature on the review of decisions not to prosecute, the 
vast majority of which is doctrinal in nature.  However, the theoretical analysis of 
Manikis and the empirical research of Iliadis and Flynn will be discussed first as these 
pieces are particularly pertinent to the focus of this thesis; thereafter key pieces of 
doctrinal research will be discussed.    
 
1.4.1 Theoretical analysis 
 
The work of Marie Manikis uses judicial review and the VRR to develop theoretical 
modelling of victim participation.  Manikis’ modelling is based on Edwards’ typology 
of victim participation in the criminal justice system which will be used in this thesis 
to conduct an analysis of participation through the review mechanisms.32  Edwards 
outlines four participation types the first three of which are non-dispositive:  
expression, information-provision and consultation.  The fourth category is control 
which is dispositive.33  Manikis utilises the VRR to propose an additional category of 
participation based on the role of victims as agents of accountability.34  Manikis’ 
rationale for this amendment is that victims have a ‘monitoring and oversight role to 
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ensure that errors are discovered and accounted for.’35  Manikis concludes that the 
VRR is inherently punitive as it can ‘only be used to increase prosecutions and 
punitiveness’ and that the VRR ‘tends to favour crime control and punitivity towards 
the offender over accountability towards state actors.’36   
 
Manikis subsequently uses the review mechanisms of judicial review and the VRR as 
an example of victim acting non-punitively to propose a new model of criminal justice 
based on victims ‘advancing non-punitiveness, penal parsimony and moderation.’37  
The focus of Manikis’ work is theoretical modelling of victim participation, not the 
finer detail of the review mechanisms.  
 
1.4.2 Empirical research 
 
Iliadis and Flynn have produced the ‘first socio-legal analysis of the VRR’ which is, 
in fact,  the only empirical research to date on the VRR.38  The focus of this research 
is whether victims’ procedural justice needs are met by the VRR and consists of 
interviews conducted with eleven criminal justice and victim support professionals as 
well as examining some of the data available on the use of the VRR.  Although 
valuable, one of the limitations of this research is that a small number of professionals 
were interviewed and not victims who had experienced the VRR.  This research does 
not examine the case law that has emerged as a result of the VRR.  In addition, the 
authors suggest that the VRR is ‘theoretically accessible for all crime victims’ without 
offering a detailed analysis of the qualifying criteria or the definition of victimhood 
on which the scheme relies.  Iliadis and Flynn’s primary criticism of the VRR is that 
the level of accountability and procedural justice that it offers is undermined by the 
 
 
35 ibid 67. 
36 ibid 79–80. 
37 Marie Manikis, ‘A New Model of the Criminal Justice Process: Victims’ Rights as Advancing Penal 
Parsimony and Moderation’ (2019) 30 Criminal Law Forum 201. 
38 Mary Iliadis and Asher Flynn, ‘Providing a Check on Prosecutorial Decision-Making:  An Analysis 




lack of an external element.39  They posit whether greater independence could be 
achieved by cases being scrutinised by a multi-agency panel.40   
 
The authors conclude that the VRR has ‘benefited victims by giving them a voice, a 
level of validation, and some control, even if the review did not alter the outcome of 
their case.’41  However, this does not take into account the very limited opportunities 
under the VRR for victims to make representations or to participate any further than 
to request a review of a decision.  Iliadis and Flynn argue that the VRR can provide 
the opportunity for the victim to achieve procedural and substantive justice with 
increased transparency in prosecutorial decision-making.42  
 
1.4.3 Doctrinal research  
 
In contrast, Dyke adopts a more ‘black letter’ approach providing a largely descriptive 
overview of challenging decisions to prosecute in which he describes the restrictive 
approach taken by the courts and the effectiveness of the VRR.43  Dyke summarises 
the judicial review cases which were heard prior to the VRR coming into force 
demonstrating that the courts took a restrictive approach to reviewing decisions not to 
prosecute.  He also discusses some of the early case law concerning judicial review of 
prosecutorial decisions including challenges to the VRR.  The article highlights that 
although the test under the VRR is whether the original decision was wrong, when the 
VRR decision is scrutinized by way of judicial review the victim would need to satisfy 
the court that it was Wednesbury unreasonable.44  
 
Dyke compares this to the unduly lenient sentence procedure where anyone can 
request that the Attorney General refer a case to the Court of Appeal.  Dyke concludes 
that the VRR has been effective at ‘channelling’ away from the expense of judicial 
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review proceedings and that possible future reforms could include amending the test 
for standing to request a review and placing the scheme on a statutory footing.45 
 
Elsewhere, I have taken a broader perspective by offering a comparative analysis of 
the implementation of the VRR in England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland 
to identify a number of differences and make proposals for improvement to the VRR.46  
This article compares the schemes across four key areas:  the definition of victim; 
scope of the schemes; the review process; outcomes.  This analysis reveals that the 
definition of victim used is broadly similar, with some differences, across all three 
jurisdictions being based on the requirement of harm.  The analysis of the scope of the 
schemes identifies that the VRR qualifying criteria are comparatively narrow.  The 
article also scrutinises the review process in terms of the procedural requirements and 
the test used during the review process.   
 
Rogers discusses the decision to prosecute in the context of human rights specifically 
referring to the case of Da Silva v UK.47  He discusses whether the evidential test is 
arbitrary and argues that the VRR adds legitimacy to the test as it allows requests for 
merits based reviews and so reduces the scope for incorrect decisions not to be 
challenged. Rogers further states that the VRR ‘probably assures… the compatibility 
of the “realistic prospect of conviction test” with any victim’s rights that arise under 
the Convention.’48  Rogers identifies that the VRR potentially fills the gap prior to its 
inception when the only options for victims were judicial review or to contact the CPS 
for an informal review.49  This article is also important as it touches upon both the 
VRR and judicial review as ways of challenging decisions not to prosecute conceding 
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One of the earliest articles on the VRR was written by the then DPP, Keir Starmer.  
He considers both the VRR and judicial review have tempered finality in criminal 
justice to ensure the correct decision in individual cases.50  Starmer also identifies 
other ‘adjustments’ to the principle of finality some of which are used as a basis of 
comparison with the review mechanisms in chapters seven and eight of this thesis.51  
The focus of this article is on the principle of finality rather than the detail of the 
individual review mechanisms. 
 
There is limited literature which focusses on judicial review of decisions not to 
prosecute.  The majority review the early cases which established that decisions of the 
CPS were amenable to judicial review.52  This thesis attempts to fill this gap by 
specifically examining judicial review of decisions not to prosecute alongside the 
alternatives of the VRR and private prosecutions.  
 
Similarly, there is limited current literature on private prosecutions in England and 
Wales.53  Most of the recent publications focus on the value of private prosecutions 
for fraud and intellectual property offences and is not directly relevant to private 
prosecutions brought by victims.54  There was also a flurry of case notes following the 
Supreme Court decision of Gujra55 that endorsed the more restrictive CPS policy on 
private prosecutions.56  The most significant article is by de Than and Elvin who argue 
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that private prosecutions should be subject to reform.57  The authors discuss Gujra and 
a Crown Court copyright case and then  review the main arguments for retaining and 
repealing the right of private prosecution, concluding that ‘there are compelling 
arguments against leaving private prosecution in its current form in England and 
Wales.’58  In particular, they argue that the need for private prosecutions has ‘very 
much diminished’ as the VRR and judicial review provide alternative means of 
challenging decisions not to prosecute.59  They also note that the CPS is better placed 
to conduct prosecutions independently and dispassionately without the potential 
conflict of interest that private prosecutors may have.60  The authors also argue that 
the existing mechanisms for controlling private prosecutions are inadequate and 
should be reformed.61 
 
Campbell et al broaden the discussion further by describing the three review 
mechanisms alongside one another.62  Although this provides a useful overview of the 
different ways that victims may challenge decisions not to prosecute, it does not offer 
a comparison between them or the extent to which they provide victims with a 
coherent framework of rights.  The authors do, however, note that the CPS is subject 
to both internal and external forms of accountability which go wider than methods of 
reviewing decisions not to prosecute, such as accountability to the Attorney General, 
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1.5 Objectives of this study and contribution to the literature 
 
1.5.1 Research questions 
 
This thesis seeks to answer the following research question:  To what extent does the 
law and CPS policy in England and Wales provide victims of crime with a 
coherent and principled framework for challenging decisions not to prosecute? 
 
In order to provide a comprehensive answer to this question the following sub-
questions are addressed: 
  
1. Do the mechanisms of the VRR, judicial review and private prosecutions 
provide victims with principled and coherent rights to challenge decisions not 
to prosecute?  
2. To what extent do these rights of review encroach on the rights of the 




This thesis will test the hypothesis that the review mechanisms have expanded victim 
participation to the detriment of the rights of the defendant and the wider public 
interest.  The rationale for testing this is that public prosecutions are part of the 
adversarial criminal justice system which is based on a contest between the State and 
the defendant.  Increasing the involvement of victims risks de-stabilising this 
adversarial structure.  Essentially, this research will explore whether increased victim 
participation through the review mechanisms amounts to an unjustifiable 
encroachment on the rights of defendants and the State acting in the public interest.  
This issue is central to the issue of whether the review mechanisms are a coherent and 
principled framework.  
 
A linked hypothesis is that the review mechanisms do not provide a coherent and 




mechanisms have developed largely independently of one another rather than as part 
of a systematic and organised process.   
 
 
1.5.3 Contribution to the literature 
 
The contribution of the research is that it provides the first detailed interrogation of 
the three principal ways in which victims can challenge decisions not to prosecute and 
sets that discussion in its wider context by examining the extent to which these rights 
of review impacted on the rights of defendants and the public interest.  
 
This thesis adds to the existing literature in the field by providing the first systematic 
analysis of the three key mechanisms by which a victim may challenge a prosecutorial 
decision not to prosecute.  This research evaluates the VRR, judicial review and 
private prosecutions as potential remedies for aggrieved victims both individually and 
then collectively against four criteria:  accessibility, participation, accountability 
and outcomes.  There is limited literature which compares all three mechanisms due 
to the recent development of the VRR.  By evaluating them against the same criteria, 
this thesis goes further than to simply consider each mechanism in isolation; it assesses 
critically the extent to which they work together to provide a coherent framework for 
victims taking into account the other interests in prosecutions, the defendant and the 
public interest.  Established criminal justice models are used to identify the values 
underpinning the review mechanisms and evaluate whether they can be justified in the 
contemporary criminal justice system. 
 
My research provides the first in-depth analysis of the VRR.  It critiques the restrictive 
qualifying criteria and the narrow definition of victimhood incorporated into the 
scheme showing that it provides a limited interpretation of the requirement to provide 
victims with a right of review and that it does not cover the full range of decisions that 
could be included within it.  The thesis also makes specific proposals for reform of the 
VRR to increase its effectiveness as a means of challenging decisions for victims and 
to offer greater protection to defendants who are potentially at risk of being prejudiced 





The analysis of private prosecutions alongside the other review mechanisms 
contributes to the debate on whether private prosecutions should be abolished.  The 
use of the criteria demonstrates that allowing victims such extensive participatory 
rights cannot be justified as they potentially undermine the rights of the defendant and 
the wider public interest. 
 
 
1.6 Methodology and thesis overview 
 
The thesis is structured into two parts:  the review mechanisms and the wider context.  
 
The methodology adopted differs for the two parts of the thesis and is set out below.  
Traditional doctrinal analysis is combined with the application of established 
theoretical models to evaluate the rights of review mechanisms.  With the exception 
of a small amount of secondary data, the research does not use qualitative or 
quantitative methods. 
 




This first chapter provides an overview and context of the VRR.  The first section of 
this chapter introduces the background to the VRR.  This is followed by an overview 
of the key elements of the scheme including eligibility for review, the structure and 
scope of the scheme and the test applied during the review process.  This chapter then 
situates the VRR in its wider context of the pre-trial stage of the prosecution process. 
 
Chapters three, four and five 
 
Chapter two is followed by a chapter on each of the three mechanisms:  VRR (chapter 
three), judicial review (chapter four) and private prosecutions (chapter five).  Each of 




accountability and outcomes.  These chapters predominantly assess each mechanism 
on an individual basis and offer conclusions on how accessible they each are, the level 
of participation they provide victims and the extent to which they are able to hold 
public prosecutors to account for their decisions, together with an indication of their 
potential to result in a prosecution.   
 
A doctrinal approach is adopted to analyse the legislation, cases, policy documents 
and relevant scholarly commentary to examine the mechanisms.  The aim of this 
methodology is to produce a ‘synthesis of various rules, principles, norms, interpretive 
guidelines and values’ to evaluate whether the law is coherent or justified as ‘a 
segment of the law as part of a larger system of law.’63  Essentially, the research is 
analysing whether there is a coherent ‘system’ to the ways in which victims can 
challenge decisions not to prosecute.64  To bring a sense of structure and clarity, these 
mechanisms are then each evaluated against the four criteria of accessibility, 
participation, accountability and outcomes.   
 
The criteria are set out in more detail in the introduction to the first part of the thesis.  
However, in brief, the criteria and their significance are as follows.  Accessibility is 
an important consideration because if there are insurmountable barriers to victims 
successfully using the mechanisms then their intrinsic value is diminished.  The 
criterion of participation is evaluated using Edwards’ model of victim participation to 
distinguish between different levels of participation of expression, information 
provision, consultation and control.65  Accountability is examined using the theoretical 
model developed by Mark Bovens.66  The final criterion of outcomes focuses on the 
potential outcomes offered by each of the mechanisms and whether they are able to 
provide a meaningful end result for victims.   
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Chapter six is a thematic analysis chapter which draws out and expands on the findings 
of the previous chapters by identifying four key themes which emerge from the 
evaluations of the individual review mechanisms.  The themes that are identified are: 
procedural barriers, the public/private nature of the review mechanisms, the ultimate 
decision-making authority, and procedural justice.   
 
1.6.2 Part B:  The wider context 
 
In this part, the discussion broadens from focussing on the detail of the individual 




Chapter seven examines whether the rights of defendants have been compromised as 
a result of increased participatory rights on the part of victims.  This chapter uses 
doctrinal analysis to examine how defendants may challenge review decisions both 
within the processes and through the trial process by using the doctrine of abuse of 
process.  This chapter also compares other prosecution rights of appeals as a way of 
analysing the review mechanisms and proposes further safeguards which could be 




Chapter eight explores the concept of the public interest and how this is impacted on 
by the review mechanisms.  This chapter opens with a discussion of relevant 
theoretical perspectives on the concept of the public interest, then uses other appeal 
mechanisms to illuminate the relationship between the review mechanisms and the 









The final chapter uses theoretical modelling to evaluates the review mechanisms in 
the criminal justice system using established criminal justice models.  A number of 
different models are used as prisms to evaluate the review mechanisms and how they 
fit within the criminal justice system.  These models are introduced below. 
 
1.6.3 Overview of the criminal justice models 
 
Herbert Packer’s crime control and due process models, ‘represent an attempt to 
abstract two separate value systems that compete for priority in the operation of the 
criminal process.’67  They are not alternative models of criminal justice, but sets of 
values which co-exist in the criminal justice system and represent the ‘normative 
antinomy at the heart of the criminal law.’68  Packer recognises that the utility of these 
models is that they allow us to identify where on the scale between these two extremes 
our current practices are as well as enabling us to identify ‘the direction and thrust of 
current and foreseeable trends.’69  Essentially, they also represent the tension between 
justice for individual defendants and an efficient prosecution system for suppressing 
crime.   
 
Packer depicts the crime control model as an assembly line the objective of which is 
to efficiently suppress crime with a ‘premium on speed and finality.’70  There is a 
preference within this model for cases to be disposed of quickly with the facts being 
established in the police interview rather than in court proceedings.  Cases are 
processed through routine procedures with the factually innocent being ‘screened out’ 
at an early stage and the guilty efficiently processed through to sentence with only 
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minimal opportunities to challenge the process.  This value system is based upon the 
need to control a high number of criminal cases with low levels of resources. 
 
By contrast, the focus of the due process model is a complex set of values which 
include ensuring reliability in the fact-finding procedures, equality and protecting the 
presumption of innocence.  Packer describes this model as like an obstacle course with 
the prosecution having to negotiate various ‘quality control’ measures to obtain a 
conviction.71  These measures would include compliance with the rules of obtaining 
and admitting evidence, jurisdictional and time limitation issues. 
 
Packer’s dichotomy can loosely be seen as a contest between the State prosecutor and 
the individual defendant.  The lack of recognition of victims as having a significant 
role in the system has been described as a ‘significant drawback’ albeit an 
understandable one as there was little discussion of the role of the victim at the time 
of Packer’s work.72 
 
However, a number of scholars have developed theoretical models to either 
supplement Packer’s original paradigms or as alternatives to them which do take into 
account the potential for victim participation.  These include Beloof’s ‘victim 
participation model’, Roach’s ‘punitive’ and ‘non-punitive’ models, and Sebba’s 
‘adversary-retribution’ and ‘social defence-welfare’ models.73  These models provide 
useful tools for evaluating the extent to which the review mechanisms are victim-
oriented procedures and will be considered in depth in chapter nine.   
 
As the review mechanisms all facilitate some level of victim participation in criminal 
justice, there could be a tendency to assume that they could all be comfortably located 
within these victim-oriented models rather than the original crime control or due 
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process models.  However, the examination of the review mechanisms will show that 
although there are some superficial associations between the VRR and these victim-
oriented models, the VRR has been subsumed into the crime control efficiency agenda.  
As error correction and victim-rights are not the primary drivers of crime control this 
conclusion initially appears illogical.  However, it will be argued throughout this thesis 
that there are significant limitations to the VRR as a means of facilitating victim 
participation in the prosecution process and that, in reality, the VRR can be seen as 
protective of the public prosecutor by appeasing aggrieved victims and diverting them 
away from the courts. 
 
1.6.4 Summary of overall argument 
 
Although each of the three mechanisms are of some value to victims, they do not 
amount to a coherent and principled framework for challenging decisions not to 
prosecute.  The VRR is a simple and convenient mechanism which may be 
superficially appealing to victims.  However, its value is heavily undermined by its 
narrow definition of victimhood and its rigid qualifying criteria.  Furthermore, it offers 
only limited opportunities to victims to participate in the process.   
 
As the expectation is that victims utilise the VRR as the primary means of challenging 
decisions not to prosecute, the scheme has the effect of diverting victims from the 
more independent and transparent mechanism of judicial review.  As a result, the VRR 
is not as victim-oriented as it would initially appear and has become a ‘crime control’ 
device protecting the CPS from other forms of challenge.  However, both the VRR 
and judicial review can be properly accommodated within the current adversarial 
system as means of fault correction without significantly compromising either the 
rights of defendants or the public interest.  This thesis identifies a number of measures 
which should be incorporated into the VRR to further reduce the risk of defendants’ 
rights being undermined by the review process.   
 
Private prosecutions are a poor fit within the contemporary criminal justice system 
which is based on adversarial contest between the defendant and the State.  The right 




ensure greater oversight by the public prosecutor to prevent the conflict with 




Introduction to Part A – The Review Mechanisms 
 
 
This part of the thesis will focus on the individual review mechanisms both 
individually and collectively to show that although they each have some merit, they 
all also have their own limitations.  Additionally, they do not provide a coherent, 
seamless framework of rights for victims.  
 
The first chapter in this part will provide an overview and contextualise the VRR in 
terms of the participatory role of the victim.  It will set out the overall structure and 
key provisions.  The second section of that chapter will then situate the VRR in the 
pre-trial stage of the prosecution process.  The following three chapters will then 
evaluate each of the primary review mechanisms against four criteria:  accessibility, 
participation, accountability and outcomes.  This will bring to the fore the 
differences, benefits and shortcomings of each mechanism as well as enabling 
comparisons to be drawn.  An overview of each of the four criteria is provided below. 
 
The final chapter in this part, chapter six, will expand on some of the themes that have 
emerged from the evaluations of the individual mechanisms to draw conclusions about 




As each of the three mechanisms have, to some extent, procedural requirements to be 
followed and entry requirements to be met, the logical starting point is to examine 
‘entry’ into that mechanism.  Therefore, the first criterion evaluates the accessibility 
of each of the mechanisms.   
 
This thesis will interpret the concept of accessibility broadly; it is not limited to the 
initial engagement with the remedy, but how easy and attainable it is for victims 
throughout the whole process of using the particular mechanism.  The discussion of 




whether it is limited to the direct victim of an offence or whether it can be used by a 
wider group of potential complainants.  It considers the procedural complexity and 
requirements of using the remedy both in terms of legal requirements and practical 
limitations, such as whether legal representation is likely to be required.  This research 
discusses the link between different conceptualisations of victimhood and accessibility 
as a particular route of challenge can become more or less accessible depending upon 




Traditionally, victims of crime have very limited participation rights in criminal 
proceedings.  Victim participation and the extent to which it should be accommodated 
in an adversarial system between the State and the defendant is controversial.  Because 
of this, participation is regularly discussed in relation to victims in criminal justice in 
a number of contexts such as domestic abuse, sentencing and victim personal 
statements.1  As explored in chapter nine, scholars have produced theoretical models 
to measure victim participation in the criminal justice system.2 
 
Therefore, this criterion evaluates the extent of victim involvement in each review 
mechanism.   This includes a discussion of whether this participation is ongoing or 
transitory and whether it takes place outside the criminal justice process.   
 
Participation is measured with reference to the victim participation model developed 
by Edwards.3  As shown below, this model is structured around two broad types of 
 
 
1 Ian Edwards, ‘Victim Participation in Sentencing:  The Problems of Incoherence’ (2001) 40 Howard 
Journal of Criminal Justice 39; Louise Ellison, ‘Prosecuting Domestic Violence without Victim 
Participation’ (2002) 65 MLR 834; J Wemmers, ‘Victim Participation and Therapeutic Jurisprudence’ 
(2008) 3 Victims & Offenders 165; Christine M Englebrecht, ‘Where Do I Stand?: An Exploration of 
the Rules That Regulate Victim Participation in the Criminal Justice System’ (2012) 7 Victims & 
Offenders 161. 
2 Douglas Evan Beloof, ‘The Third Model of Criminal Process: The Victim Participation Model’ [1999] 
Utah L.Rev. 289; Leslie Sebba, Third Parties: Victims and the Criminal Justice System (Ohio State 
University Press 1996); Kent Roach, Due Process and Victims’ Rights: The New Law and Politics of 
Criminal Justice (University of Toronto Press 1999). 
3 Ian Edwards, ‘An Ambiguous Participant:  The Crime Victim and Criminal Justice Decision-Making’ 




participation, dispositive and non-dispositive.  Dispositive consists of participation 
where the victim has control of the decision-making.  By contrast, the non-dispositive 
type is further sub-divided into three categories:  consultation, information-provision, 
and expression.4 
 
Table 1:  Four different participatory roles for victims (from Ian Edwards, ‘An Ambiguous Participant: 
















to seek and apply 
victim preference 
 
non-optional supply of 














to seek and consider 
victim preference 
 








to seek and consider 
victim information 
 










optional supply of 
information and/or 










Manikis has proposed an additional category of participation to specifically recognise 
the involvement of victims in requesting reviews of prosecutorial decisions.5   
 
Table 2:   A new form of participatory role for victims (from Marie Manikis, ‘Expanding Participation:  
victims as agents of accountability in the criminal justice process’ [2017] PL 63) 
 Participation type Obligation on 
Criminal Justice 
decision-maker 
Obligation on Victim 
Non-dispositive Accountability To seek and consider 
victim request to 
review 
Non-optional supply 
of request to review if 






This criterion examines the extent to which the review mechanisms have the potential 
to hold the prosecutor to account for the exercise of his discretion.   The existence of 
the discretionary powers of officials in public bodies has long been recognised and 
indeed accepted as a positive feature of official authority.6  However, those who 
exercise discretionary power need to be accountable in some way to ensure that 
decisions are not made arbitrarily.  In view of the centrality of discretionary power to 
decisions not to prosecute, the evaluation of the review mechanisms as accountability 
mechanisms is justifiable. 
 
The work of Mark Bovens is used to describe and evaluate private prosecutions, 
judicial review and the VRR as accountability mechanisms in the context of decisions 
not to prosecute.  Bovens identifies the key characteristics of accountability as the 
relationship between the actor and a forum, an obligation on the actor to explain and 
justify his conduct, the power of the forum to pose questions, pass judgement (for 
 
 
5 Marie Manikis, ‘Expanding Participation:  Victims as Agents of Accountability in the Criminal Justice 
Process’ [2017] PL 63. 




example, approve or criticise the official’s actions or decision) and the potential for 
the actor to face consequences.7  If some, or all, of these characteristics are not present 
it may be that the particular process does not amount to an accountability mechanism; 
Bovens suggests that in those circumstances the procedure could be alternatively 
categorised as participation, responsiveness or transparency.8  After determining that 
the procedure is an accountability mechanism, the ‘type’ of accountability can be 
categorised based on either the nature of the forum, the actor, the conduct or the nature 
of the relationship between the actor and the forum (the obligation).9  The nature of 
the forum could be political, legal, administrative, professional or social, for example.  
Categorisation according to the nature of the actor would be, according to Bovens, be 
corporate, hierarchical, collective or individual.  The nature of the conduct would be 
either financial, procedural or a ‘product’.  The nature of the obligation could be 
classified as either vertical, diagonal or horizontal.   
 
Bovens then proposes that accountability mechanisms can be analysed and evaluated 
against one or more perspectives:  the democratic perspective, the constitutional 
perspective or the learning perspective.  The democratic perspective is concerned with 
the scrutiny of executive action by elected bodies.  Alternatively, the constitutional 
perspective involves analysing the ‘checks and balances’ of executive power.  The 
focus of the learning perspective is to use accountability as a means of developing the 
learning of the executive branch to improve future conduct.10  Potentially, the 
constitutional and learning perspectives are the most relevant to challenges to 
prosecutorial decisions.  Bovens provides some evaluative questions which could be 
used to evaluate specific mechanisms.  These include whether the forum has sufficient 
investigative powers and the incentives to engage the actors in the review process as 
well as whether they have appropriate sanctions to punish and deter executive 
misconduct.  A relevant question from the learning perspective is the robustness of the 
 
 
7 Mark Bovens, ‘Analysing and Assessing Accountability:  A Conceptual Framework’ (2007) 13 ELJ 
447, 452. 
8 ibid 453. 
9 ibid 461. 




forum including whether it is ‘safe’ enough minimise the growth of defensive 
practices.11   
 
In the assessment of accountability consideration is also given to whether the forum 
is internal or external.  Mulgan has distinguished between internal and external forms 
of accountability and suggested that the ‘core accountability’ involves external 
scrutiny that includes a dialogue between the parties with forum asserting authority 
over the body being held to account as well as the power to impose sanctions.12 
 
Wright and Miller have argued that there is an accountability deficit in prosecutorial 
discretion that has not been adequately addressed with most jurisdictions relying on 
either electoral accountability or systems of internal review.13  Toole identifies 
accountability measures in Australia in relation to prosecutorial decision-making, 
many of which would be relevant to England and Wales:  the use of guidelines and 
policies, hierarchical prosecution structures, judicial mechanisms and the political 
accountability of the Attorney General to parliament.14   
 
Links have also been made between participation and accountability by the 
development of a model of citizen participation in public accountability based on 
Bovens’ model of accountability.15  Although this model is not used in this research 
to evaluate the review mechanisms as, unlike Edwards’ model, it is not specific to 
criminal justice, it does highlight the relationship between participation and 
accountability.  As discussed above, Manikis’ work also specifically links 
participation through challenging decisions not to prosecute with accountability.16  
 
 
11 Mark Bovens, Thomas Schillemans and Paul Hart, ‘Does Public Accountability Work?  An 
Assessment Tool’ (2008) 86 Public Administration 225, 231–232. 
12 Richard Mulgan, ‘“Accountability”:  An Ever-Expanding Concept?’ (2000) 78 Public Administration 
555, 555–556. 
13 Ronald F Wright and Marc L Miller, ‘The Worldwide Accountability Deficit for Prosecutors 
Prosecutorial Power: A Transnational Symposium’ (2010) 67 Washington and Lee Law Review 1587. 
14 Kellie Toole, ‘The Decision to Prosecute - The Accountability of Australian Prosecutors’ in Victoria 
Colvin and Philip C Stenning (eds), The Evolving Role of the Public Prosecutor: Challenges and 
Innovations (Routledge 2019) 234. 
15 Bodil Damgaard and Jenny Lewis, ‘Accountability and Citizen Participation’ in Mark Bovens, Robert 
E Goodin and Thomas Schillemans (eds), ‘Accountability and Citizen Participation’, The Oxford 
Handbook of Public Accountability (Oxford University Press 2014). 




Therefore, the use of both participation and accountability are valuable criteria for 




The final criterion is ‘outcomes’ which is used to review the potential for the review 
mechanisms to result in a meaningful outcome for victims.  There would be little value 
in victims embarking on a process that did not have any potential to provide a remedy.  
I consider what outcomes or remedies each route can offer the aggrieved victim.  This 
includes whether a successful outcome would have the potential to result in a 
prosecution.  Alternatively, whether it is more likely to result in the original decision 
being returned to the public prosecutor for further review.  This criterion examines 
critically whether the review mechanisms provide routes to substantive justice for 














This chapter will introduce the Victims’ Right to Review (VRR) scheme, the CPS 
internal mechanism by which aggrieved victims can apply for review of decisions not 
to prosecute in cases that meet certain criteria.1  This will provide the foundation for 
the next chapter which analyses the VRR in more detail against four criteria.  The 
VRR is a recent addition to the options available to victims of crime who wish to 
challenge a decision either not to prosecute or to terminate proceedings.  It was 
launched following the Court of Appeal decision in Killick, which the court held that 
victims of crime have a right of review to challenge prosecutorial decisions to 
terminate proceedings.2   
 
The first section of this chapter will set out the background to the VRR that developed 
as a result of Killick.   The VRR is intended to give effect to the principles of review 
set out by the Court of Appeal following the court’s indication to the DPP that he 
should introduce a review procedure.  The VRR also purports to implement Article 11 
of the EU Victims’ directive.3   The VRR guidance states that:  ‘The scheme gives 
effect to the principles laid down in Killick and in Article 11 of the European 
Directive.’4  The second section of the chapter will provide an overview of the VRR 
focussing particularly on the circumstances that need to be present to permit a victim 
to engage the scheme in relation to a decision of the public prosecutor.  The third 
section of this chapter will situate the VRR in the context of the pre-trial stage of the 
 
 
1 Crown Prosecution Service, ‘Victims’ Right to Review Guidance’ (CPS 2016) 
2 R v Killick [2011] EWCA Crim 1608, [2012] 1 Cr App R 10.   
3 Council Directive 2012/29/EU of 25 October 2012 establishing minimum standards on the rights, 
support and protection of victims of crime [2012] OJ L315/57 (Victims’ Directive) Art 11. 




prosecution process to show that victims are gradually accruing procedural and service 
rights although these may be motivated by factors other than simply a desire to 
increase victim participation in the criminal justice system.    
 
 
2.2 R v Killick and the background to the VRR 
 
In February 2006, the three complainants who all suffered from cerebral palsy made 
complaints to the police of sexual assault and rape by Christopher Killick.  The 
defendant was arrested and interviewed by police in April 2006.  The matter was then 
referred to the CPS in May 2006.  The initial advice given by the CPS in October 2006 
was that no further action should be taken against Mr Killick as there was insufficient 
evidence for a realistic prospect of conviction.  The CPS conducted a second review 
of the case after the police requested that the decision be reviewed.  The reviewer 
applied the test for judicial review, namely whether the decision was a reasonable 
decision for the prosecutor to make.   
 
The complainants’ solicitors wrote to the CPS to request a further review of the case 
through the CPS complaints procedure.  This resulted in the case being further 
reviewed by the CPS in July 2009 who confirmed the decision to take no further 
action.  During this period, the CPS also instructed independent counsel to provide an 
opinion on the case.  He agreed that a prosecution should not be commenced.  The 
complainants sent a judicial review pre-action protocol letter in September 2009 which 
resulted in the case being referred to the DPP’s Principal Legal Advisor for a third tier 
review under the CPS Complaints and Feedback policy.  This review concluded that 
the previous decisions were wrong.  The CPS therefore advised the police to issue a 
summons for Mr Killick for offences under the Sexual Offences Act 1956.  The 
defence application for the case to be stayed for abuse of process was unsuccessful.5  
Mr Killick was convicted after a jury trial of two of the three counts on the indictment 
and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment. 
 
 





Killick appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeal and the case was referred to the 
full court on three points of appeal: 
 
1. Whether the judge's decision to allow the matter to proceed and to dismiss the 
application for a stay for abuse of process was wrong; 
2. Whether fresh evidence should be admitted under section 23 of the Criminal 
Appeal Act 1968 
3. Whether the conviction was unsafe in all the circumstances. 
 
The first of these points is most relevant to the development of the VRR.  The Court 
of Appeal considered whether the representations that had been made to the appellant 
that no further action was to be taken amounted to an abuse of process.  They referred 
to the case of R v Abu Hamza that held that there would only be an abuse of process 
when an unequivocal representation had been made to the defendant that he would not 
be prosecuted and the defendant had relied on that representation to his detriment.6  In 
Killick, the first representation was an email from the investigating officer to the 
defence solicitors in June 2007.  However, the Court of Appeal concluded that the 
solicitors would have been: ‘well aware of the rights of the complainants to seek a 
review.’7  The court indicated that the solicitors should have advised the appellant of 
this.  Other representations made during the case were also discounted on the basis 
that the appellant’s solicitors were aware that a further review had been commenced 
and they had not been notified to the contrary. 
 
This case highlighted a deficiency in the way in which the CPS dealt with requests 
from complainants for decisions to be reviewed.  Requests for review of decisions 
were routinely dealt with under the Feedback and Complaints Policy.  The court 
distinguished between a ‘complaint about service’ and a request to have a 
discretionary decision reviewed.8  The current version of the policy clearly sets out 
 
 
6 R v Abu Hamza [2007] QB 659 
7 Killick (n 2) [44] 




that victims seeking reviews of decisions should refer to the VRR, but at the time of 
Killick this distinction did not exist.9 
 
The court stated that complainants have an inherent right to request a review:  ‘As a 
decision not to prosecute is in reality a final decision for a victim, there must be a right 
to seek a review of such a decision…’10  The court also referred to the right then 
expressed in Article 10 of the Draft EU Directive on establishing minimum standards 
on rights, support and protection of victims of crime dated 18 May 201111 (this right 
is now contained in Article 11 of Directive 2012/29/EU).12  The court urged the DPP 
to review the procedure by which victims seek a review of these types of decision 
suggesting that it should be separate to the complaints system for issues relating to the 
service provided by the CPS:  ‘it must be for the Director to consider whether the way 
in which the right of a victim to seek a review cannot be made the subject of a clearer 
procedure and guidance with time limits.’13   Thomas LJ further stated that ‘it is an 
integral part of the exercise of a prosecutorial discretion’.14  In response, the DPP 
issued interim guidance in June 2013 with a consultation period that ran until 
September 2013.15   Final guidance was then issued and came into force in July 2014.16   
The VRR guidance was revised in July 2016.17 
 
The Right to Review is one of the rights contained in the Code of Practice for Victims 
of Crime (the Victim Code) which is now placed on a statutory footing under sections 
32 and 33 of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004.18  Decisions not to 
prosecute made by the police are subject to a right of a review by the individual police 
 
 
9 Crown Prosecution Service, ‘Feedback and Complaints Policy’ (CPS February 2019) [1.4] 
10 Killick (n 2) [48] 
11 ibid [49] 
12 Victims’ Directive, Art 11 
13 Killick (n 2) [57] 
14 ibid [57] 
15 Crown Prosecution Service, ‘Victims’ Right to Review Interim Guidance’ (CPS 2013) 
16 Crown Prosecution Service, ‘Victims’ Right to Review Guidance’ (CPS 2014) 
17 CPS, VRR (n 1) 




force in accordance with the procedure adopted by the National Police Chiefs 
Council.19 
 
As mentioned briefly above, the VRR also purports to implement Article 11 of the 
Victims’ Directive.  Article 11(1) states:  ‘Member States shall ensure that victims, in 
accordance with their role in the relevant criminal justice system, have the right to a 
review of a decision not to prosecute. The procedural rules for such a review shall be 
determined by national law.’  This makes clear that it is for Member States to 
implement their own review mechanism in accordance with national laws.  Each of 
the three jurisdictions in the UK has done so.  This general right is supplemented by 
Article 11(3) which requires that victims are ‘notified without unnecessary delay of 
their right to review, and that they receive sufficient information to decide whether to 
request a review.’  Article 11(4) permits the review to be conducted by the same 
prosecuting authority as conducted the original review if it is the highest prosecuting 
authority within the Member State’s legal system.   
 
There is very little detail in the Directive of the scope of the right to review.  This has 
been left to the individual Member States to determine.20 Article 11(5) specifically 
excludes decisions to use an out-of-court disposal from the right to review.  This 
exclusion is also contained in Recital 45.  Recitals 43 and 44 are also relevant to the 
right to review.  Recital 43 limits the right of review to the decisions of ‘prosecutors 
and investigative judges or law enforcement authorities such as police officers, but not 
to decisions taken by the courts.’  Recital 44 simply states, ‘A decision ending criminal 
proceedings should include situations where a prosecutor decides to withdraw charges 
or discontinue proceedings.’21  Having set out the background, the next section of this 
chapter will provide an overview of the key provisions of the VRR. 
 
 
19 Association of Chief Police Officers, ‘National Policing Guidelines on Police Victim Right to 
Review’ (2015) 
20 It is difficult to predict what effect, if any, the UK’s withdrawal from the EU will ultimately have on 
these provisions.  However, as the VRR is part of domestic law and it would perhaps be difficult to 
justify repealing it.   
21 For a discussion on the implementation of Article 11 in Germany, Italy, France and Croatia, see: Ante 
Novokmet, ‘The Right of a Victim to a Review of a Decision Not to Prosecute as Set out in Article 11 
of Directive 2012/29/EU and an Assessment of Its Transposition in Germany, Italy, France and Croatia’ 





2.3 The Victims’ Right to Review - An Overview 
 
This section of the chapter will develop the preceding background to the VRR by 
providing an overview of the scheme in relation to the following areas: eligibility to 
use the scheme; the scope of the scheme; and the structure of the scheme including the 
test applied during the review process.  An important aspect of the scheme is who is 
eligible to use it and will be discussed first.   
 
2.3.1 Eligibility to use the VRR 
 
The VRR defines a victim as: ‘a person who has made an allegation that they have 
suffered harm, including physical, mental or emotional harm or economic loss which 
was directly caused by criminal conduct.’22  This is based on the general definition 
adopted by the criminal justice system in England and Wales from the Victim Code, 
but adapted so that an allegation of harm is sufficient.  The current version of the 
Victim Code states that a ‘victim’ is ‘a person who has suffered harm, including 
physical, mental or emotional harm or economic loss which was directly caused by 
criminal conduct.’  This definition is then extended to ‘close relatives’ of ‘a person 
whose death was directly caused by criminal conduct.’23  Domestic legislation in 
England and Wales does not provide a definition of victimhood.  Although section 32 
of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 200424 puts the Victim Code on a 
statutory footing it does not provide a statutory definition of victimhood.25   
 
This definition also broadly mirrors that in the Directive: ‘a natural person who has 
suffered harm, including physical, mental or emotional harm or economic loss which 
was directly caused by a criminal offence.’26  It also includes family members of a 
 
 
22 CPS, VRR (n 1) [14] 
23 Ministry of Justice, Victim Code (n 18) [1] 
24 Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004, s.32(2)(a) 
25 Section 52(2) gives a more basic version of the definition of ‘Victim’ by simply stating that it is a 
‘victim of an offence’ or ‘of anti-social behaviour’, but this only applies to sections 48-51 which are 
concerned with the appointment of a Commissioner for Victims and Witnesses. 




person who has died as a result of a criminal offence.27  The VRR guidance expands 
the definition to include families of deceased victims and those that have a disability 
or cannot communicate, and parents of child victims.28  The Code also provides for 
businesses the inclusion of which extends the scheme considerably as this could 
include corporate victims as well as individuals who have a business that has been 
affected.29  However, as will be discussed in the next chapter in relation to 
accessibility, this is only one construction of victimhood that limits the scheme to 
those ‘victims’ who come within this relatively narrow definition. 
 
2.3.2 Scope of the VRR 
 
The VRR enables individuals who come within the definition of a victim to apply to 
the CPS for review of ‘qualifying decisions’.  The VRR applies to decisions that 
resulted in the charges relating to the victim being brought to an end either at the pre-
charge stage or post charge.   The scheme can potentially apply whether the 
termination is by way of discontinuance notice, withdrawal of charges, offering no 
evidence, leaving charges to lie on file or, at the pre-charge stage, a formal advice of 
no further action.30  However, the remit of the scheme is narrower than it would first 
appear as a number of exclusions apply reducing the range of cases that could amount 
to qualifying decisions.  Paragraph 11 specifically excludes certain types of decision 
from the scheme.31   
 
Firstly, the VRR does not apply to decisions made prior to the 5 June 2013.  Secondly, 
the CPS scheme does not apply to decisions made by the police (even if the CPS has 
been consulted, but has not formally made the charging decision).  The scheme is 
therefore limited to reviews of CPS decisions and therefore decisions made by the 
police cannot be appealed to the CPS using the CPS VRR scheme.  Thirdly, cases 
where charges are brought in respect of some of the allegations or against some of the 
 
 
27 Ministry of Justice, Victim Code (n 18) [23]-[25] 
28 ibid [26]-[27] 
29 ibid [28] 
30 CPS, VRR (n 1) [9] 




suspects do not qualify.  For example, if the victim had made allegations of assault 
and rape, but only the assault allegation had been prosecuted the victim could not use 
the VRR to challenge the decision not to prosecute the rape.  Similarly, where the 
victim reported being assaulted by a group, they could not use the VRR to challenge 
the decision to prosecute only some of the suspects.  This exclusion was challenged 
by way of judicial review in the case of Chaudhry.32  This and other exclusions are 
more controversial and will be considered in the next chapter under the criterion of 
accessibility. 
 
Fourthly, the VRR also does not cover situations where charges have been altered or 
reduced, but proceedings involving the victim still continue.  This would exclude 
situations where either the prosecution decides to proceed with lesser charges that 
those originally taken to court or where the defence have offered lesser charges which 
have been accepted by the prosecution.  In the same way, the scheme will not apply in 
cases where some charges are left to lie on file and are not proceeded with.  If the case 
is dealt with by way of an out-of-court disposal, such as a caution or conditional 
caution, the case is specifically excluded from the scheme.  Understandably, perhaps, 
the final category covers the situation where the victim requests that the proceedings 
are stopped or withdraws their support for them; the victim cannot withdraw their 
support and then challenge the decision not to prosecute.  Therefore, the scheme is 
only available if the victim comes within the definition and is seeking the review of a 
qualifying decision, namely one that is not specifically excluded.  
 
2.3.3 Structure of the VRR 
 
The right to use the scheme is triggered by notification from the CPS that a decision 
not to bring proceedings or to bring the proceedings to an end has been made.  This 
notification should inform the victim of their eligibility to use the VRR.33  The 
guidance states that the request for review should ‘ordinarily’ be made within five 
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working days of the notification although the guidance goes on to state that the request 
can be made up to three months after the notification.34  
 
The guidance establishes a two-stage system of review: ‘Local Resolution’ and 
‘Independent Review’.  The local review is conducted by the team that made the 
decision and must be completed before the request can progress to an independent 
review.35  The second stage is conducted by the ‘Appeals and Review Unit’ (or the 
Chief Crown Prosecutor for the team that made the decision where the case relates to 
a decision to offer no evidence).  The ‘Local Resolution’ stage acts as a filter ‘aimed 
at helping victims to understand the decision taken by providing additional 
information and provides the CPS with the opportunity to look again at the decision 
and to establish whether it was correct.’36  
 
In the event that the local stage does not resolve the matter by either the prosecutor 
deciding to prosecute or the victim accepting the decision, the case proceeds to the 
‘Independent Review’ stage either as a result of a request from the victim or referral 
by the CPS where the victim has previously had an explanation and it is felt that the 
victim will not benefit from further correspondence.37  The CPS Appeals and Review 
Unit normally conducts the second stage.  The exception is where no evidence has 
been offered to the charge as this amounts to an acquittal and therefore a further 
prosecution could not take place; the Chief Crown Prosecutor for the CPS unit that 
made the decision reviews these cases.38   
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The reviewer must conduct a re-review of the case afresh, and in order to 
overturn a decision not to prosecute they must be satisfied: 
 
- That the earlier decision was wrong in applying the evidential or public 
interest stages of the Full Code Test…; and  
- That for the maintenance of public confidence, the decision must be 
reversed.39 
 
The test essentially requires the reviewer to re-review the case to determine whether 
the initial application of the evidential and public interest stages of the Full Code Test 
were correct followed by the additional ‘maintenance of public confidence’ 
requirement.  Consequently, a prosecution does not automatically follow a review 
decision that the original decision was wrong.   
 
The next section will review the role of the victim in the criminal justice system in 
order to place the VRR in its wider context. 
 
 
2.4 The Role of the Victim in the pre-trial stage  
 
This section of the chapter will set the VRR in the wider context of the victim’s 
participatory role in pre-trial stage of the prosecution process.  The police and 
prosecutors largely control this stage of the process and the decision whether to 
prosecute, with victims rarely participating beyond reporting potential offences and 
providing witness statements.  However, this analysis will identify the VRR as another 
development in the gradual expansion of victims’ procedural and service rights in the 








2.4.1 The pre-trial stage 
 
The decision whether to prosecute will be made by either the police or the CPS on the 
basis of the two-stage test in the Code for Crown Prosecutors.40  If the evidential stage 
is met, the prosecutor must consider the public interest stage.  This includes ‘the 
circumstances of and the harm caused to the victim’ and the prosecutor is required to 
take into account ‘the views expressed by the victim about the impact that the offence 
has had.’41  Therefore, at most there is consultative participation at this stage if the 
decision-maker is considering taking no further action on the basis of public interest 
considerations.  There is, however, no requirement to consult the victim on the 
evidential stage.  If the police decide to divert the matter from court, the victim may 
have an opportunity to participate as part of a community resolution.42  Victims may 
also be involved through conditional cautions although victims may not be supportive 
of these causes of action and may seek to challenge them.43  
 
Beloof argues that the victim has a ‘de facto veto’ over whether a prosecution is 
brought in that they can ‘maintain complete control over the process’ by not reporting 
a potential offence to the authorities.44  Although the victim’s failure to report an 
offence would effectively prevent a criminal investigation and prosecution in some 
situations, this is not always the case.45  Third parties may report offences which may 
be investigated and prosecuted against the wishes of the victim.  For example, high 
rates of victim withdrawal in domestic abuse cases has led to reliance on ‘victimless’ 
prosecutions.46  CPS policy indicates that the authorities will seek to build a case 
 
 
40 Crown Prosecution Service, ‘Code for Crown Prosecutors’ (CPS October 2018) [4.1]-[4.14] 
41 ibid [4.14] 
42 For an example of a scheme that incorporated victim involvement see Mark Manning, ‘Evaluation of 
Enhanced Triage – Can a Welfare Approach to Young Offenders Make a Difference?’ (Fundatia 
Romania de Maine 2017) <http://icesba.eu/ocs/index.php/ICESBA2017/icesba2017/paper/view/154> 
accessed 11 December 2017. 
43 Crown Prosecution Service, ‘Adult Conditional Cautions (The Director’s Guidance)’ (CPS April 
2013) 
44 Douglas Evan Beloof, ‘The Third Model of Criminal Process: The Victim Participation Model’ 
[1999] Utah Law Review 289, 306. 
45 For a discussion of under-reporting see: Roger Tarling and Katie Morris, ‘Reporting Crime to the 
Police’ (2010) 50 Brit J Criminol 474. 




‘without the complainant’s active participation’ by gathering other evidence that could 
lead to a prosecution.47   
 
The acceptance of pleas by the prosecution is another area of potential conflict 
between the victim and the public prosecutor.48  The defendant may plead guilty to a 
different offence to that originally charged.  Ultimately, the decision whether to accept 
the offer of a guilty plea is one for the public prosecutor as they are permitted to accept 
alternative pleas provided that they would allow a court to ‘pass a sentence that 
matches the seriousness of the offending’.49  However, prosecutors are required 
‘where possible’ to take into account the views of the victim, or in appropriate cases 
the views of the victim’s family, when deciding whether it is in the public interest to 
accept  a guilty plea.50  Although this acknowledges the interest of the victim in the 
decision, it does not give the victim any right to be involved in the decision.  This 
situation is also expressly excluded from the VRR. 
 
A similar situation may arise if the prosecution were to accept a guilty plea on a limited 
basis when the defendant was prepared to accept some of the allegations against him, 
but not the full extent of the victim’s allegations.  The court should hold a Newton 
hearing to determine the factual basis for sentencing if the two accounts are so 
different to make a material difference to sentence.51  This emphasises that the 
objective of a Newton hearing is to facilitate an appropriate sentencing, not to 
vindicate the victim.  A Newton hearing would at least allow the victim to put forward 
their account to enable the court to decide which version to accept.  If not, the 
defendant would be sentenced on their version of events.  If either the prosecutor 
accepted a version of events that the victim did not perceive as accurate or if the court 
declined to hold a Newton Hearing, this could result in the victim feeling frustrated 
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that the defendant was being sentenced on a different factual basis to what the victim 
had originally alleged.  Again, the victim would not be able to use the VRR to 
challenge either the acceptance of the basis of plea by the prosecution or the outcome 
of the Newton hearing. 
 
Even if the defendant pleads guilty to the allegations in their entirety, the victim may 
still not agree with the prosecutor’s presentation of the case.  Unless the court has 
heard evidence, it is the responsibility of the prosecutor to summarise the prosecution 
case for the court.52  This summary may not include what the victim deems to be the 
most pertinent parts of the case and, of course, is dependent on the quality of the 
original police statements on which the prosecutor will rely.  
 
As well as these limited rights of consultation, ‘service’ style rights have been 
conferred on victims at the pre-trial stage to improve their experience of the criminal 
justice system through the Victim Code.  The police are required to provide a written 
acknowledgement that a crime has been reported, provide a clear explanation and 
information about the procedure.  Regular updates are required including explanations 
of decisions not to prosecute.  An assessment of the victim’s needs should also be 
conducted.53  The victim should also be offered the opportunity to make a Victim 
Personal Statement (VPS). 
 
There is, therefore, evidence of victim participation during this stage, primarily by 
making an allegation and being consulted by the public prosecutor in relation to the 
assessment of the public interest or acceptance of pleas.  The VRR provides an 
additional way for victims to be involved in this critical decision-making stage.  The 
level of victim involvement compares quite favourably to the extent of procedural 
rights in the trial stage which is the most staunchly adversarial part of the prosecution 
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2.4.2 Trial and post-conviction 
 
The trial is a contest between the prosecution and the defence to determine the guilt 
of the offender.  As a result, the victim is marginalized from the process and reduced 
to the status of a witness.  As Doak has identified, there are structural barriers to victim 
participation beyond that of an individual witness in the trial process and ‘radical 
reform’ would be required to accommodate the victim within the current model.54  
These barriers are not as prominent in the pre-trial stage.  Victim-oriented reforms to 
the trial stage are largely confined to ‘service’ rights which take a protective stance 
towards victims of crime although many of these provisions are equally available to 
other witnesses.55  The restrictions on cross-examination by defendants in person are 
particularly relevant to victims as are the limitations on cross-examination of rape 
complainants in relation to their previous sexual history.56  These changes to the trial 
process have been supported by a number of entitlements under the Victim Code such 
as ‘needs assessments’ and services at court such as separate entrances and waiting 
areas.57 
 
There is evidence of reforms within the trial stage which at face value appear to be 
victim-oriented, but on closer analysis are perhaps pursuing a different agenda.  The 
Criminal Justice Act 2003 brought about large-scale change to the criminal justice 
system in a number of key areas.  According to the White Paper that preceded these 
reforms, they were purportedly to ‘re-balance’ the system in favour of victims.58  On 
a superficial level, changes to the rules of evidence to allow hearsay evidence and to 
admit the bad character of defendants do appear to be in support of victims. However, 
when the entirety of the Act is considered the overall package of reform is more 
indicative of an attempt to dilute the rights of the defendant in pursuance of crime 
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control rather than to improve the victim experience.  A significant part of the Act was 
concerned with a new sentencing regime together with new defence disclosure duties, 
trials without juries and a change to the double jeopardy rule.  Jackson has argued that 
these measures reduced the rights of defendants without significantly increasing the 
rights of victims.59  This perhaps suggests that scrutiny of reforms to other areas of the 
process, such as the VRR in the pre-trial stage, is justified as the rationale for 
implementing them could be more complex than it would first appear. 
 
There are also examples of apparently victim-focused reforms in the post-conviction 
phase for which there may be alternative rationales for.  Since 2001, the victim of a 
crime has had the opportunity to participate in the sentencing process by submission 
of a VPS.   The right to make a VPS is currently contained within the Victim Code 
and allows the victim to explain the impact of the offence on them.60  The Victim Code 
emphasizes that it is the victim’s choice whether they make a VPS and whether they 
wish to read it to the court.61  Court of Appeal guidance states that the VPS ‘gives 
victims a formal opportunity to say how a crime has affected them’ and that ‘The court 
will take the statement into account when determining sentence.’62  This is clearly 
relevant to the court’s assessment of harm and could potentially be referred to by the 
sentencing judge in their sentencing remarks.63   The Practice Direction specifically 
states that:  ‘The VPS and any evidence in support should be considered and taken 
into account by the court, prior to passing sentence.’64  However, ‘the court must pass 
what it judges to be the appropriate sentence having regard to the circumstances of the 
offence and of the offender, taking into account, so far as the court considers it 
appropriate, the impact on the victim.’65  It is also clear, however, that the victim does 
not have carte blanche to say whatever they wish in their VPS and there are a number 
of procedural safeguards to ensure that the VPS does not have a detrimental impact on 
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either the rights of the defendant or the decision of the court.   In Perkins the court 
emphasized that the statement should not include opinion on what sentence should be 
passed.66  It has been argued that the VPS is not justified on any aspect of sentencing 
beyond addressing compensation and reparation.67  Ashworth has argued that criminal 
offending should be prosecuted and sentenced on the basis of the public interest and 
that the victim’s interest is only part of the public interest.68  He has also raised 
concerns that victims are used ‘in the service of severity’ to increase sentences and ‘in 
the service of offenders’ to fulfil restorative justice aims.69  Perhaps similar arguments 
could be made in respect of the VRR; that its objective could be to pacify disgruntled 





This chapter has introduced the background and key provisions of the VRR and set it 
in the wider context of the role of the victim.  From this preliminary overview, a 
number of potential issues are apparent which are relevant to the usefulness of the 
VRR for victims of crime, such as eligibility to use the scheme, the related definition 
of victimhood, the exclusion of particular cases and the nature of the test applied when 
reviews are conducted.   
 
This chapter has also identified that the VRR is most relevant to the pre-trial stage of 
the prosecution process and is consistent with victims gradually accruing procedural 
rights in stage of the process.  In particular, it has the potential to increase the victim’s 
participation in the pre-trial stage of the prosecution process as one of a number of 
apparently victim-oriented reforms that is changing the role of the victim in criminal 
justice.  This theme of participation will be developed further in the next chapter when 
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the VRR will be evaluated against the four criteria one of which is participation 
showing that the extent of this participation is perhaps less extensive than it could be. 
 





Chapter 3 - An evaluation of the Victims’ Right to Review 
scheme as a method of challenging decisions not to prosecute. 
 
 
This chapter evaluates the VRR against the four criteria established in the introduction 
to this part of the thesis of accessibility, participation, accountability and outcomes.  
This will enable conclusions to be drawn as to the usefulness of the VRR for victims 
of crime.  Essentially, the VRR is superficially beneficial in that it is flexible, simple 
to use and has the potential to reverse a decision not to prosecute.  However, it only 
applies in very limited circumstances as the eligibility and qualifying criteria are 
restrictive filtering out a proportion of cases.  The provisions of the VRR also limit 
the extent of victim participation through the scheme to essentially requesting a review 
rather than allowing a meaningful dialogue or encouraging representations.  In the 
event that a decision under the scheme is favourable to the victim, a prosecution will 
not automatically follow.  The following two chapters will then evaluate the 
alternative mechanisms of judicial review and private prosecutions against the same 
criteria to allow an analysis of the extent to which they provide a coherent framework 
of rights.  
 
This chapter will be structured around the four criteria with accessibility being 





Firstly, the VRR scheme will be examined against the criterion of accessibility to 
answer the following question:  to what extent is the VRR appropriately 
accessible?  In order to evaluate usefulness of the VRR we need to consider whether 
it is accessible to those who may wish to use it.  The concept of accessibility will 
consider external factors that may prevent victims from invoking the review 




restriction on who can access the scheme is the particular harm-based construction of 
victimhood that excludes potential victims who fall outside its definition.  This issue 
will be discussed first followed by the specific exclusions to the scheme. 
 
3.1.1 The harm-based construction of victimhood 
 
As was set out in chapter one, victimhood is a social construct which may be shaped 
by the particular context, policy objectives and interpretation by citizens and criminal 
justice officials. The Victim Code definition of a victim is predicated on the 
requirement of direct harm which potentially excludes some individuals:  ‘a person 
who has suffered harm, including physical, mental or emotional harm or economic 
loss which was directly caused by criminal conduct.’1   Earlier editions of the VRR 
guidance used this Victim Code definition verbatim.2  However, the current VRR 
definition is:  ‘a person who has made an allegation that they have suffered harm, 
including physical, mental or emotional harm or economic loss which was directly 
caused by criminal conduct.’3  This is a valuable amendment for victims as there is no 
longer a requirement of actual or proven harm; the victim is eligible to use the VRR 
if they have made an allegation of harm.  However, the definition is still predicated 
on the requirement of harm in that the victim has to assert that they have been harmed 
directly by the offence.  The use of ‘including’ also suggests that it is possible that 
harm could be caused in other ways although it is unclear what this could be.  Some 
of these categories are also quite vague; ‘emotional harm’, for example, is quite a 
difficult condition to define.  
 
Having such a rigid requirement of harm may mean that some individuals will be 
denied victim status because they do not fulfil the harm requirement either because 
they have not claimed that they have suffered loss as a result of the criminal act or 
because their suffering has been construed as not falling within the definition of harm 
under this particular construction of victimhood.  Although, in reality, this is unlikely 
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to affect a huge number of potential victims, there are situations where this could be 
relevant.  For example, a complainant in an attempted theft allegation would not 
ordinarily have sustained any physical, mental or emotional harm by the incident and, 
by virtue of the fact that it was an attempt, would not have suffered any financial loss.  
Similarly, a complainant who was threatened with physical violence would only 
qualify for victim status under the definition if they claimed that they had suffered 
either mental or emotional harm which depending on the facts of the case and the 
fortitude of the victim they may not have done.  The individuals in these examples 
would conventionally be treated as victims of crime, but could be excluded for not 
conforming to the particular construction of harm used by the Victim Code and the 
VRR.  The VRR, perhaps inadvertently, differentiates between substantive offences 
and various forms of inchoate liability including attempts, conspiracies and offences 
of threatening to commit a particular act, such as threats to kill4 and threats to destroy 
or damage property.5   
 
The limitation of this harm-based approach is demonstrated by offences under the 
Public Order Act 1986 which would not normally result in the complainant qualifying 
as a victim of the offence unless they claimed that they had suffered direct harm as a 
result.  A good example of this would be the application for judicial review brought 
by Gideon Falter of the CPS decision not to prosecute Jeremy Bedford-Turner for 
offences of racial or religious incitement under the Public Order Act 1986 in relation 
to a speech which contained potentially anti-Semitic remarks.6  The claimant initially 
attempted to challenge the decision by using the VRR and was precluded from doing 
so on the basis that he did not suffer direct harm despite the fact that he was Jewish 
and was present at the time of the speech.  Permission was granted by Haddon-Cave J 
on the basis that there was an arguable case that the CPS had interpreted the definition 
of ‘victim’ too narrowly and that it was ‘wrong to conclude’ that the claimant ‘did not 
suffer “direct harm”.’7  This case did not reach a full hearing as an order was agreed 
between the parties that the original decision would be quashed and the case further 
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reviewed by the CPS.8  Individuals who are present at the scene of a crime, but who 
did not suffer direct harm, are just one of the categories of potential ‘victims’ who are 
excluded from the scheme.  Such a narrow construction of harm could deprive the 
individual of rights under the VRR.  Essentially, individuals would be denied victim 
status by the restrictive criteria of the VRR.  However, if a rights-based definition, 
such as that proposed by Stewart, were to be adopted such individuals would acquire 
victim status.9  This concept should be incorporated into the VRR definition to ensure 
potential victims are not refused victim status purely because they have not sustained 
harm despite their rights having been infringed. 
 
The above discussion of harm has highlighted how there are issues of interpretation 
and subjectivity into who is attributed victim status; this is not limited to the 
requirement of harm. Potential users of the VRR may not self-identify as victims or 
may not be recognised as victims by the CPS and refused use of the scheme as a result.    
Nils Christie’s notion of the ‘ideal victim’ is relevant here.10  He identifies a number 
of attributes that are representative of the ‘ideal’ victim and the ‘ideal’ offender.  The 
notion of the victim being vulnerable and undertaking a ‘respectable’ project for which 
he or she could not be blamed are all features which make the victim ‘ideal’.  In the 
context of the VRR, ‘ideal victims’ are those less likely to be denied access to the 
VRR.  For victims attempting to use the VRR this may mean that prosecutors are less 
likely to accept their request for review if their allegation of harm falls outside the 
categories of harm set out in the VRR or if the alleged harm is not directly caused by 
the criminal conduct.  This could result in the individual being treated as an indirect 
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3.1.2 Indirect victims 
 
Indirect victims of criminal offences are not eligible to use the VRR unless they are 
the family of a deceased victim, representing victims with a disability or a victim who 
is injured to the extent that they cannot communicate.11  The inclusion of relatives of 
deceased victims is limited to circumstances where the death was ‘directly caused by 
criminal conduct.’12  Therefore, if there is no causal link between the alleged criminal 
conduct and the death, the family would not be able to engage the VRR.  This could 
exclude cases, for example, where the defendant was prosecuted for minor motoring 
offences, but not for causing the death of the victim although there is an argument that 
this should come within the ‘allegation’ of harm.  Similarly, the family of a direct 
victim may suffer harm themselves as a result of what happened, but would not be 
able to engage the scheme.   
 
Likewise, the definition does not recognise the concept of the community victim.  For 
example, members of a community which has been affected by anti-social behaviour 
or environmental crime would not be able to challenge a decision not to prosecute the 
offenders unless they could demonstrate that they had suffered harm caused directly 
by the criminal conduct.   
 
The requirement of direct harm is also problematic as a result of the causal element 
embedded within the definition; in order to be classified as a victim under the VRR, 
the harm has to have been caused by the criminal conduct.  Causation is a complex 
area.13  The decision not to prosecute may be linked to evidential difficulties proving 
causation.  If the prosecutor’s initial decision were that there was insufficient evidence 
to prove causation, this may also potentially exclude the victim from engaging the 
VRR on the basis that to be able to use the scheme the harm has to have been caused 
to the victim by the criminal conduct.  Although the CPS may not interpret the criteria 
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of the VRR this rigidly in practice, this analysis does highlight the extent of the 
deficiency of using a definition of victimhood that is constructed in this way.   
 
A number of academic commentators have highlighted how the impact of crime can 
reach beyond direct victims to indirect victims.  Spalek describes primary, secondary 
and tertiary victims as an alternative to the direct/indirect classification.  The term 
secondary victims is used in this context to describe those who are ‘indirectly harmed, 
as in the case of the significant others of murder or rape victims.’  Tertiary victims 
‘include a wider circle of people who may be affected by a particularly shocking 
event.’14  Spalek emphasises that these categories are not hierarchical and it is possible 
that secondary and tertiary victims may suffer more harm than primary victims in 
certain circumstances.15  Spalek illustrates the notion of indirect harm with the concept 
of ‘spirit injury’ where in the context of racist or sexist abuse, ‘the wider audience of 
people, who may not directly be victimised in this way, but who nonetheless are 
indirect victims because their subject positions link to aspects of society that denigrate 
parts of their self-identity.’16  Also in the context of hate crime, Iganski and Lagou 
have developed the concept of ‘vicarious harm’ where those that have the same 
identity as the primary victim suffer harm.17  Iganski describes ‘waves of harm’ 
generated by hate crimes which spread out from the primary victim to the victim’s 
group within and beyond his neighbourhood to other targeted communities to the ‘core 
of societal values.’18  Walklate develops the notion of ‘shared indirect victimisation’ 
further by citing the impact that serial killers such as Ian Brady, Myra Hindley and 
Harold Shipman had on their local communities.19  Shapland and Hall outline the 
effect of indirect victimisation on employees, owners and customers of businesses as 
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well as families of homicide and sexual assault victims, children of burgled 
households and that these effects ‘may also ripple out through the community.’20   
 
Another related limitation is that organisations that represent the community, or 
groups of the community, would be denied victim status.  Charitable bodies such as 
support organisations for rape victims would not be able to engage with the criminal 
justice process within the ambit of a ‘victim’ as defined by the Victim Code, but could 
have a strong nexus to the offence through the individuals that they represent.  
Similarly, organisations which act on behalf of society at large, such as the NSPCC or 
RSPCA, would not be able to engage with the criminal justice system in the capacity 
of a victim.  The requirement that harm must be caused directly by the offence has the 
effect of filtering out potential claimants of victim status limiting the rights offered by 
the Victim Code to a closed category of primary victims. 
 
3.1.3 Other types of direct victims 
 
The construction of victimhood under the VRR could be expanded to include other 
types of primary victim and not be limited to conventional direct victims.  Businesses 
are able to use the VRR.  However, as we have seen with natural persons, the fact that 
a business falls within the specific definition of victimhood, does not automatically 
mean that an entity will recognise its validity as a victim.  Allegations of harm to 
businesses is likely to be based on economic loss rather than the other and, depending 
on the circumstances of the case, it might be difficult to argue that this was directly 
caused by the criminal conduct.  There may be a number of different of layers of 
‘victimhood’ within businesses.  In many businesses it would be the owners who 
would suffer financially as a result of a crime against the business.  In more complex 
business structures, loss could also be suffered by shareholders, employees and 
consumers both in terms of their experience on the day of the offence if they were 
 
 
20 Joanna Shapland and Matthew Hall, ‘What Do We Know about the Effects of Crime on Victims?’ 
(2007) 14 International Review of Victimology 175, 179; See also: Katie Long, ‘Community Input at 




present and any consequent price increases.21  As Johnston points out:  ‘The problem 
with this stereotype is that it treats businesses as things and forgets that in reality they 
consist of people.’22  Although insurance may be in place to indemnify the business, 
this can result in increased premiums, the cost of which is likely to be passed on to 
consumers.23 
 
Another potential expansion of the concept of the primary victim would be to extend 
it to include the State or public sector as a victim.  In her discussion of corporate crime, 
Croall identifies a number of potential victims which include ‘crimes against the 
government’ from tax evasion or fraud against public bodies such as the NHS.24  In a 
similar way, there is a case for arguing that communities directly affected by 
environmental crime should lead to the attribution of victim status.25  Property owned 
by communities and charitable organisations could also come within the definition of 
a primary victim although they are not individual natural or legal persons or 
businesses. 
 
A generous interpretation of the VRR could be that the definition is deliberately 
narrow to focus the scheme on genuine victims rather than allowing third parties, such 
as campaigning organisations and community groups, to use the scheme to contest 
decisions which they are not directly affected by.  A more cynical interpretation would 
be that the VRR provides the bare minimum that was required to appease victims 
whilst keeping the scheme within tight parameters.  It may be that the VRR will evolve 
over time and that the requirements of who can engage the scheme will broaden to 
permit a larger number of potential victims to request a review.  This could develop in 
a similar way to the extension of Victim Personal Statements to Community Impact 
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Statements.26  The availability of the scheme is further restricted by the exclusions to 
the qualifying criteria that determine whether a case is eligible for review under the 
scheme. 
 
3.1.4 Exclusions from the VRR 
 
The restrictive criteria for what amounts to a qualifying decision is, perhaps, the most 
striking limitation of the VRR.  The guidance initially appears to cover a wide range 
of situations as it states that the right to request a review arises in relation to decisions 
not to bring proceedings and all the main methods by which proceedings can be 
terminated.  However, these ‘qualifying decisions’ are immediately heavily restricted 
by excluding a number of situations from the scope of the VRR in paragraph 11.  Some 
of these exclusions are inevitably more controversial than others and these will be 




It is perhaps understandable that the scheme is not retrospective as it could be argued 
that this would cause undue fairness to defendants as they would not have been aware 
of the possibility of review at the time of the original decision.  The scheme only 
applies to decisions made on or after 5 June 2013.27  The police and CPS ‘Child Sexual 
Abuse Review Panel’ attempts to fill this gap within the VRR by reconsidering child 
sexual abuse allegations which were determined prior to the 5 June 2013 along similar 
lines to the VRR.28  This remit of the panel is limited to sexual offences against 
children and provides an additional opportunity to challenge the decisions in these 
types of historic offences.  The scheme is an exception to the general rule that 
decisions that pre-date June 2013 cannot be reviewed.  As well as highlighting one of 
the limitations of the VRR, the implementation of a scheme that does have 
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retrospective application creates inconsistency between the different types of offences 




The CPS VRR only applies to decisions made by the CPS; it does not extend to 
decisions to take no further action made by the police (or other investigating 
authorities).  The guidance states that requests for review of police decisions must be 
directed to the police.29  Therefore, it is not possible to use the scheme to challenge a 
police decision not to prosecute.  The police retain the power to decide whether 
charges should be brought in respect of less serious offences and retain a discretion 
not to refer the matter to the CPS for a charging decision in relation to more serious 
matters if they believe that the evidence does not pass the Full Code Test for 
submission.30  Although the victim is able to approach the police to challenge the 
decision, the fact that eligibility to use the scheme depends on the identity of the 
decision-maker reduces the value of the scheme to victims.  There is no guarantee how 
robust the scheme offered by an individual police force will be and it is likely to have 
a one-tier structure with the review being conducted by a police officer rather than a 
lawyer.31  There is therefore the potential for an element of inconsistency between 
schemes.  The existence of more than one scheme also has the potential to confuse 
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Other charges and suspects 
 
The third category excludes cases where charges are brought in respect of some 
allegations or some possible suspects.  Essentially, this means that if the victim’s 
grievance is that the charges do not reflect the full extent of their allegations either in 
terms of what happened or who was involved, the VRR cannot be used to challenge 
this.32   This is clearly a substantial limitation of the scheme.  The guidance is therefore 
drafted on the basis of a very narrow interpretation of Article 11 that requires Member 
States to ensure that victims have the right to a review of a decision not to prosecute.  
The scheme only permits a victim to request a review if there has been no prosecution; 
it is not sufficient that there has been no prosecution for the offence alleged by the 
victim.  For example, the victim may have made an allegation of robbery and the 
defendant has been prosecuted for an offence of theft arising out of the same 
allegation.  This would be specifically excluded from the scheme and so the victim 
would be unable to use the review process. 
 
The lawfulness of paragraph 11(iii) was challenged in Chaudhry by way of judicial 
review proceedings.33  The claimant challenged the decision of the CPS not to 
prosecute her sister-in-law for her alleged involvement in the abduction of the 
claimant’s children.  The claimant had attempted to use the VRR, but was prevented 
from doing so by the restriction in paragraph 11(iii) as another suspect had been 
prosecuted in relation to the allegation, namely the claimant’s former husband who 
had been convicted of child abduction.  The claimant applied for judicial review on 
the grounds that the CPS had incorrectly applied the VRR and, in the alternative, that 
the VRR guidelines were unlawful and contrary to Directive 2012/29/EU.  
Specifically, it was argued that the CPS had fettered its discretion by interpreting 
paragraph 11 (iii) as an absolute bar to reviewing the decision.  However, the 
appellant’s case was undermined by the fact that the CPS had conducted an ad hoc 
review of the case despite the apparent exclusion under paragraph 11.  Additionally, a 
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footnote was added to paragraph 11 in the 2016 revision of the VRR guidance that 
provided a discretion to depart from the paragraph 11 criteria in exceptional cases 
which states, ‘there may be very exceptional circumstances in which cases that fall 
within the exceptions of paragraph 11 may nevertheless be considered for inclusion in 
the VRR scheme…’34  
  
The Divisional Court held that neither the original form of paragraph 11 or the 
amended 2016 version were unlawful and the criteria as to when an exceptional review 
should be conducted were sufficiently transparent and not arbitrary.  Neither the 
Divisional Court nor the Court of Appeal accepted the argument that Article 11 and 
the common law entitled victims to a general right of review with the Divisional Court 
stating that such an extensive right of review ‘would both significantly undermine 
operational prosecutorial discretion and have potentially serious resources 
implications for the CPS.’35  The court was essentially stating that the independence 
and function of the public prosecutor would be undermined by victim having a right 
to challenge operational decisions such as which suspects should be prosecuted and 
which should not.  Arguably, however, allowing victims to request a review in such 
circumstances would not compromise the independence of the prosecutor nor 
undermine their constitutional function as the review only entitles the victim to a 
review of the decision, it does not entitle them to a prosecution.   
 
The victim appealed to the Court of Appeal.  Her grounds of appeal were that Article 
11 of the Directive entitles victims of crime a review of a decision to prosecute and, 
in the alternative, that the VRR was unlawful.36  The appeal was dismissed with the 
court stating that, ‘the Divisional Court’s reasoning readily withstands scrutiny.’37  
The court did not accept that Article 11 afforded victims a general right of review and 
took the view that Member States had a wide margin of appreciation as to how to 
implement the scheme dependent upon the role of the victim in the individual criminal 
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justice system.38  The Court of Appeal particularly focussed on the principle that 
offences that have allegedly been committed jointly should be jointly tried and that 
delaying cases to give victims a right of review in such cases ‘would pose a major risk 
to the administration of justice.’39   
 
The courts have therefore endorsed the narrow interpretation of the right to review 
adopted in the VRR.  The VRR excludes a number of types of potential cases from the 
scheme to the extent that it is not accessible to a proportion of victims who may wish 
to use it to challenge a decision not to prosecute.  It seems unlikely that this is what 
the Court of Appeal intended in Killick.  Indeed, the guidance states that grievances 
that do not fall within the scope of the VRR will be dealt with under the CPS Feedback 
and Complaints Policy.40  This is exactly what had happened in Killick and what the 
court had been critical of when they stated:  ‘This was not “a complaint” about 
“service” by the CPS, but a request to have the discretionary decision to prosecute 
reviewed.’41  Therefore, this part of the qualifying decisions criteria significantly 
undermines the value of the scheme as it has the potential to preclude victims with a 
legitimate grievance from accessing the scheme.  Similarly, it seems illogical that a 
case cannot be reviewed under the scheme in respect of a particular suspect simply 
because someone else has been prosecuted.  No prosecution is taking place in relation 
to that individual and essentially it is a final decision for the victim in respect of them. 
 
A similar situation that is not covered is where some charges are terminated, but others 
continue.  This means that the victim cannot use the scheme to challenge the decision 
not to continue with particular charges when other charges relating to the victim are 
continuing.  Therefore, to use the scenario referred to above, if the robbery charge 
were to be discontinued and the theft were to continue, the victim would not have any 
redress through this mechanism.  Even though it is a final decision in relation to the 
robbery, that is not sufficient to engage the right of review.  The scheme under the 
Lord Advocate’s Rules in Scotland provides a better approach:  decisions are excluded 
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from the review process when a charge is stopped or amended in respect of the victim 
only if another ‘substantial and significant’ charges continues.42  Although a definition 
of what may constitute ‘substantial and significant’ is not provided by the rules, there 
would be a stronger argument in the robbery scenario described above, for example, 
that the theft is not ‘substantial and significant’ in the context of a robbery allegation.  
The incorporation of this qualification into the VRR would widen the remit of the 
scheme and make it available in a proportion of cases where some charges were 
terminated and others were to continue.  In a similar way, the VRR does not apply to 
situations where the initial charge or charges are ‘substantially altered’ provided 
proceedings involving the same victim continue.43  Therefore, if the robbery charge 
referred to above were amended to one of theft, the VRR could not be used by the 




The VRR does not apply to cases that are finalised by way of an out-of-court 
disposal.44  This is perhaps unsurprising in view of the fact that such decisions are 
excluded under the Directive.  This means that even though the decision to utilise an 
out-of-court disposal has effectively closed off the possibility of a conviction in 
respect of the allegation made by the victim, they cannot challenge that decision using 
the VRR.  In reality, the decision is a decision not to prosecute, but one where the 
suspect will receive a caution or conditional caution instead of the case continuing to 
court.  Jones v Whalley highlighted that the issuing of an out-of-court disposal is a 
decision with which the victim may well take issue and may wish to challenge the 
decision.45  As will be discussed in the next chapter, the only way to challenge the 
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Other prosecutorial decisions 
 
As the VRR only covers cases where the proceedings are terminated, it is of no value 
to a victim who wishes to challenge the way in which a particular case has been 
prosecuted.  It does not enable them to challenge the selection of charges or tactical 
decisions as to what evidence to rely on.  One particular area that has the potential to 
cause tension between the prosecutor and the victim is the acceptance of pleas or bases 
of pleas.  This could happen either by the prosecution accepting reduced charges, such 
as a guilty plea to sexual assault on an indictment for rape or by the prosecution 
accepting a particular defence basis.  A defence basis of plea would be one that 
differed to the prosecution version of events and could result in a lesser sentence albeit 
to the same charge.46   
 
The fact that the VRR is not available in such a wide range of potential areas of 
contention with victims is arguably inconsistent with other CPS policies and 
guidelines.  The Code for Crown Prosecutors states that when considering whether an 
offer of pleas is acceptable they should take into account the views of the victim or his 
family where appropriate.47  This is further supported by the Farquharson guidelines 
that emphasises the importance of consulting with the victim and explaining any 
decisions to them.48  These guidelines were originally published in 1986 and set out 
the role of prosecuting advocates and specifically referred to the need to take into 
account the views of the victim when applying the public interest test.  These policies 
emphasise the importance of consulting with the victim and taking their views into 
account, yet the victim cannot challenge a decision not to do so through the internal 
review mechanism.  This potentially leads victims towards judicial review as an 
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A comparison of the right to review mechanisms in Scotland and Northern Ireland 
highlights some of the limitations of the model adopted in England and Wales.49  
Although narrowing the remit of the review scheme by excluding certain types of case 
is used in both the VRR and the scheme in Scotland, the scheme implemented in 
Northern Ireland does not appear to have any exclusions or qualifications.  The Public 
Prosecution Service (PPS) guidance states:  ‘Any victim of a crime reported to us by 
the police or other statutory authority can apply for a review of a decision by us not to 
prosecute.’50  This suggests that the scheme in Northern Ireland is more accessible, 
however, this may be due to the lower case load and may subsequently be revised as 
a result of the influence of the other schemes.51 
 
Although the VRR clearly has rigid entry criteria which very much limits the 
availability of the scheme to potential applicants, it is accessible in the sense that it is 
simple to request a review:  there is no prescribed form for requesting a review and 
the victim could simply send an email or make a telephone call.  The guidance states:  
‘The only action a victim need take is to notify the CPS of their request for review’ 
and that they can then ‘make contact by their preferred means.’52  In this sense, the 
VRR compares favourably to the schemes in Scotland and Northern Ireland as both 
require that requests be made in writing which may be a deterrent for some victims.  
However, there is also evidence from the CPS Inspectorate that there is ‘inconsistent 
understanding and application’ of this part of the policy and that some victims are 
being required to request a review in writing.53  One clear benefit, however, is that 
there is no cost or fee incurred by the victim in requesting a review and there is no 
requirement to seek legal advice.  This is one of the strengths of the VRR over judicial 
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review and private prosecutions both of which are likely to require legal advice and 
representation and the cost element could deter victims from using those mechanisms.  
 
Communication with victims 
 
This analysis of the VRR does, however, pre-suppose that the victim has been properly 
informed of the decision in the case and advised of the existence of the VRR together 
with instruction on how to request a review.  The guidance states that victims will be 
notified of the nature of the decision and, if it meets the qualifying criteria, advise 
them that they are entitled to apply for a review and provide ‘sufficient information’ 
to allow them to decide whether they wish to apply for a review and how they can 
request one.54   
 
The CPS Victim and Witness Survey published in 2015 suggests that a significant 
number of victims may not receive an explanation for charges being altered or 
dropped.  The survey found that only 58 per cent of victims recalled receiving an 
explanation where charges were dropped and only 63 per cent where charges were 
altered.55  Victims were also asked about the clarity of the explanation given to them 
with only 47 per cent of victims in cases where charges were stopped reporting that 
the explanation given to them was very clear.56  The significance of this is that the 
quality of the explanation for altered or dropped charges may influence whether the 
victim decides to challenge the decision in some way.   
 
Participants in the survey were also questioned specifically about the VRR.  It revealed 
that 10 per cent of victims who felt that the decision to stop charges was unfair went 
on to request a review under the scheme.57  Of those that felt the decision unfair and 
did not request a review, 49 per cent said that they did not know how to.  Therefore, 
the survey does highlight a degree of dissatisfaction about dropped charges and that 
there is an appetite for challenging decisions using the scheme.  However, it also 
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highlights the variable quality of the explanations given to victims both by way of 
explanation for the decision and also how to engage the VRR. 
 
There is further evidence from HM CPS Inspectorate that some letters to victims 
regarding the VRR continue to be poor quality.58   It revealed that there was no 
reference to the VRR in 8.6 per cent of letters written to victims when there should 
have been; it was also incorrectly offered in 19.4 per cent of letters.59  As a previous 
report commented:  ‘If the victim is not informed of this right in the VCL letter, and 
if the victim does not read the CPS Feedback and Complaints leaflet which informs 
them of this right, the opportunity to challenge any decision made is lost to them.’60  
A 2018 report also found that only 32.9 per cent of a sample of local resolution letters 
gave the victim a clear legal explanation for the decision and only 80.3 per cent 
correctly explained the next stage of the VRR process.61 
 
Both the Victims and Witness Survey and the Inspectorate reports demonstrate that a 
proportion of potential applicants for a review under the scheme are not being properly 
informed of its existence or how to go about requesting such a review.  This is clearly 
a significant barrier to accessibility as aggrieved victims will not request a review 
under a scheme if they are not aware that they are entitled to do so.  Although clearly 
some will conduct their own research or indeed write a letter of complaint to the CPS 
which may result in it being directed to the scheme, there will be others who do not 
take any action due to lack of awareness of their right to request a review.  This issue 
is addressed in the government’s Victims Strategy which states that ‘we will improve 
how we communicate to victims, explaining how victims can access the right to review 
scheme in a much clearer and simpler way’ and that this will include the introduction 
of a ‘national quality assurance process.’62  This perhaps represents a recognition that 
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victims’ access to the VRR is undermined by the quality of the explanations of 




A linked barrier to accessibility is the tight time limits for requesting a review.  The 
guidance states that a request should ‘ordinarily be made within 5 working days of 
receipt of the notification of the decision.’ However, the following sentence creates a 
‘long stop’ date: ‘a request can be made up to three months after the communication 
of the decision to the victim.’63  It is unclear in what circumstances the three-month 
time limit will apply rather than the five day period.  These time limits do not allow 
the victim much time to deliberate whether to seek a review or not and the time 
pressure could rush the victim into a snap decision that they later regret.  It could also 
prevent a victim obtaining legal advice on whether to challenge the decision.   
Although the time limit does not start running until the notification that the case has 
been terminated has been received, the quality of the notification may affect how 
easily the victim can reach a decision as to whether they wish to seek review of the 
decision.  Clearly, the imposition of a time limit could be justified on the basis that 
there is a need to take into account the needs of the suspect.  If the VRR were open-
ended, it would mean that a suspect would never know when he was no longer at risk 
of the decision being reversed and a prosecution being commenced.   
 
Therefore, in terms of accessibility the gateway to the VRR is not a wide one:  the 
qualifying criteria are restrictive and only permit a request for review in very limited 
circumstances.  Situations which one would expect such a scheme to cover are not, in 
fact, covered.  The scheme is essentially limited to those victims whose case has been 
not prosecuted in its entirety.  The definition of victimhood adopted by the VRR also 
serves to limit the availability of the scheme further and excludes those that do not 
come within the narrow definition provided by the Victims’ Code.  This construction 
could be redefined to include a wider range of potential victims including indirect 
 
 




victims such as community victims and those who have been exposed to a criminal 
act, but not necessarily harmed by it.  This would allow those who are relegated to 
witnesses to criminal behaviour, such as Gideon Falter, to access the scheme. 
 
However, on a positive note, if a victim’s case does fall within the criteria, there are 
few formal, procedural requirements for the victim to comply with.  They can simply 
request a review by their preferred means and then await a response.  Potentially, 
therefore, the VRR is an easy to use route for challenging a decision provided the 
applicant is eligible to use it and the case falls within the criteria.  The next criterion 
will develop this analysis further by exploring the extent to which the VRR enables 





The second of the four criteria is ‘participation’.  This criterion will essentially address 
the following question:  to what extent do victims have a meaningful participatory 
role?  As outlined in the introduction to this part, there are different forms of 
participation, including those categorised by Edwards in relation to decision-making 
in the criminal justice system.64  The VRR necessarily involves a participatory 
relationship between the CPS and the victim as the victim has to initiate the process 
by requesting the review.  Although it is inevitable that the CPS would not give full 
control to the victim, this criterion will evaluate the nature of that participation as to 
be meaningful it should facilitate more participation than simply to allow the victim 
to emote about the decision.  
 
The analysis against this criterion will show that the VRR provides only a relatively 
passive form of participation representing very little engagement for the victim.  It is 
possible to distinguish between the different stages of the victim’s involvement.  
Firstly, the victim has to trigger the review mechanism by making a request and as this 
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decision falls within the control of the victim, this is the highest level of participation 
in the process.  Secondly, beyond triggering the process there is limited opportunity 
for the victim to enter into a meaningful dialogue with the prosecutor about the 
decision.  Thirdly, the victim is the passive recipient of the decision whether to change 
the original outcome.  Additionally, the participation that they do have through the 
review process is actually outside the court proceedings. 
 
As has been discussed above in relation to accessibility, the onus is on the victim to 
request the review of the case if they wish to do so.  The only action that the victim 
needs to take is to request the review; they do not have to provide reasons for the 
request or to put forward an argument as to why they believe the decision is wrong.65  
Under the previous version of the VRR, the victim did not have the opportunity to 
present new information or to put forward reasons why they felt that the matter should 
be prosecuted.  Prior to the 2016 revision, the terms of the VRR specifically excluded 
the reviewing prosecutor from considering anything other than the information 
available at the time of the initial review.  The VRR guidance stated:  ‘A victim 
wishing to raise new evidence/information should do so with the investigating officer, 
not the reviewing prosecutor.’66   
 
The 2016 guidance is an improvement on the earlier versions as it no longer expressly 
prohibits the victim from submitting additional information and does not prohibit the 
prosecutor from considering it.67  However, it does not encourage or invite victims to 
submit new information or evidence; the way in which the guidance is drafted does 
not invite victims to enter into a dialogue.  Although the expectation is not that the 
victim will make representations to the CPS, clearly some will do so.  In the case of 
Monica, solicitors for the victim had made detailed submissions to the reviewer in 
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The court recognised in FNM that the VRR provides an opportunity for victims to 
make representations under paragraph 42 by indicating that issues raised by victims 
will be addressed.69  However, the court stopped short of ruling that the DPP was 
under a duty to invite representations or that the process should be delayed to allow 
victims to make representations.70  In any event, it is unclear how much weight will 
be placed on such submissions and the guidance does not confirm that such 
representations will be taken into account during the review process.  
 
The CPS VRR contrasts with the scheme in Scotland which states that the reviewer 
will, ‘obtain any further information which is required in order to make the decision’ 
and the victim is specifically invited to submit any further information that they wish 
to take taken into account when they request the review.71  The Northern Irish scheme 
provides an even more victim-centred approach by distinguishing between victims 
who have additional information to be taken into account and those that those that do 
not.  If the victim submits new information, the decision is returned to the original 
decision-maker, otherwise it is reviewed by a different prosecutor.  There is then the 
additional benefit that if the new material does not persuade the original prosecutor to 
reach a different decision, the case is then passed to a different prosecutor for a further 
review.72 
 
Iliadis and Flynn state that the VRR ‘arguably responds to victims’ procedural justice 
needs by enabling victims to have their voices heard.’73  In a similar way to potential 
therapeutic effects of making a VPS, the VRR potentially provides the victim with an 
outlet for any negative feelings that they may have about the decision; it could perhaps 
assist them in achieving closure on the basis that they have attempted to challenge the 
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decision.74  It may also reassure victims that the decision is sound as it provides a way 
in which the victim can have the decision checked.    
 
However, in reality, the VRR does not proactively encourage the victims to make 
representations about the case or enter into a dialogue with the prosecutor who will be 
reviewing the case.  The VRR represents very little opportunity for the victim to 
actively participate in the review decision although potentially it could result in the 
original decision being changed; the victim’s role is limited to triggering the process.  
The guidance does acknowledge that a victim may ‘give reasons for requesting a 
review’, but it states that those issues will be addressed after the decision has been 
made as part of the communication of the final decision.75  The approaches in Scotland 
and Northern Ireland are more conducive to a dialogue between the victim and the 
prosecutor as both schemes recognise that the victim may wish to submit additional 
information.76  This approach would have the potential to increase victim participation 
and ultimately satisfaction with the VRR.  
 
Manikis argues that the VRR provides a form of participation which involves victims 
acting as ‘agents of accountability’ in relation to prosecutorial decisions.  Her 
proposed amendment to Edwards’ model of participation propounds a new category 
of participation:  Accountability.77  Although this analysis is useful in that it recognises 
the empowerment of victims to challenge prosecutors and to hold them to account, it 
places obligations on both the prosecutor and the victim that are not currently 
contained within the VRR.  Under Manikis’ model, the prosecutor would be under an 
obligation to ‘seek out and consider the victim’s position’ and the victim would be 
required to ‘examine the decision made’ and to ‘seek a review if they believed an error 
was made.’  These obligations stretch far beyond the current parameters of the VRR 
 
 
74 Edna Erez, ‘Integrating a Victim Perspective in Criminal Justice through Victim Impact Statements’ 
in Adam Crawford and Jo Goodey (eds), Integrating a Victim Perspective within Criminal Justice: 
International Debates (Ashgate 2000) 167. 
75 CPS, VRR (n 3) [42] 
76 PPS, ‘Review of a Decision not to prosecute’ (n 50) 5; Crown Office & Procurator Fiscal Service, 
Lord Advocate’s Rules (n 42) 4-5 
77 Marie Manikis, ‘Expanding Participation:  Victims as Agents of Accountability in the Criminal 




and would take the nature of the victim’s participation to a much higher level on that 
they would be under an obligation to act rather than being entitled to if they wished to 
do so.  Additionally, on this interpretation, the reviewer would be under an obligation 
to actively seek the views of the victim on the decision rather than simply reviewing 
whether the decision was correct.  Therefore, this account of the VRR does not reflect 
the reality of the victim’s participation under the scheme which is arguably more 
peripheral.  
 
The VRR process takes place after the decision has been made and therefore after any 
proceedings have been brought to an end. In fact, the decision in Hayes confirms that 
it is not possible to request that a review takes place after the decision to terminate a 
case has been made, but prior to the proceedings being formally brought to an end.78  
What limited involvement the victim does have as a result of the VRR is not part of 
the criminal proceedings.  In the event that the challenge is successful and a decision 
made to prosecute, the victim would have no further participation as a result of 
engaging the mechanism:  the victim returns to the role that they would ordinarily have 
in a prosecution; there is no enhanced status or ongoing involvement as a result of 
applying for a review. 
 
Because the victim’s actual role in the VRR process is so minimal, there is perhaps 
less opportunity for a meaningful dialogue about the case or even to vent their feelings 
about the way in which the case was handled as part of their involvement in the 
scheme.   In the event that the application is successful, a victim eligible for an 
enhanced service under the Victims’ Code will be entitled to ‘increased support’ 
throughout the VRR process and ‘offered the opportunity to discuss the outcome of 
the review.’79  However, this is after the review has taken place, so could be seen as 
little more than a token gesture.  
 
Therefore, the VRR offers very much a passive form of participation:  the victim is 
entitled to request the review provided the case and the ‘victim’ fit the criteria, but 
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their involvement largely ends at that point.  On Edwards’ model of victim 
participation the victim’s use of the VRR’s amounts to only ‘expression’ or 
‘information provision’; it clearly does not go as far as ‘consultation’ as the victim’s 
preference is not sought and their views if they do put them forward are not taken into 
account.  The VRR provides a basic mechanism by which the victim can request that 
a second lawyer checks the original decision provided the case is a qualifying decision.  






The VRR is potentially a means of challenging the decision of the public official, 
namely the public prosecutor, who made the decision not to prosecute.  The VRR will 
be evaluated as a method of holding the public decision-maker to account by analysing 
it against the key characteristics of accountability mechanisms identified by Bovens.80  
The following question will be addressed:  to what extent is the VRR an effective 
mechanism for holding the public prosecutor to account?  
 
As explained in the previous chapter, the VRR is an internal review mechanism 
implemented by the CPS following the Killick judgment.  Applying Bovens’ criteria, 
the VRR could arguably be classified as an accountability mechanism; although are 
features which suggest that the argument is not particularly compelling.  The VRR 
provides a two-tier structure of review consisting of ‘local resolution’ and 
‘independent review.’81  Therefore, the ‘forum’ is different for the second stage and 
perhaps more remote from the original decision-maker than at the local review stage 
in that it is conducted by a specific unit of the CPS which deals with appeals rather 
than mainstream casework.  However, the extent to which the VRR requires the 
decision maker to explain and justify his decision appears to be limited.  The VRR 
guidance suggests that the review is conducted on the papers without any contact 
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between the original decision-maker and the reviewer.  Even if the reviewer were to 
ask questions of the original decision-maker on occasions, there is no requirement to 
do so within the guidance.  The decision maker is not required to explain or justify his 
decision other than he will have conducted a written review when he applied the Code 
for Crown Prosecutors. 
 
The reviewer undertaking a review of the case under the VRR scheme does form a 
judgment as to whether the original decision is wrong as this is the test that is applied 
under the VRR.82  The main consequence of the scheme is that the decision not to 
prosecute may be reversed which clearly could be described as a consequence for the 
CPS in its institutional role as the public prosecutor rather than as consequence for 
specific individuals within the organisation.  However, there are no obvious 
consequences for the original decision maker as a result of their decision being judged 
as wrong.  The guidance does state that ‘Where lessons can be learned from the 
outcome of a VRR request, the CPS will make the necessary changes to guidance, 
process or practice to reduce the likelihood of the situation arising again.’83  Although 
the guidance does not give further details, this could include some kind of feedback, 
re-training or disciplinary sanction in relation to the individual who made the decision.  
This suggests that the learning perspective is the most relevant ‘evaluation 
perspective’ for the VRR although there is some evidence from a recent CPS 
Inspectorate report to suggest that this is not happening consistently across CPS areas; 
one area was ‘cascading lessons learnt from VRRs and complaints’, but the majority 
were not.84  As the independent reviews are conducted by a different CPS unit there is 
perhaps less opportunity for action to result from the reviewer concluding that the 
original decision was wrong. 
 
There is also the risk that the existence of the right of review fosters a more risk-averse 
culture in the CPS with cases being taken to court rather than running the risk of the 
case being reviewed at the instigation of the victim.  Although this may sound 
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appealing, it could result in evidentially weak cases, or those with questionable public 
interest status, being prosecuted.  The impact of the VRR on the CPS working culture 
is an area which could be the subject of future empirical research.  
 
Although the review process involves legal decisions, the VRR is more of an 
administrative, rather than a legal, type of accountability.  The accountability process 
runs vertically through the CPS hierarchy rather than involving any external legal 
element.  It is clear that the relationship between the decision-maker and the review 
body is not an independent one in the true sense; this will become more obvious when 
judicial review is examined in the next chapter.    The review is still conducted by the 
CPS itself and despite the fact that is labelled as an independent review, it is not truly 
independent.  The decision is not made completely at arm’s length as it is still from 
within the CPS hierarchy.  The two-tier structure may be of some reassurance to 
victims that a close colleague of the original decision-maker is not conducting the 
review.  
 
The fact that the CPS is adjudicating on requests for review of its own decisions is not 
in conflict with the comments of the Court of Appeal in Killick and complies with 
Article 11 of the Victims’ Directive.  Article 11(4) states that ‘where the decision not 
to prosecute is taken by the highest prosecuting authority against whose decision no 
review may be carried out under national law, the review may be carried out by the 
same authority.’85 There remains, however, a risk of actual or perceived bias.  The 
victim as an outsider to the CPS is unlikely to be aware of the proximity or otherwise 
of the Appeals and Review Unit to the original decision-maker.  From their perspective 
the review is being considered by the same organisation as made the original decision.  
Other commentators have also noted that the scheme lacks true independence.86 
 
The case law from the rule against bias in the context of judicial review suggests that 
the appearance of bias may be sufficient to undermine the fairness of the hearing.  For 
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example, in R v Bow Street Metropolitan and Stipendiary Magistrate ex parte 
Pinochet Ugarte (No 2) the proceedings were re-heard after it was established that 
Lord Hoffman had connections with Amnesty International and there could be a public 
perception of bias.87  In Porter v Magill the House of Lords established the following 
test:  whether the circumstances would lead a fair-minded and informed observer to 
conclude that there was a real possibility of bias.88 Although this would be a difficult 
test for the applicant to overcome without some evidence of bias in the particular case, 
it does highlight a potential shortcoming of the scheme:  the aggrieved victim, and 
perhaps the wider public, may feel that the review may be less than a full and rigorous 
review of all the evidence.  Similar concerns have been raised in respect of prosecutors 
and police officers sitting on juries.89  Although these cases were not successful, the 
prosecutor or police officer would have been one person on a jury of twelve whereas 
with the VRR there will be only one reviewer - from the same organisation as the 
original decision-maker. 
 
Therefore, although there may not be the basis of a legal challenge to the CPS 
adjudicating on the reviews, perhaps this is an area where the VRR could be improved.  
If the scheme is truly about improving victims’ rights and increasing their levels of 
satisfaction with prosecution decision-making, incorporating a fully independent 
stage, perhaps limited to particularly sensitive or serious cases, may serve to increase 
public acceptance of the scheme.  This could perhaps take the form of a third tier to 
the VRR that would only be available when the first two tiers had reviewed the case 
and confirmed the original decision.  There is at least one precedent of a review being 
conducted externally under the VRR in that a review of the DPP’s decision not to 
prosecute the peer Lord Janner was conducted by an independent barrister who 
reversed the decision.90  Although this was perhaps an exceptional case in view of the 
amount of media attention that it attracted and the fact that the original decision not to 
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prosecute was made by the DPP personally, this does show that an external element 
would be a possibility and would perhaps lend more legitimacy to the scheme in terms 
of public confidence.  In principle, an external element to the scheme would not need 
to be restricted to reviews of decisions made by the DPP, although this could be one 
benefit of such an amendment.  The inclusion of an independent element to the VRR 
is not, however, straight-forward. 
 
A difficulty with incorporating an external element to the VRR is caused by the 
particular constitutional position of the CPS as the national prosecuting service.  As 
outlined in the introductory chapters, Parliament has delegated this role to the CPS 
under the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985.  There is no higher prosecutorial body in 
England and Wales.  There are limited possibilities as to who could conduct an 
additional layer of independent review if one were to be created.  Perhaps the most 
obvious choice would be for this to come within the role of the Attorney General and 
his office as the DPP is ‘superintended’ over by the Attorney General.91   It is the 
Attorney General who appoints the DPP and who can assign any additional functions 
to him.  This supervisory role could therefore be extended to include an independent 
dimension to the VRR.  The Attorney General’s office has a casework aspect to their 
work in that they make referrals to the Court of Appeal under the unduly lenient 
sentences provisions, advise on contempt of court cases and deal with consent to 
prosecute where required by statute amongst other areas of law.92  Clearly, there would 
be resourcing implications, but perhaps this would be weighed off by the reduction in 
work for the CPS.  This is perhaps a way in which the Attorney General could 
effectively oversee the work of the CPS and gain an insight into their casework. 
 
Other options for an independent layer would be HM CPS Inspectorate, a bespoke 
body specifically for VRR adjudications or a panel of independent barristers.  This 
role does seem to be outside of the remit of the Inspectorate whose function is not 
really to review specific cases with a view to changing the outcome.  An independent 
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body would realistically need to be established by statute which seems unlikely when 
the VRR is not itself on a statutory basis.   
 
Referral of appropriate cases to the independent bar, as in the Janner case, would be a 
possibility.  However, there would need to be some degree of regulation in terms of 
the selection of barristers and the extent of their role over and above their professional 
obligations.  This could, perhaps, take a similar format to the advocate panels 
established by the CPS for the selection of barristers as agents for different levels of 
prosecution cases.93   Barristers would need to apply for inclusion on the panel 
demonstrating evidence of a sufficient level of expertise and experience.  There could 
be a grading system so that certain barristers could be allocated to certain types or 
seriousness of case.  For example, only barristers experienced in conducting rape trials 
would be allocated VRR referrals involving allegations of rape.  Such a model would 
not include one clear, identifiable body being responsible for this new tier of review 
potentially introducing a degree of uncertainty and inconsistency.  
 
Other jurisdictions offer some useful alternatives.  As has been shown by reference to 
Scotland and Northern Ireland, Article 11 of the Directive has been implemented 
differently in other jurisdictions.  This is also the case outside the UK.  Novokmet has 
analysed the position in a number of Member States.94  The decision not to prosecute 
may be reviewed by the court in Germany and Italy.  In Germany this is on the 
application of the victim whereas in Italy the court reviews all decisions not to 
prosecute.  Novokmet describes the Italian system as a ‘special form of judicial 
review’ that is conducted by the judge of preliminary investigation.95  This system, 
however, could not easily be transposed from an inquisitorial system to an adversarial 
one.  The first instance criminal courts in England and Wales are not normally called 
upon to review evidential decisions, the role of the judge being different in civil 
jurisdictions.  This role may be more suited to the High Court jurisdiction although it 
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would seem to overlap with judicial review proceedings.  The extent to which the High 
Court essentially conducts an independent review through judicial review will be 
explored further in the next chapter.  An obvious difficulty would be, however, the 
conflict with the doctrine of separation of powers.  The court would essentially be 
undertaking a function which has been allocated to the executive by Parliament.  As 
will be set out in the next chapter, the higher courts have been very reluctant to 
substitute the public prosecutor’s decision with their own.  
 
An independent element could improve a further shortcoming of the scheme.  
Currently there are no real opportunities for the victim to discuss the decision with the 
reviewer.  The review is generally based on the same material that the original decision 
maker had before them and there is no provision to allow the victim to make 
representations to the reviewer or to discuss the case with them.  Victims who are 
entitled to an enhanced service (as set out under the Victim Code) are entitled to 
enhanced support throughout the process and an opportunity to discuss the outcome 
after the review. 
 
It seems likely that the lack of an opportunity to discuss the case with the review prior 
to the review decision being made is as a result of concerns that it could undermine 
any subsequent prosecution were the review to be successful.  The CPS guidance on 
pre-trial witness interviews highlights how carefully managed any discussions with 
witnesses prior to a trial need to be.96  The linked Code of Practice states:  ‘Prosecutors 
must not under any circumstances train, practise or coach the witness or ask questions 
that may taint the witness’s evidence.’97  The Court of Appeal has also provided 
guidance on the risks of contamination inherent in discussing the evidence in a case 
with a witness.98  This risk of allegations of contamination could be reduced by any 
interaction regarding the case being conducted by an individual or body independent 
from the prosecutor.  Perhaps the safest course, however, would be to permit only 
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representations from the victim prior to the review decision, rather than allowing them 
to enter into a dialogue with the prosecutor. 
 
Another important issue is the degree of public accountability for the decision.  The 
VRR scheme operates outside the criminal justice process and is essentially a private 
matter between the victim and the CPS (with the proposed defendant not being 
informed that the review is being conducted).  Ordinarily there is no public element to 
the process.  High profile cases, such as those involving celebrities or politicians, 
attract media interest whereas less topical ones would not do so.  The private nature 
of the VRR process means that cases that are reviewed in this way have limited 
opportunity to influence future cases (except perhaps if a learning point was identified 
by the CPS and formed the basis of future training or changes to procedures).  There 
is no precedent value in VRR decisions and indeed they do not result in a growing 
body of case law.  Indeed, they may have a negative effect on the potential generation 
of case law under other review mechanisms.  For example, the analysis of the judicial 
review case law demonstrates that there has been a greater willingness in the courts to 
quash decisions not to prosecute.  However, with the implementation of the VRR there 
is a clear expectation that this is the primary route for challenging the decision with 
judicial review only being available in exceptional situations.   This highlights perhaps 
how, in one sense, the VRR is a private, rather than public, accountability mechanism. 
 
On one level, the VRR does hold the public prosecutor to account as it provides a 
checking mechanism in respect of the original decision:  the review compels the CPS 
to review whether or not the decision was wrong.  However, it does not subject the 
original decision to public scrutiny in an open, independent forum in the way that 
judicial review does.  A successful VRR would vindicate the victim’s belief that the 
decision was wrong, but it has little impact on future cases:  each case is dealt with on 
an individual basis with no body of case law being developed by the decisions.  The 
extent to which the VRR is capable of delivering the outcome sought by the victim is 








This criterion addresses the question:  does the VRR provide meaningful and 
satisfactory outcomes for victims?  As part of this, the available data on the VRR 
will be reviewed as to whether it is being used by the public and the extent to which it 
has resulted in a prosecution despite an earlier decision not to prosecute. 
 
The VRR does provide a way in which the victim can seek to challenge a decision not 
to prosecute which could result in a prosecution being brought.  The Killick case 
highlighted the need for such a mechanism and led to its foundation.  The Court of 
Appeal commented that the right of the victim to apply for review of the decision was 
‘an integral part of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.’99  The VRR therefore 
formalised into a policy the approach taken by the CPS in Killick:  it provides a 
mechanism whereby a review of whether the decision not to prosecute was wrong can 
be requested by the victim and may ultimately result in a prosecution. Until the 
implementation of this policy, the only options for victims were judicial review or to 
bring a private prosecution supplemented by simply being persistent in their complaint 
to the CPS in the hope that someone would look at the decision again. 
 
Therefore, at a very superficial level the VRR does provide a potential remedy; it 
provides a new route that was not previously available.  However, as set out above, it 
can only be used in a limited range of situations.  If the decision does qualify for the 
scheme and the reviewer concludes that the original decision was wrong, there is the 
potential for a prosecution to follow.  However, this is not automatic.  
 
Firstly, if the original decision resulted in no evidence being offered at court, it would 
not be possible to re-commence criminal proceedings as the earlier dismissal of the 
charge would amount to an acquittal.  If proceedings were subsequently recommenced 
on the same charge, the defendant would be able to plead autrefois acquit.  Similarly, 
a prosecution would not be possible if the offence was time-barred.  Therefore, in such 
 
 




a situation the outcome for the victim is limited to an acceptance that the original 
decision was wrong and potentially an apology.100  The Hayes the Divisional Court 
took the view that such an outcome still amounted to an effective right of review and 
did not leave the victim without satisfaction.101 
 
The guidance acknowledges that there is balance to be struck between the rights of the 
victim and the rights of the defendant, but on occasions it may be appropriate to bring 
proceedings despite an earlier indication to the defendant to the contrary.102  Once the 
reviewer has concluded that the original decision under the Full Code Test was wrong, 
to bring a prosecution they also have to be satisfied that:  ‘for the maintenance of 
public confidence, the decision must be reversed.’103  The ‘maintenance of public 
confidence’ test incorporated in the VRR is vague and no further details are given in 
the VRR guidance as how this will be assessed.  Therefore, reference has to be made 
to the Code and the guidance on ‘Reconsidering a Prosecution Decision’ for further 
details of the test.104 
 
The actual guidance specifically refers to section 10.2 of the Code for Crown 
Prosecutors and the VRR.  It provides some guidance as to the assessment of whether 
a prosecution should be brought to maintain public confidence.  The guidance states 
that, ‘A careful balance must be struck between providing certainty to the public in 
our decision-making and not allowing wrong decisions to stand.’105  The guidance sets 
out the different aspects which need to be ‘weighed’ which broadly falls into two 
categories, ensuring justice in individual cases and maintaining public confidence in 
prosecutorial decision-making.  Therefore, this conflict is central to the decision 
whether to bring a prosecution and whether individual justice outweighs public 
confidence depends on the circumstances of the individual case.  However, as the 
guidance says that it will only be in ‘rare’ cases that the decision will be overturned, 
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it would appear that public confidence is prioritised over justice in individual cases.  
This perhaps suggests that decisions will only be overturned when the risk of 
reputational damage to the CPS is greater from not overturning the decision than from 
not doing so.  The incorporation of the public confidence element to the VRR’s 
decision-making process gives the impression that the scheme is not entirely 
concerned with the interests of victims, but at least partly focused on preserving the 
reputation of the CPS, and the criminal justice system more widely, in the eyes of the 
public.  These tensions between the competing interests in the criminal prosecution of 
the victim, the defendant and the public interest will be considered fully in chapters 
seven and eight. 
 
An important part of the analysis of the VRR as a remedy for aggrieved victims is 
therefore whether it is capable of achieving the outcome that they are seeking.  By 
requesting a review, it seems likely that their ultimate aim is to persuade the CPS to 
instigate a prosecution.  Essentially, a three-stage test is applied to cases that meet the 
qualifying criteria consisting of the standard Full Code Test together with the ‘public 
confidence’ element.  If these are all met a prosecution will follow.     
 
The CPS provides statistics on the number of reviewable decisions and the number of 
requests received.106  From this data it has been possible to calculate the number of 
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Table 3:  VRR requests and successful outcomes  
(1) 
Year 































94,727 1930 152 53 205 0.22 10.62 
2017-
2018 
91,133 1956 136 42 178 0.2 9.1 
2016-
17 
103,113 1988 122 15 137 0.13 6.89 
2015-
16 
115,941 1809 123 65 188 0.16 10.39 
2014-
15 
126,589 1674 137 73 210 0.17 12.54 
2013-
14 
113,952 1186 114 48 162 0.14 13.66 
 
The data shows that although only a relatively small number of requests are received 
each year, the number of requests is gradually rising despite a reducing overall case 
load.  The percentage of requests that are successfully averages at around ten per cent 
with most of these being upheld at the local resolution stage.  
 
The notes on the 2014-2015 data sheet suggest that where the appeals are categorised 
as upheld, this means that the decisions were found to be wrong and a prosecution was 
required to maintain confidence.  A request under the Freedom of Information Act 
2000 has provided further details of the 162 successful appeals between June 2013 
and March 2014.107  At the time of the FOI disclosure, out of the 162 decisions, 66 
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related to cases that were ongoing.  72 cases had been finalised in the CPS records, 
but 53 of those resulted in a conviction. Therefore, a significant number of successful 
VRR requests resulted in a conviction.  Overall, the statistics shows that a reasonable 
number of victims do engage the scheme and it can successful for a proportion of 
them. 
 
3.4.1 Challenges by the defendant 
 
Another factor affecting whether the VRR is capable of providing a useful remedy for 
the victim is whether the prospective defendant will be able to successfully challenge 
the VRR decision. In S v CPS the defendant applied for judicial review of a VRR 
decision to prosecute him after he had been notified that no further action would be 
taken against him in respect of a rape allegation.108   It was argued that the CPS 
conclusion that the earlier decision not to charge was wrong was Wednesbury 
unreasonable and that the CPS should have to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the 
original decisions was either wrong in law or Wednesbury unreasonable.109    This 
argument as to what test should be applied was rejected by the court which stated:  ‘the 
Guidance is a lawful policy, faithfully reflecting the Directive and the approach 
identified in Killick.’110   Although judicial review of the decision was potentially 
available to the claimant, the court also found that the decision by the reviewer was 
not unreasonable.111 
 
The claimant further argued that the decision was contrary to natural justice as he had 
not been allowed to make representations as part of the review process.  The court also 
rejected this submission as the guidance only permitted the reviewer to consider the 
evidence that was available to the original decision-maker.112  However, it may now 
be possible to argue this point further in view of the fact that the latest version of the 
VRR no longer imposes such a restriction on the reviewer.  
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Another argument put by the claimant was that the prosecution should have enquired 
as to whether the potential defendant had acted to his detriment before a charge was 
authorised.  The court did not accept that this amounted to grounds for judicial review, 
although this point could be argued as part of an abuse of process argument.113   
 
The case of L v DPP was also referred to.114  This concerned an application for judicial 
review of a decision not to prosecute.  The court emphasised the expectation that 
aggrieved victims use the VRR before considering judicial review, but then went on 
to state: ‘if there has been a review in accordance with this procedure, then, it seems 
to me, that the prospect of success will, as I have said, be very small.’  The court in S 
v CPS recognised that judicial review may be the only way of challenging an 
unsuccessful VRR request.  However, in relation to a successful VRR which the 
defendant wishes to challenge the court stated that: ‘the trial process provides the 
protection that the law affords to those charged with crime.’115 
 
Therefore, the High Court has indicated that there is nothing inherently unlawful about 
the VRR guidance and was satisfied that it is consistent with the Directive and the 
Killick judgment.  In light of this judgment, it is going to be extremely difficult for the 
party that is being prosecuted following a VRR decision to overturn that decision by 
way of judicial review.  If undue unfairness has been caused, perhaps by him acting 
to his detriment in relying on the indication that he would not be prosecuted, that will 
be a matter which should be challenged through the trial process.  The impact of rights 
of review on the rights of defendants will be examined in more detail in chapter eight.  
 
The finality of a VRR decision is also demonstrated by R (Ram) v CPS where the 
claimant applied for judicial review of a VRR which had upheld the decision to 
discontinue a private prosecution brought by the claimant.116  The claimant had 
brought a private prosecution against his former partner for perverting the course of 
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justice after he was unsuccessfully prosecuted for harassing her.  The VRR reviewer 
had been satisfied that the evidential limb was met, but concluded that the public 
interest limb was not.  The claimant put four grounds forward.  The first concerned 
whether the reviewer had properly applied the Code for Crown Prosecutors.  The 
second whether the reviewer had properly applied the relevant CPS offence specific 
guidance.  The third ground was whether the public interest ground was properly 
applied.  The final ground was whether the decision was irrational.  The Divisional 
Court rejected all four grounds. 
 
However, this case demonstrates how the issue of whether there are grounds for a 
successful judicial review still has to be decided on a case-by-case basis.  It is not 
inevitable that the court would refuse an application for judicial review of a VRR 
decision:  it very much depends, as always, on the substance and quality of the decision 
that the reviewer has made.  The claimant had argued that the reviewed had placed too 
much wait on the status of the claimant’s wife as a victim.  The court response 
emphasised the importance attached to the role of the prosecutor: 
 
‘In my judgment that submission really demonstrates that this is an area, once one 
considers matters such as weight to be given to evidence, where it is entirely within 
the discretion of the particular prosecutor what conclusion is reached, provided that 
the correct test are applied.  That is precisely the sort of situation in which one 
reasonable prosecutor might reach one conclusion, whereas another might reach 
another conclusion, but that is not a basis for this court intervening or in any way 
impugning the decision.’117 
 
Therefore, there is a possibility of a VRR decision not being a final outcome.  It could 
be subject to judicial review proceedings.  This could be a challenge by the prospective 
defendant of the decision to prosecute him or by the victim following an unsuccessful 
VRR.  Although the courts’ stance to date demonstrates a reluctance to intervene in 
prosecutorial discretion exercised under the scheme, that does hinge on the decision 
 
 




being made in a procedurally fair way and being capable of being justified if the 
reasonableness of the decision is challenged.  




The VRR was introduced to fill a gap in the CPS procedural framework identified by 
the Court of Appeal in Killick.  It also provides a review mechanism to meet the 
requirements of Article 11 that had to be implemented by Member States by 16 
November 2016.118  Superficially, it would appear that the initiative could only 
improve victims’ rights and their ability to challenge prosecutorial decisions 
effectively.  The VRR provides a free and simple procedure for victims to request 
reviews of decisions that does not require them to articulate the reasons for their 
dissatisfaction with the decision or put forward arguments why the case should be 
prosecuted.  However, on closer analysis, the VRR is not quite as valuable as it would 
first appear.  The analysis of accessibility has shown that although the mechanism is 
simple to use, it is only available in very limited situations; there are many 
circumstances where a victim may legitimately wish to challenge a prosecutorial 
decision and the VRR would not be available to them.  The analysis of the restrictive 
qualifying criteria demonstrates that the scheme is only really of value when no 
prosecution has been brought.  If other charges or suspects have been prosecuted, the 
mechanism is unlikely to be available.  It is clear that both the CPS and the courts have 
resisted a more general right of review. 
 
This does not mean that the VRR is of no value as if the case meets the criteria, the 
VRR does provide a way for victims to hold prosecutors to account for their decisions.  
The victim is a catalyst for triggering a re-review of the original decision.  However, 
the victim does not get the opportunity to participate to any great extent either by 
entering into a dialogue on the case or by being involved in the review process; indeed, 
the scheme actively discourages such involvement.  Victims would benefit from 
 
 




greater clarity about whether they are entitled to make representations and the extent 
to which they will be taken into account.  
 
Potentially the VRR provides a form of accountability albeit of an internal, 
administrative nature rather than through the more formal, external legal mechanism 
of judicial review proceedings.  A sense of hierarchy does exist in that decisions are 
reviewed by a specialist unit or Chief Crown Prosecutor level.  However, the VRR 
arguably provides a more private, opaque form of accountability in that the reasons 
behind the decision are not fully interrogated and the victim does not get the 
opportunity to enter into a dialogue with the CPS regarding the decision.  The most 
the scheme does, therefore, is to provide a checking mechanism that may identify, and 
possibly remedy, some erroneous decisions.  This is made clear by the first stage of 
the test that is applied under the guidance:  whether the original decision was wrong.   
 
Although there is some evidence that the VRR is being successfully invoked by 
victims, it would perhaps have a greater sense of legitimacy if an independent element 
were incorporated.  The review is conducted by the same body that made the initial 
decision, behind closed doors.  The fact that the review is conducted by a different 
department or individual may be of little reassurance to the aggrieved victim.  A third, 
more independent, tier to the process could improve the VRR as a robust review 
system that could be done in a way which avoids undermining the separation of 
powers.  This is particularly important when there is the clear expectation from the 
courts that the aggrieved victim uses the VRR rather than apply for judicial review.   
The next chapter will examine judicial review as a mechanism for challenging 
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This chapter will build on the previous VRR chapters by introducing judicial review 
as an alternative way in which victims can challenge decisions not to prosecute.  
Judicial review is the traditional method of challenging decisions not to prosecute and 
has increased in importance for victims of crime in recent years.  However, this has 
been curtailed to some extent by the advent of the VRR.  The first section of this 
chapter will provide an overview of judicial review in the context of decisions not to 
prosecute both in relation to the traditional grounds of judicial review and under the 
Human Rights Act 1998.  The discussion of the traditional grounds will also show the 
importance and impact of prosecution policies on judicial review including the VRR 
guidance.  The second section will then evaluate the usefulness of judicial review 
against the same criteria used in the previous chapter of accessibility, participation, 
accountability and outcomes.  
 
This evaluation will show that judicial review is an accountability mechanism that 
does have the potential to compel the prosecutor to reconsider their decision.  
However, in order to reach this point the claimant has to negotiate a complex and 
legalistic procedural framework and put their case to a court which takes a restrictive 
approach to such applications.  Although judicial review does allow victims high 
levels of participation, a satisfactory outcome is not assured and even if the court is 
satisfied that the original decision was unlawful, the court is likely to simply quash the 







4.2 The development of judicial review of decisions not to prosecute 
 
An application for judicial review is the traditional route for challenging the decision 
of a public body or decision maker and is not unique to public prosecutors.  If the 
source of the body’s power is statutory, the body is likely to be susceptible to judicial 
review.  The source of the power is not the only factor and it has been established that 
if the ‘body in question is exercising public law functions, or if the exercise of its 
functions have public law consequences’ that may be sufficient to make its decisions 
susceptible to judicial review.1  The Crown Prosecution Service is a statutory body 
created by the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985.  As the CPS is concerned with the 
exercise of discretionary power conferred by statute to prosecute criminal cases on 
behalf of the state, it is inconceivable that anyone would argue that it could not, in 
principle, be amenable to judicial review.2  Indeed, as discussed below, there are a 
series of authorities that a decision not to prosecute can be subject to judicial review 
proceedings.   The application for judicial review is therefore more likely to be 
defended, and potentially refused, on the basis that the applicant does not have 
sufficient grounds or that the decision should be challenged by an alternative 
mechanism, such as the VRR.  Judicial review is a remedy of last resort and as such 
there is an expectation that the applicant has exhausted alternative remedies before 
commencing court proceedings.3  
 
The discussion which follows on grounds of judicial review in relation to decisions 
not to prosecute will show that the courts have adopted a restrictive stance to such 
applications both before and after the implementation of the VRR.  Judicial review 
has developed as an accountability mechanism for exceptional cases rather than as a 
routine course of action for challenging decisions not to prosecute.  This restrictive 
approach will be discussed further in the second section of this chapter where judicial 
review is evaluated against the criterion of accessibility.   
 
 
1 R v City Panel on Takeovers and Mergers ex parte Datafin plc [1987] QB 815, 847 
2 Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, s 3. 





4.2.1 Judicial Review:  The Traditional Grounds 
 
In the ‘GCHQ’ case Lord Diplock described the grounds of judicial review under three 
heads:  illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety.4  As judicial review 
develops on a case by case basis, these grounds are not static and may expand or 
develop in the future.  As set out below, there is now an additional ground of 
infringement of human rights including proportionality as an emerging head of 
review.5  These broad headings are a convenient way of categorising the different 
types of grounds for judicial review.  Illegality essentially concerns the correct 
interpretation and application of a decision-making power.  Irrationality describes 
what has become known as ‘Wednesbury unreasonableness’6 – described in ex parte 
Smith as taking a decision ‘beyond the range of reasonable responses’7 - with 
procedural impropriety relating to compliance with what were once known as the rules 
of natural justice, but which we now tend to think of as ‘procedural fairness’ and rules 
against bias.  These broad grounds are relevant to judicial review of decisions not to 
prosecute although the courts have set out specific potential grounds that are 
particularly relevant to challenges to prosecutorial discretion.  
 
Judicial review was used to challenge decisions not to prosecute since before the 
creation of the CPS when the police were the primary prosecutors.  One of these earlier 
cases, which provides a useful starting point chronologically, is R v Commissioner of 
Police of the Metropolis ex parte Blackburn.8  The applicant sought judicial review of 
the respondent’s policy of not enforcing the provisions of the Betting, Gaming and 
Lotteries Act 1963.  Although the court did not make an order against the 
Commissioner as by the time of the hearing he had revoked the policy, this case is 
significant as it marked the beginning of the courts being receptive to applications to 
intervene in decisions not to prosecute.  Lord Denning MR stated that ‘there are some 
 
 
4 Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374, 410-411 
5 Pham v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] UKSC 19, [2015] 1 WLR 1591 
6 Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 
7 R v Ministry of Defence ex parte Smith [1996] QB 517, 554 




policy decisions with which, I think, the courts in a case can, if necessary, interfere’ 
giving the example of a chief constable directing that no one would be prosecuted for 
theft of goods of less than £100 on that basis that ‘he would be failing in his duty to 
enforce the law.’9 
 
Subsequent judicial review proceedings brought by Mr Blackburn in relation to the 
Commissioner of Police’s failure to prosecute under the Obscene Publications Act 
1959 also failed on the basis that the Court of Appeal did not accept that it was a proper 
case for the court to interfere with the discretion of the police.10   
 
As the Blackburn cases pre-dated the creation of the CPS, the cases concerned judicial 
review of police policy decisions and although unsuccessful did confirm that such 
decisions could potentially be subject to judicial review.  Subsequently the courts had 
to determine whether decisions of the CPS should be amenable to judicial review.  
This issue was considered in R v Chief Constable of Kent and CPS ex parte L which 
concerned applications for judicial review of CPS decisions not to discontinue 
prosecutions against two youths who had been charged by the police.11  The court 
concluded that as ultimately it was a CPS decision as to whether the case proceeded, 
the CPS was the prosecuting body who should be subject to judicial review with 
Watkins LJ stating:  ‘if judicial review lies in relation to the current criminal 
proceedings… it lies against the body which has the last and decisive word, the CPS.’12  
The role of the police was reduced at that time to initiators of criminal proceedings in 
that they had the power to charge suspects without reference to the CPS, but beyond 
that point it was within the discretion of the CPS as to whether the case continued or 
was discontinued.  The court held that the decision of the CPS could be susceptible to 
judicial review where the decision related to a youth and was in contravention of 
settled policy.  However, both applications were refused on the basis that the discretion 
had been properly exercised. 
 
 
9 ibid 136. 
10 R v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis ex parte Blackburn (Albert Raymond) (Order of 
Mandamus) [1973] QB 241 
11 (1991) 93 Cr App R 416 





The Divisional Court considered the susceptibility of the CPS to judicial review 
specifically in relation to decisions not to prosecute in the seminal case of R v DPP ex 
parte C.13  This was an application for judicial review of the DPP’s decision not to 
prosecute the applicant’s husband for an offence of buggery under section 12 of the 
Sexual Offences Act 1956.  The court held that the decision of the DPP was 
unreasonable in that it failed to properly consider all possible offences and lines of 
defence.  As a result, he had not properly applied the evidential sufficiency stage of 
the Code for Crown Prosecutors.  The decision was set aside and then remitted back 
to the DPP for further consideration. 
 
Kennedy LJ confirmed that the power to judicially review decisions not to prosecute 
should be used ‘sparingly.’14  This case is significant because the judgment then sets 
out the three circumstances when the court could review a decision not to prosecute:  
Firstly, because of some unlawful policy; secondly, failing to act in accordance with 
the Code or settled policy; thirdly, the decision was Wednesbury unreasonable.15  
Although not specifically mentioned, presumably it would also be possible to argue 
the decision was unlawful as a result of a procedural impropriety such as bias.  The 
effect of this judgment was to clearly establish the approach of the High Court to 
intervening in prosecutorial discretion:  the court would be unlikely to entertain an 
application unless it fell within the three categories.  This case remains influential and 
was cited in the more recent cases of L v DPP16 and R (S) v CPS.17   
 
The decision not to prosecute following a death in prison custody whilst the deceased 
was being restrained was quashed by the court in Manning.18  The decision not to 
prosecute was challenged on the grounds that it was irrational in light of the evidence 
and the inquest jury’s verdict of unlawful killing; that the CPS had failed to properly 
apply the Code; and that the DPP was under a duty to give reasons – particularly as a 
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16 [2013] EWHC 1752 (Admin) 
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result of the right to life under Article 2 of the ECHR.  The court held that the review 
was not ‘an objective appraisal’ of the prospect of success and the prosecutor applied 
‘a higher test than that laid down in the Code.’19  This underlines the centrality of the 
Code test:  the decision is liable to be quashed if the evidential and public interest 
stages of the Code are not properly applied.   
 
The correct application of prosecution policy including the Code is central to judicial 
review of decisions not to prosecute.  If the prosecutor has properly applied relevant 
prosecution policies and complied with the Code, the court is unlikely to interfere with 
the decision unless it can be shown that the decision was unreasonable.  If a decision 
is Wednesbury unreasonable, it is likely that the Code or policies would not have been 
properly applied.  The role of prosecution policies will be examined in more detail 
below.   
 
An alternative ground for judicial review is to argue that the prosecutor made an error 
of law although this could be framed in terms that the evidential stage of the Code was 
not properly applied or that the decision was unreasonable.  An example of a case 
involving an error of law is R v DPP ex parte Jones where the prosecutor had 
misunderstood the legal test that would be applied by the court basing his decision on 
a subjective test for gross negligence manslaughter rather than an objective one.20  As 
a result, Buxton LJ concluded that the relevant law had not been properly addressed 
by the prosecutor and quashed the decision not to prosecute.21  In the more recent case 
of R (Purvis) v DPP the court held that the prosecutor had made an error of law by 
incorrectly applying the evidential stage of the Code; the prosecutor had incorrectly 
concluded that there was not sufficient evidence for a realistic prospect of conviction 
for perverting the course of justice.22  The court also held that the decision was 
Wednesbury unreasonable in that the prosecutor had decided that it was not in the 
public interest on the facts of this case to prosecute a serving police officer when there 
was evidence that he had lied on oath.  These cases highlight how an application based 
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upon the grounds that the decision was wrong in law and incorrect application of the 
Code for Crown Prosecutors can potentially result in the decision being quashed.  The 
Code is fundamental to the decision-making process and, together with relevant 
prosecution policies, is likely to shape the exercise of the prosecutor’s discretion.  
Therefore, the importance of prosecution policies (including the Code) and their 
relevance to judicial review applications will be explored further after an examination 
of judicial review on human rights grounds.  
 
4.2.2 Judicial Review:  Human Rights Grounds 
 
The Human Rights Act 1998 has expanded the traditional grounds of judicial review 
as an aggrieved victim may bring a claim for judicial review on the basis that their 
human rights have been breached.  This is potentially relevant to review of decisions 
not to prosecute.  Under the Human Rights Act 1998 public authorities are under an 
obligation to act compatibly with the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR).23 As the CPS is the public prosecutor, it is clearly a public authority for the 
purposes of the Act as its ‘functions’ are ‘of a public nature.’24 
 
Those who claim to have been subjected to an unlawful act can bring an application 
for judicial review on the grounds that their rights have been infringed provided they 
are the victim of the alleged breach.25  It has been established in both the UK courts 
and in Strasbourg that to rely on Convention rights in legal proceedings the claimant 
must be directly affected by, or that they run the risk of being directly affected by, the 
unlawful act or decision.26  This should not pose a problem for individuals challenging 
a decision not to prosecute, although generic campaigning organisations may be 
refused standing.  Victim status is made out not because they are the victim of a 
criminal offence, but because they are victim of the State’s failure to protect or make 
 
 
23 Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA 1998) s 6(1). 
24 ibid s 6(3) 
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good a breach of their human rights.  One benefit of a human rights claim to victims 
is that the time limit is one year from the date of the act complained of.27 
 
In terms of specific grounds, case law has established that particular Convention rights 
are especially relevant to decisions not to prosecute.  The European Court of Human 
Rights has held that Members States are under a positive obligation to effectively and 
proactively investigate and prosecute crimes and a failure to do so might constitute a 
freestanding breach of Articles 2, 3 and 4 (and potentially Article 8), depending on the 
nature of the crime alleged.  These positive obligations have been established by a 
series of cases from Strasbourg and the domestic courts.  The first in the line of cases 
was X and Y v Netherlands in which the court held that the victim’s Article 8 rights 
had been breached as a result of the Dutch criminal law not allowing the prosecution 
of a male who had sexually assaulted a sixteen-year-old who lacked capacity to make 
her own complaint.  The court stated that, ‘there may be positive obligations inherent 
in an effective respect for private and family life.’28   This concept was developed 
further in the cases which followed.   
 
Osman v UK involved a claim that the applicant’s rights under Articles 2, 6 and 8 had 
been breached by the failure of the UK authorities to protect the applicant and his 
family from a stalker which ultimately resulted in the shooting of two family members 
(one of which was fatal).29  The claim was essentially that the police had failed to take 
proper steps to protect him and his family and that the law did not provide a remedy 
in tort because case law had established that the police did not owe a duty of care to 
individual victims in such circumstances.30  Although the court did not find breaches 
of Articles 2 and 8 on the facts of this case, the case did establish the principle that 
Member States were required to undertake an effective investigation into allegations 
that an individual’s rights under Article 2 have been breached.31  Although this case 
did not involve a claim against the public prosecutor, arguably the principle could 
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include an obligation to prosecute individuals who had ended or put someone’s life at 
risk.  The courts have subsequently upheld judicial review applications on the basis 
that the failure to prosecute amounted to an infringement of the victim’s Convention 
Rights.  
 
One such case is R (B) v DPP which is significant in that the Administrative Court 
held that the decision to offer no evidence in relation to a serious assault because the 
prosecution had received a medical report which stated that the victim had a history 
of mental health problems was not only irrational, but also a breach of the victim’s 
Article 3 rights.32  The victim stated that he was humiliated by the decision not to 
prosecute and felt like a second-class citizen. The court concluded that to decide not 
to prosecute for such reasons would place vulnerable victims outside the protection of 
the criminal justice system and allow them to be assaulted without the risk of 
prosecution.33 
 
In MC v Bulgaria the court held that the State had been in breach of both Articles 3 
and 8 by having criminal law provisions which failed to effectively investigate and 
prosecute offences of rape.34  This was a rape case in which the authorities 
discontinued the case because of a lack of evidence of active force by the victim.  The 
court specifically referred to the requirement to effectively prosecute:  ‘States have a 
positive obligation inherent in Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention to enact criminal 
law provisions effectively punishing rape and to apply them in practice through 
effective investigation and prosecution.’35  Challenges to the decision not to prosecute 
on human rights grounds are not limited to Articles 2 and 3 as the subsequent case of 
Waxman demonstrates.36  This claim for judicial review of a decision not to prosecute 
two allegations of breach of Restraining Order was found to be an infringement of the 
claimant’s rights under Article 8.  The court stated: ‘the state owed her [the claimant] 
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a duty to take proper measures to protect her and was in breach of its duty in failing 
to pursue the prosecution.’37 
 
The relationship between human rights and the decision to prosecute in England and 
Wales was recently considered by the European Court of Human Rights in Da Silva v 
UK.38  The applicant was challenging the decision not to prosecute individual police 
officers in relation to the shooting of her cousin (Jean Charles de Menezes) in a 
suspected terrorist attack at Stockwell underground station in London.  She argued 
that the UK was in breach of its positive obligations under Article 2 to conduct an 
effective investigation and prosecution when following an investigation by the IPCC, 
the CPS decided not to prosecute by applying the Full Code Test from the Code for 
Crown Prosecutors.  The applicant challenged the lawfulness of the public prosecution 
system in England and Wales and argued that the failure to prosecute amounted to a 
breach of Article 2.39  Specifically, she argued that the evidential test in England and 
Wales is too high and should include the hearing of oral evidence to assess the honesty 
and credibility of the witnesses.40   
 
Although there have been occasions when the court has identified ‘institutional 
deficiencies’ in the prosecutorial system that could breach Article 2, the court was of 
the view that the decision could be made by a public official provided the process was 
independent and objective.41  The court concluded that the setting of a threshold 
evidential test such as the one within the CPS code came within the margin of 
appreciation accorded to individual Member States.42  Clearly different tests are in use 
in different jurisdictions with some states having the decision made by a judicial figure 
rather than a prosecutor.  The court was ultimately of the view that there had been no 
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Overall, these cases highlight that the human rights ground is emerging as a way of 
challenging prosecutorial discretion.   
 
4.2.3 The Significance of Prosecution Policies 
 
As has been shown above, prosecution policies are central to the decision-making 
process and therefore are often central to an application for judicial review of a 
decision not to prosecute. This section will examine the role of prosecution policies 
generally before considering the impact of the VRR on challenging decisions not to 
prosecute by way of judicial review. 
 
Two of the three grounds established in ex parte C relate to prosecution policies, 
namely either that the policy is unlawful per se or the decision maker has not acted in 
accordance with a settled policy.44  Not acting in accordance with a policy could also 
lead to an argument that the decision was Wednesbury unreasonable.  The case of 
Purvis is an example of the second and third grounds:  the prosecutor had applied the 
Code to the facts of the case, but the court decided that it was unreasonable to conclude 
that a prosecution was not in the public interest on the facts of the case.45  The 
remainder of applications are likely to be based on claims that either the law has been 
incorrectly applied to the case or that the decision is based on an incorrect assessment 
of the evidence.  Even then it is likely that the grounds will be articulated in such a 
way to suggest that the prosecutor has not properly applied the evidential stage of the 
Code for Crown Prosecutors.  Again, Purvis is a relevant example.  The prosecutor 
had wrongly concluded that there was insufficient evidence to prosecute perverting 
the course of justice.  
 
The Code is not the only relevant policy.  In cases where there is a victim, there is also 
likely to be at least one relevant policy. There are, for example, prosecution policies 
on Domestic Abuse, Racist and Religious Hate Crime, Mentally Disordered Offenders 
and Rape.  Historically, prosecution policies were not publicly available and there was 
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concern that this could have an impact on proper accountability.46 The majority of 
policies are now publicly available on the CPS website which will make it easier for 
potential claimant to identify the relevant policy and form a view whether it was 
appropriately applied in their case.47 
 
The use of policies and guidelines to shape decision-making is not unique to the CPS 
and has been subjected to public law challenges in a range of contexts.  The British 
Oxygen Company v Board of Trade case established that it is permissible to have a 
policy in place to guide discretion, but it must not be so rigid to preclude the 
consideration of individual cases that may justify departure from the policy.48  To 
adopt such a policy would amount to a fettering of discretion.  This point was argued 
in judicial review proceedings in the context of prosecutorial discretion in R (Robson) 
v CPS when a prosecutor refused to consider a conditional caution in a criminal 
damage case because the CPS guidance on adult conditional cautions appeared to 
preclude such a disposal in cases that came within the broad definition of domestic 
abuse.49  The CPS conceded that the guidance was being operated as an inflexible rule.  
However, the court did not declare the policy as unlawful, but rather quashed the 
decision on the basis that the prosecutor had interpreted the guidance inflexibly and 
as not permitting exceptions.50 
 
These cases illustrate how an inflexible policy or rule that does not allow the 
circumstances of individual cases to be taken into account can result in the decision 
being quashed.  However, it is also possible for a challenge to be brought on the basis 
that a particular policy has not been properly complied with.51   The doctrine of 
legitimate expectation may be used as grounds for judicial review when the decision 
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maker has failed to follow particular procedures in the decision-making process.  This 
could be where a particular policy exists and there is an expectation that it will be 
followed.52  Breach of legitimate expectation on the basis of departure from 
established policy should be distinguished from substantive legitimate expectation 
where the claimant has relied on a specific representation made by a public body.53  
 
Failure to follow established policy was successfully argued in R (Guest) v DPP where 
a decision to issue a conditional caution was challenged the victim of a serious assault 
on the basis that the decision was contrary to the Code for Crown Prosecutors and the 
DPP’s guidance on conditional cautions.54  The court held that the decision was 
‘fundamentally flawed’ as the both the evidential and public interest stages of the Code 
test were met and the severity of the alleged offence justified prosecution rather than 
disposal by way of a conditional caution.55  To issue a conditional caution in respect 
of this offence was held to be contrary to the guidance in a number of respects:  firstly, 
the guidance did not permit a conditional caution for such a serious offence, secondly, 
it was not a ‘appropriate and proportionate response’ and the victim was not involved 
in the decision making process.56  Although the Supreme Court has ruled that equal 
treatment is not a separate head of review in domestic law, it did accept that it is part 
of the application of rationality.57  Therefore, if a particular case is decided differently 
to similar cases there would be an argument that the decision was irrational.58  
However, decision-makers cannot be required to check every similar case before 
making a decision and the court has recognised that two different decisions on the 
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Therefore, the application of prosecution policies arguably offer fertile ground for 
challenging a decision not to prosecute if it can be shown that either a policy was not 
properly applied when it should have been or that it has been applied so rigidly that 
account has not been taken of a potential exception to the general policy.  Despite the 
plethora of different prosecution policies and guidelines, not all offences are covered 
by offence-specific policies.  More often the policies are more generic and offer 
guidance in relation to specific types of crime such as Hate Crime, or guidance in 
dealing with particular offenders or victims.  An example of a policy that has attracted 
a significant amount of academic discussion is the prosecution policy on assisted 
suicide.   
 
This policy was as a result of the House of Lords decision in the 2010 case of Purdy.60  
Mrs Purdy claimed that the offence of Assisting Suicide under section 2(1) of the 
Suicide Act 1961 engaged Article 8 of the ECHR and that compliance with article 8(2) 
required an offence-specific policy from the DPP in order that she was able to make 
an informed decision as to whether her husband would be prosecuted for assisting her. 
She argued that the Code for Crown Prosecutors was too vague for this purpose.  The 
House of Lords granted a mandatory order that DPP publish a policy setting out the 
factors that will be taken into account when assessing the public interest of prosecuting 
such a case.  The academic discussion regarding this policy highlights some of the 
potential problems with prosecution policies which could be relevant to policies more 
generally. 
 
Rogers has argued that publishing an offence-specific policy which suggests non-
prosecution in certain circumstances offends against the rule of law as it could be seen 
to override the will of Parliament.61  An application for judicial review could be made 
on the grounds that the decision was Wednesbury unreasonable as a result of an 
irrational conclusion based on the absence or presence of relevant factors.62  Rogers 
argues that there may also be difficulties if the policy were amended:  A defendant 
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may make his decision based on one policy, but then the decision whether to prosecute 
decided on the basis of a different policy.  Defendants could then potentially argue 
breach of legitimate expectation.  Heywood identifies that there is a tension between 
certainty and discretion:  certainty was what Mrs Purdy was seeking, but the risk is 
that the policy will rigidify prosecutorial discretion in future cases.63  Nobles and 
Schiff have argued that the policy has virtually introduced a right not to be 
prosecuted.64  Decision-making under the policy is, however, structured around the 
assessment of factors for and against prosecution and therefore does not provide an 
absolute guarantee that a prosecution would not be brought in specific cases.  The 
difficulty is perhaps that the very nature of the offence in question may mean that a 
potential defendant takes a carefully considered approach weighing up the likelihood 
of prosecution on the basis of the factors identified in the policy.  As a result, it is 
possible that a relatively accurate prediction as to the likely decision could be made in 
advance of the act taking place.  It is of note, however, that this is a rare type of 
offending and so the concerns about this particular policy arguably are not applicable 
to other prosecution policies.  
 
The aim of prosecution policies is to increase consistency of decision-making.  
However, they do need to be flexible enough to take into account cases that do not fit 
neatly within them.  There are clear risks associated with them such as the tendency 
to apply them too rigidly potentially causing injustice.  Alternatively, the prosecutor 
may be faced with an argument that the policy generated an expectation that an offence 
would be dealt with in a particular way and that the decision should be quashed.  This 
discussion will now be developed specifically in relation to the VRR.  
 
4.2.4 The Impact of the Victims’ Right to Review 
 
The VRR is a policy of particular relevance to applications for judicial review of 
decisions not to prosecute as it provides an alternative means for victims to challenge 
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prosecution decisions.  As the VRR is specifically designed for victims to request a 
review of a decision not to prosecute, it should have the effect of reducing the number 
of applications for judicial review.  In addition, this section will show that the courts 
have indicated that the existence of the VRR will reduce the likelihood of permission 
being granted.   
 
As set out in chapter two, the CPS introduced the VRR following the case of Killick 
in which the Court of Appeal indicated that victims should have a means of requesting 
a review of decisions not to prosecute.65  As a result, the CPS implemented the VRR 
scheme that applies to qualifying decisions made on or after 5 June 2013.  It is clear 
from cases that have followed Killick that the courts have adopted an even more 
restrictive approach to applications for judicial review as a result. 
 
An early indication of the approach to be taken by the court was given in the case of 
L v DPP that was decided in March 2013 shortly before the VRR was published.66  Sir 
John Thomas said that even prior to the VRR grounds for judicial review would be 
‘very narrow’ and referred to the three grounds set out in R v DPP ex parte C of 
unlawful policy, failing to act in accordance with a set policy, and unreasonableness.67  
He further stressed the importance of the ‘constitutional position of the Crown 
Prosecution Service as an independent decision maker’ and that the courts had adopted 
a ‘very strict self denying ordinance.’68  He then stated that when a review has been 
undertaken under the VRR, ‘proceedings for judicial review to challenge the decision 
will be more difficult to advance’ because ‘the CPS will have independently 
reconsidered the position’.69  The court emphasised that the VRR should be engaged 
before judicial review proceedings were commenced and that the courts should not 
entertain applications that had not gone through the VRR first.70  A subsequent judicial 
review application would need to show how the VRR decision fell within one of three 
grounds set out in ex parte C.  The court also raised the possibility of costs being 
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imposed against unsuccessful claimants where an inappropriate challenge had been 
brought.71 
 
This approach has been followed in a number of cases that came before the courts after 
the VRR came into force.  The cases discussed here are those which particularly 
illuminate the relationship between the VRR and judicial review.  The judgment of L 
v DPP has been cited in subsequent judicial review cases which have post-dated the 
implementation of the VRR.  For example, in R (D) v DPP after quoting Sir John 
Thomas’s comments that the prospect of success in judicial review proceedings will 
be very small in light of the VRR, Gross LJ stated that the court will ‘proceed with 
caution’ as ‘there will already have been a VRR scheme review and the decision not 
to prosecute is vested in the prosecutor not the Court.’72  In R (S) v CPS the court 
outlined the approach to be taken to applications for review of VRR decisions.73  This 
case concerned judicial review of a decision to prosecute an offence of rape following 
a VRR request.  The court indicated that the potential grounds of challenge would be 
‘narrow.’  In the absence of either an unlawful policy or failing to act in accordance 
with an established policy, the court would have to be satisfied that the reviewer had 
acted unreasonably.  In S the court concluded that it had to decide whether the 
‘decision was one that was open to the reasonable prosecutor.’74 
 
The difficulty in persuading the court that a decision was unreasonable is highlighted 
by R (Oliver) v DPP, a death in custody case where the claimant was challenging the 
CPS decision not to prosecute the custody sergeant for gross negligence 
manslaughter.75  The initial decision not to prosecute had been confirmed through the 
VRR.  Both CPS decisions were also supported by an opinion from leading counsel.  
In his judgment, Davis LJ specifically referred to the fact that the decision whether to 
prosecute had been considered by two specialist prosecutors and approved by two 
leading counsel.76  Although this in itself would not prohibit the decision being 
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quashed on review, the VRR process does potentially add weight to the initial decision 
not to prosecute when subsequent reviewers have reached the same conclusion.  If the 
review decision agreed with the original decision and a number of prosecutors have 
been involved in the process, it is arguably going to be more difficult to satisfy the 
court that no reasonable prosecutor could have reached that decision.  Similarly, in 
John-Baptiste there was a division of views on whether there was a realistic prospect 
of conviction the Divisional Court dismissed the claim for judicial review on the basis 
that both views were rational.77  
 
It is clear, therefore, that the VRR will have a significant impact on the approach taken 
to applications for judicial review of decisions not to prosecute.  Although essentially 
the same grounds exist as previously, the judicial approach appears to be that if cases 
have been reviewed under the VRR this should be sufficient and the courts should 
only interfere in exceptional circumstances.  This will be explored further in relation 
to accessibility in the next section where the criteria will be applied to judicial review 
as a means of challenging prosecutorial decisions.  
  
 
4.3 Application of the criteria 
 
This section will develop the examination of judicial review as a method by which a 
victim can challenge a decision not to prosecute by evaluating it against the four 
criteria:  accessibility, participation, accountability and outcomes.  This will build the 
foundation for the thematic analysis of the three mechanisms of VRR, judicial review 
and private prosecutions in chapter six.   
 
As in the previous chapter, participation will be measured against Edwards’ model of 
participation and the assessment of accountability will use Bovens’ work as a 
framework for evaluating the extent to which judicial review can hold prosecution 
decision makers to account.  Outcomes will evaluate the extent to which judicial 
 
 




review is capable of bringing about a prosecution although it is accepted that this is 
not the outcome that every victim is seeking by challenging a decision not to 




This criterion will address the following question:  to what extent is judicial review 
appropriately accessible?  It will be argued here that judicial review is a largely 
inaccessible course of action for the majority of victims due to its complexity.  
Although it is a common law remedy, its procedure is regulated by legislation in the 
form of the Senior Courts Act 1981 and Part 54 of the Civil Procedure Rules.  The 
Pre-Action Protocol for Judicial Review must also be complied with.  As will be 
shown below, there are extensive procedural requirements that the victim would need 
to navigate in order to bring a claim and it is almost inevitable that a potential claimant 
would need legal advice.  
 
Judicial review is a remedy of last resort and would not be an appropriate route where 
there was an alternative available.  The Pre-Action Protocol states that it may only be 
used where ‘there is no right of appeal or where all avenues of appeal have been 
exhausted.’78   The protocol emphasises engagement with alternative dispute 
resolution that would include complaints mechanisms, mediation and other out of 
court settlements.  Clearly, the Victims’ Right to Review is the most relevant 
alternative and, as set out in the previous section of this chapter, the courts have an 
expectation that this is pursued before judicial review proceedings are brought.79  The 
VRR is not available in all cases, but where the case is eligible under the scheme this 
would in reality be a barrier to judicial review.  There are other expectations under the 
protocol such as the requirement to send a letter before claim that sets out the basis of 
the claim allowing the potential defendant the opportunity to respond and potentially 
resolve the matter without resorting to court proceedings.80 
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There are also onerous requirements associated with the process of issuing a claim 
which are contained within Part 54 of the CPR and the supplementary practice 
directions.81  These include requirements to incorporate certain mandatory 
information including the legal basis of the claim and remedies sought together with 
a ‘detailed statement of the claimant’s grounds for bringing the claim’ and written 
evidence in support.82  This in itself makes judicial review inaccessible for many 
unrepresented victims; access is guarded by numerous procedural requirements that 
require expertise in the relevant law and procedure.  If the victim successfully issues 
the claim, they would then have to obtain permission from a single judge in the 
Administrative Court for the claim to proceed.83  At this stage, the claimant would 
need to persuade the judge that they had standing to bring the claim, it was brought in 
time and that they had an arguable case to proceed to a full hearing.  The permission 
stage, therefore, filters out those claims that are deemed to be without merit, out of 
time or brought by someone who does not have sufficient interest in the decision.  
 
In the majority of cases brought by victims, standing is not likely to be an issue.  The 
legislation states that leave should only be granted if ‘the applicant has sufficient 
interest in the matter to which the application relates.’84  Most victims are going to be 
arguing that they have standing on the basis of their personal rights and interests in the 
matter, namely that they were the victim of the offence which the public prosecutor 
has decided not to prosecute.85  Family members of deceased victims are also likely 
to be granted standing.86   
 
The position is more complicated when it comes to individuals or groups beyond the 
conventional victim.  Although there is not a rigid definition of who can be granted 
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standing in relation to applications based on the traditional grounds of judicial review, 
the more remote the applicant from the offence which the CPS declined to prosecute 
the less likely standing would be granted for judicial review.  Wider constructions of 
victimhood such as indirect victims and unconventional direct victims, such as 
community victims, are less likely to be able to successfully bring proceedings.  
Unless they can demonstrate a connection with the decision, members of the 
community in which the alleged offence occurred are likely to be refused standing on 
the basis that they have no more interest in the case than anyone else.87 
 
However, there are cases where standing has been granted to pressure and public 
interest groups.  These could be groups that represent individual or groups of victims. 
If a group was supporting a particular victim, then standing should not be an issue.  
Standing may be granted on a similar basis to in ex parte Greenpeace in which the 
court granted permission to bring judicial proceedings to Greenpeace on the basis that 
they were a respected campaigning body with a significant number of supports in the 
UK and internationally and, most importantly, 2500 supported in the Cumbria area.88  
In ex parte World Development Movement standing was granted to challenge the 
decision to challenge the decision to provide funding for a power station in Malaysia.89  
In this case, one of the factors taken into account by the court was the absence of 
anyone else who could bring proceedings.  If there are no other potential claimants, 
then the court may be more willing to grant standing.   
 
Therefore, if an individual or group, other than a conventional victim, were to attempt 
judicial review of a decision not to prosecute, the court would be likely to take into 
account whether there is a more suitable claimant.  An example of this is the ‘black 
cab rapist’ case in which the Mayor of London was refused standing to challenge the 
decision of the Parole Board on the basis that he was in ‘no different position from 
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any other politician, or indeed any member of the public.’90  The court emphasised 
that the Secretary of State and the victims of the offences would be ‘obviously better 
placed challengers.’91  Therefore, if the victim was not engaged in the process and a 
pressure group, such as an anti-domestic abuse organisation, wished to challenge the 
decision not to prosecute, they may well be refused standing.       
 
It is, therefore, not automatic that standing will be granted and although the courts are 
adopting a more flexible approach to standing, the courts are likely to look at the issue 
of standing in relation to the case as a whole and whether it represents a point of wider 
public interest.  If the claim is based on human rights grounds, the application would 
need to be made by the victim of the decision as the ‘applicant is to be taken to have 
a sufficient interest in relation to the unlawful act only if he is, or would be, a victim 
of the act.’92   
 
A further obstacle for victims is that applications need to be made in a timely manner. 
Applications must be made ‘promptly’ and ‘in any event no later than 3 months after 
the grounds to make the claim first arose.’93  Although the court has a discretion to 
extent the time limit, the courts have taken a restrictive approach to this and in the 
absence of good reason, leave is likely to be refused.94  This requirement of timeliness 
restricts accessibility as an aggrieved victim may not appreciate the urgency of 
bringing the matter to court.  The tight time limits create a pressure on the victim to 
decide what action to take without delay and then put it into action.  The time limit 
could have a knock-on effect on the quality of the application that is made and 
therefore reduce the chances of permission being granted.  
 
The third element considered at the permission stage is whether the applicant has an 
arguable case.  Essentially this is an initial assessment of the grounds of review and 
the likelihood of success.  The difficulty for the victim is that their disagreement with 
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the decision not to prosecute needs to be recast into public law terms.  Unlike the VRR, 
it is not sufficient to argue that the prosecutor’s decision is wrong; the claim needs to 
be articulated in terms of established grounds of judicial review.  As has been shown 
in section one above, the grounds are narrow and the courts have adopted a restrictive 
stance towards such applications over a period of time; this has narrowed further 
following the implementation of the VRR.   
   
If the claim is to be based on the failure to apply a particular policy or the 
misapplication of the policy, this will be difficult to argue without detailed reasons as 
to how the decision was reached.  Similarly, in relation to irrationality:  without the 
detailed reasoning of the prosecutor, it would be more difficult to show that the 
prosecutor’s decision is unreasonable.  Although the CPS is under an obligation to 
give reasons for its decision to victims, the quality of the reasons given is variable.95 
 
In the event that leave is granted at the permission stage, the claimant has to prepare 
for the substantive hearing.  As well as a number of procedural requirements, such as 
providing paginated bundles and skeleton arguments, the claimant needs to be able to 
articulate his claim in oral argument.  This requires more detailed submissions on the 
grounds than were set out at the permission stage.  Without legal representation, this 
is likely to be a particular challenging part of the process.  The victim is likely to be 
against an experienced and qualified opponent in an area of law where decisions are 
not easily predictable.  
 
Whether the victim can be legally represented is likely to depend in many cases on the 
availability of public funding to finance the proceedings.  Potentially civil Legal Aid 
is available for judicial review.96  However, this is subject to a merits test:  the Legal 
Aid Agency would have to be satisfied that the prospects of success are at least 
moderate.97  This would rely on the assessment of the case by the legal practitioner 
who was to represent the applicant.  There have been attempts recently to reduce the 
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availability of public funding for judicial review claims by shifting the risk on to the 
legal representative that they may not be remunerated for work undertaken prior to the 
permission stage if leave was not granted.  Although this was itself successfully 
challenged by judicial review, it does show an appetite on behalf of the government 
to reduce funding in this area and it will not be easy to overcome the strict financial 
and merits criteria.98 
 
Notwithstanding the onerous requirements of judicial review, a number of applications 
for judicial review appear to be brought each year.  A request under the Freedom of 
Information Act 2000 revealed that the CPS was party to 102 sets of proceedings in 
the Administrative Court in 2011-2012 (either as claimant, defendant or an interested 
party) peaking at 156 cases in 2014-15 and reducing down to 64 in 2017-18.99  It is 
suggested that a significant proportion of these are likely to be challenges to decisions 
not to prosecute.  It is also quite likely that the overall reduction in the number of cases 
is at least partly as a result of the availability of the VRR.  
 
Therefore, judicial review is a relatively inaccessible way of challenging a decision 
not to prosecute.  There are a number of procedural requirements as well as practical 




The second criterion is that of participation; the question is addressed here is: to what 
extent do victims have a meaningful participatory role?  Traditionally the victim 
has very limited participation rights in the criminal justice process.  The highest points 
of participation are, however, the pre-trial and post-conviction stages with the victim 
being relegated to the role of a witness during the trial phase.  This is largely as a result 
of the adversarial model on which the criminal justice system in England and Wales 
is based.  This section will show that judicial review proceedings do accord 
 
 
98 R (Ben Hoare Bell Solicitors) v Lord Chancellor [2015] EWHC 523 (Admin) 
99 Response from CPS Information Management Unit to request under the Freedom of Information Act 




participation rights to victims although these rights take place outside the prosecution 
process.   
 
The parties to the criminal prosecution are the State and the defendant; the victim is 
not a party although the victim’s interests are accommodated in a number of specific 
ways such as having the opportunity to make a VPS or by participating in a restorative 
justice part of a sentence.  Judicial review proceedings are the obverse of criminal 
proceedings:  they are a public law action between the victim and the State.  The 
suspect in the criminal proceedings becomes an interested party in the judicial review 
proceedings.  Judicial review is not easy to locate in terms of the categorisation of the 
proceedings.  There is case law that establishes judicial review proceedings are distinct 
from private law proceedings.100  The issue is, therefore, whether judicial review of 
the decision not to prosecute is part of the prosecution process.  
 
Whether judicial review is a criminal or civil matter was considered by the Supreme 
Court in R (Belhaj) v DPP.101  The court decided that judicial review of a decision not 
to prosecute was a ‘criminal cause or matter’ for the purposes of section 6 of the Justice 
and Security Act 2013.  This would determine whether or not the ‘closed material 
procedure’ could be used to prevent the disclosure of classified documents on which 
the decision not to prosecute was based.  Lord Sumption JSC, in giving the majority 
judgment, referred to the ‘extensive criminal jurisdiction by way of review’ of the 
High Court and its ‘supervisory jurisdiction over the criminal process.’102  The 
majority was of the view that judicial review ‘cannot be regarded as an inherently civil 
proceeding’ and that ‘it is an integral part of the criminal justice system.’103  However, 
the dissenting judgment of Lord Lloyd-Jones JSC stated that judicial review 
proceedings ‘are, at least, one remove from a criminal cause or matter and the court is 
performing the function of determining the legality of the conduct of the decision 
maker.104   
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From the perspective of an analysis of participation, it is perhaps possible to reconcile 
these judgments.  Whether or not judicial review of a decision not to prosecute is a 
criminal or civil matter, the reality is that the judicial review proceedings are separate, 
or collateral, proceedings to the criminal prosecution of the suspect.  However, they 
do accord the victim participation rights in relation to a key stage of the criminal 
process, namely the decision to prosecute.  Judicial review allows the victim the 
opportunity to plead their case to the High Court in a way that they would not 
ordinarily be allowed to do either by making representations to the police or the CPS 
prior to a charging decision being made or as part of the VRR process.  In the event 
that the application is successful, the court is likely to quash the decision and remit it 
back to the CPS for further review.   In such circumstances, the victim’s involvement 
will have been central to the course that the case has taken and prosecution again 
becomes a possibility.  Without the victim’s involvement, the case would have 
concluded.  
 
Judicial review attributes party status to the victim for the determination of the issue 
before the court, namely the lawfulness of the decision not to prosecute.  The nature 
of this participation is that it is intense and extensive.  The victim, perhaps through his 
representatives, has to challenge the reasons behind the decision using established 
public law grounds.  The previous discussion of accessibility highlighted the 
procedural and substantive complexities of bringing an action for judicial review and 
the high levels of involvement that are required of the party to successfully pursue 
such a claim.   
 
The application of Edwards’ model of participation to judicial review suggests a high 
level of participation akin to consultation in the non-dispositive category.105  However, 
it is not an easy fit as the victim is going further than simply supplying their preference; 
they are attempting to enforce their view that the decision not to prosecute should not 
stand.  One clear characteristic of this participation, however, is that it is transitory.  
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The victim’s party status remains until the High Court has determined the outcome of 
the judicial review proceedings and it then ceases with the victim returning to their 
previous non-party status with no long-term consequences in terms of their 
participation in any future prosecution.  
 
Therefore, participation through judicial review is in excess of the level of 
participation ordinarily accorded to victims within the criminal justice process.  But it 
is limited to the judicial review proceedings and ends abruptly once the issue before 
the High Court has been determined. This analysis will be developed further in the 




The third criterion is that of accountability.  To what extent is judicial review an 
effective mechanism for holding the public prosecutor to account?  This analysis 
will show that judicial review is a legal form of accountability mechanism which has 
a number of characteristics which indicate that it should be an effective method of 
holding prosecutors to account.  However, in practice, case law suggests that 
applications for judicial review are rarely likely to succeed. 
 
In an article published in 1994 after the release of the third edition of the Code for 
Crown Prosecutors, Fionda and Ashworth recognise that actions for judicial review 
could be a source of external accountability for the CPS.106  Burton concludes that the 
Manning case brought hope that the courts would review individual decisions not to 
prosecute, but also comments:  ‘The level of accountability to the court for decisions 
not to prosecute is likely to remain low.’107   
 
A closer examination using Bovens’ characteristics does reveal that judicial review 
proceedings are a form of accountability mechanism.  Firstly, the formal nature of the 
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relationship between the CPS and the High Court is such that the court is in the 
position of dominance over the CPS and is ultimately the decision maker.  As it has 
clearly been established in case law that the court has a power to judicially review 
decisions of the public prosecutor, the CPS is in the position that it has to explain and 
justify its conduct to the court.  The CPS will submit evidence in the form of affidavits 
and the court would then have to decide whether or not it is persuaded by the 
justifications that have been put forward.  Judicial review remains an adversarial rather 
than inquisitorial process so the conventional position is that it is actually the other 
party (the claimant) that will be challenging the decision of the CPS rather than the 
judge.  They are doing so by virtue of the fact that they have brought the proceedings 
and by arguing through submissions that the decision was unlawful.  However, in 
reality, the judiciary do challenge the representations of the defendant as part of the 
judicial review process by the questions that they put to the defendant.  The court is 
then in a position to pass judgment and to determine whether or not the decision should 
be allowed to stand.  This includes a power to impose a sanction, which in all 
likelihood is to quash the decision and remit it back to the CPS for further review.  
 
As the forum is the High Court, judicial review is a form of legal accountability with 
a ‘vertical’ form of obligation between the CPS and the court.  Judicial review clearly 
comes within Bovens’ ‘constitutional perspective’ with the court providing a checking 
mechanism on the actions of the CPS as part of the executive.  The legal and 
hierarchical nature of judicial review as a form of accountability mechanism means 
that the courts clearly do have sufficient powers to investigate the actions of the CPS 
as well as to be able to impose appropriate sanctions.  The CPS would be under a legal 
obligation to comply with the judicial review process.   Judicial review also provides 
an external and independent model of accountability which inherently has a level of 
dialogue between the parties.  Judicial review proceedings bring an element of public 
scrutiny and accountability in that they are in open court and can be reported in both 





Therefore, judicial review clearly does have the potential to hold the public prosecutor 
to account over a decision not to prosecute.108  The High Court has the power to quash 
unlawful decisions compelling the CPS to reconsider their decision.  However, it will 
only do so in a relatively narrow range of situations that limits its usefulness to the 
aggrieved victim.  Arguably, therefore, the level of accountability offered by judicial 
review remains low.  This is largely because of the very narrow circumstances in 
which a court will review a decision (as outlined in relation to accessibility) with 
relatively poor prospects of success often relying on the court finding that the decision 
was unreasonable.  To bring about any degree of accountability, the claimant will need 




The likelihood of a meaningful outcome is an important criterion to consider when 
evaluating the usefulness of a particular course of action for victims.  Therefore, the 
question addressed under this criterion is: does judicial review provide meaningful 
and satisfactory outcomes for victims?  Victims who are challenging decisions not 
to prosecute by way of judicial review are likely to be seeking a prosecution.  
Therefore, this section will consider the extent to which judicial review could lead to 
a prosecution.  
 
In general terms, if an application for judicial review is successful a number of 
remedies are potentially available to the court.  Quashing Orders, Mandatory Orders 
and Prohibiting Orders have replaced the old prerogative orders of Certiorari, 
Mandamus and Prohibition.109  The court can also make declarations and injunctions 
as well as order damages or restitution.110  However, in applications for review of 
decisions not to prosecute or to terminate criminal proceedings, the course taken by 
the courts has been to quash the original decision and to remit the decision back to the 
public prosecution for reconsideration.  
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The CPS exercises statutory powers as the public prosecutor and is part of the 
executive branch of government.  Although the courts will quash unlawful decisions, 
they will not go as far to substitute their own decision for that of the prosecutor.  This 
distinction has been made in a number of the authorities.111  For example, after 
quashing the decision not to prosecute in Manning, the court confirmed that the 
decision would not require a prosecution, but ‘require reconsideration of the decision 
whether or not to prosecute.’112  On a related point, the court has regularly emphasised 
that it is not the function of the court to decide who should be prosecuted and for what 
offence:  ‘The court should not, however, be drawn into examining the decision in the 
same way in which it might analyse a judicial decision against which it was 
considering an appeal on the merits.’113 
 
In theory, the fact that the High Court has quashed the decision not to prosecute as 
unlawful should be a powerful incentive for the CPS to review the case again and 
reach a different decision.  However, as the purpose of judicial review is to examine 
the lawfulness of the way in which the decision was made rather than the merits of the 
actual decision, it is quite possible that a subsequent review of the decision by the CPS 
after the original decision has been quashed may still result in the same outcome, but 
with the decision being made in a lawful and procedurally fair way.  The rationale for 
the first decision may have been flawed, but following further analysis after the 
judicial review proceedings the conclusion may ultimately still be that the case does 
not meet either the evidential stage or the public interest stage of the Code for Crown 
Prosecutors. 
 
The Treadaway case is a useful illustration of how difficult it can be to get a decision 
not to prosecute overturned.114  Treadaway was convicted of robbery and conspiracy 
to rob in 1983.  In 1994 he successfully brought a civil claim against the police for 
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assault on the basis that he was tortured whilst in custody.  The Court of Appeal 
quashed his conviction as unsafe in November 1996 on the basis of the judgment of 
McKinnon J in the civil proceedings.  The DPP decided that there was not a realistic 
prospect of conviction in respect of the police officers both after the High Court 
judgment and after the Court of Appeal quashed the conviction.   Treadaway applied 
for judicial review of the decision not to prosecute on the basis that the Code for Crown 
Prosecutors had been breached and that the decision was perverse.  Essentially the 
applicant argued that the prosecutor had not taken sufficient account of the judgment 
of McKinnon J in the civil claim in which he heard evidence from both sides and 
determined that the police had assaulted Treadaway.  In his judgment, Rose LJ 
commented that although the decision of the High Court judge in the civil proceedings 
was not binding on the DPP, it required ‘a most careful analysis if a decision not to 
prosecute was to be made.’115  The court concluded that it did not receive such an 
analysis and therefore quashed the decision not to prosecute and remitted the decision 
back to the DPP for reconsideration. 
 
Therefore, despite the fact that the applicant had been awarded damages in the linked 
civil case and his conviction had been quashed as unsafe, the most that the court would 
do on judicial review was to quash the decision not to prosecute and to remit the case 
back to the DPP.  Although the judgment of Rose LJ does essentially demand a robust 
analysis of the decision in the civil case when deciding whether there is sufficient 
evidence to prosecute, it cannot guarantee that such a prosecution would be brought.  
Where there is a civil judgment such as this in the claimant’s favour, however, it must 
be a highly compelling factor when deciding whether to prosecute.  Burton refers to 
the Treadaway case commenting that it will be easier to bring a challenge on the basis 
of an incorrect application of the evidential test when a tribunal has previously 
considered the evidence.116 
 
The cases consistently demonstrate that the Administrative Court will only sparingly 
use its powers to quash decisions not to prosecute.  When they do so, the judges are 
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deferential to the fact that Parliament has delegated the power to exercise prosecutorial 
discretion to the DPP and that they should not substitute their own decision for that of 
the prosecutor.  The most that the victim can realistically hope for is that the decision 
is quashed and remitted back to the CPS for further review with trenchant criticism of 
the original decision that may inform the future decision. 
 
It could be argued, however, that some grounds border on a review of the substance 
of the decision rather than being limited to the procedural regularity of the decision.  
If the victim has persuaded the court that the original decision was irrational, for 
example, it is arguably going to be more difficult for the prosecutor to reach the same 
decision on re-review without unless he is able to reach the decision in a way that 
could not be construed as unreasonable.  If a central tenet of irrationality was that the 
prosecutor did not place sufficient weight on a particular piece of evidence or the like 
and this omission is not repeated on review, then it may be that the prosecutor could 
achieve the same outcome without being at risk of a further adverse outcome from the 
High Court.  Similarly, if the proceedings were brought on the grounds that the 
victim’s human rights had been breached, depending on the precise nature of the claim 
it may be difficult to further justify a decision not to prosecute.  
 
Therefore, even if the victim can successfully negotiate the procedural complexities 
of bringing an application for judicial review and can persuade the Administrative 
Court that the decision was unlawful in some way, it is only a partial remedy.  
Although the original decision not to prosecute is likely to be quashed it, it does not 
mean that a prosecution is inevitable.  In their reconsideration of the decision, it is 





The courts have consistently indicated that judicial review of decisions not to 





The case of R v DPP ex parte C is a central case that defined the circumstances in 
which the courts can review the DPP’s decision not to prosecute.  This is limited to 
three situations:  an unlawful policy, failing to act in accordance with a settled policy 
or a perverse decision.  Manning clarified this further in that the decision not to 
prosecute must be based on an objective assessment of the evidence.   The test applied 
by the courts is not whether the decision was correct, but whether it was reasonable.  
Prosecution policies are likely to be central to any such claim:  whether the policy is 
unlawful per se and whether it was properly complied with.  Applications are likely to 
be argued on the basis that the prosecutor has not properly considered or applied the 
publicly available policy.  However, as the discussion of the policy on assisted suicide 
has highlighted, this is not an easy task.  The policies tend to be widely drafted and 
subject to interpretation.  The policies normally emphasise the importance of 
considering the individual circumstances of the case.  Provided the individual 
decision-maker makes it clear that they are applying the relevant policy and justifies 
their decision by reference to the policy, it would be hard to challenge the decision. 
 
Post Killick, with the implementation of the VRR, the courts are likely to adopt an 
even more restrictive approach with the deterrent of costs in favour of the CPS for 
inappropriate applications.117  This is consistent with the general onus on settlement 
rather than litigation that pervades the judicial review framework.  The victim would 
need to demonstrate that they attempted to resolve the matter without court 
proceedings in accordance with the pre-action protocol; the VRR is now likely to be 
viewed as the primary remedy that should be utilised before resorting to judicial 
review provided the decision qualifies under the scheme. 
 
If an application were to proceed, the victim would have to negotiate the procedurally 
complex and legalistic requirements of such a claim.  It many cases publicly funded 
legal representation may not be available.  Therefore, the victim would have to be able 
to articulate their claim both orally and in writing that the decision was amenable to 
 
 




judicial review on one of the tightly defined grounds.  It is, therefore, not an easily 
accessible remedy. 
 
However, if a claim is pursued it does afford the victim a high level of participation.  
It involves the victim engaging directly with the authorities and holding them publicly 
to account.  The judicial review action becomes a contest between the victim and the 
State with the court as the forum to adjudicate the outcome.  The defendant of the 
original or future prosecution is on the periphery as an interested party. This is very 
different to the conventional position of the criminal prosecution where the victim’s 
role is limited to that of a witness.  It is also more than a private law conflict between 
the victim and the defendant from the criminal proceedings.  Judicial review is a public 
law action, which if successful, could result in the court imposing a sanction against 
the CPS.  Although this is likely to be Quashing Order, it still has the potential to put 
pressure on the public prosecutor to review the decision and possibly bring a 
prosecution. 
 
A central limitation of judicial review is that the courts have been very careful to 
ensure they do not usurp the role of the public prosecutor and will not substitute its 
own decision.  At the point that the decision is quashed and remitted back to the CPS, 
the victim’s participation is curtailed; they are returned to the limited role that they 
had prior to proceedings being issued.  
 
The successful victim has, therefore, compelled a further reconsideration of the case, 
but cannot compel a positive outcome.  It is still quite possible that the public 
prosecutor will conclude that a prosecution should not take place, albeit the reasons 
may be significantly different to the previous decision.  Therefore, judicial review is 
an important remedy for victims.  However, it is unlikely to be the remedy of first 
choice as it can be seen as convoluted, possibly impenetrable, with only low prospects 
of success which is qualified by the fact that it will not reverse the decision not to 
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This chapter will examine the right of victims to bring a private prosecution and 
evaluate its usefulness and value as a means of challenging a decision by a public 
prosecutor not to bring a prosecution.  The first section of this chapter will provide an 
outline of the historic development of private prosecutions up to and beyond the 
enactment of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985.  Section two will then evaluate 
the value of the right to bring a private prosecution in view of the existence of a 
national prosecution organisation against the four criteria of accessibility, 
participation, accountability and outcomes. 
 
This chapter will show that although the right of a citizen to commence a private 
prosecution remains, it is of minimal value to a victim of crime as a means of 
challenging the decision of the public prosecutor.  It is not an accessible route for 
victims as it essentially requires them to prosecute the case themselves (either 
personally or through a legal representative) and there are a number of barriers that 
they would have to overcome to successfully prosecute.  However, the most 
compelling reason why it is of limited value is because it can so easily be defeated by 
the decision of the public prosecutor to take over the prosecution and discontinue it.  
This has been reinforced by the decision of the Supreme Court in R (Gujra) v Crown 
Prosecution Service.1  This decision has meant that the circumstances in which an 
aggrieved victim could bring a private prosecution are so narrow that the value of it 








Although bringing a private prosecution does accord the victim high levels of 
participation in the proceedings, this would only be the case if the public prosecutor 
did not take over the prosecution to either conduct it himself or to discontinue it.  
Arguably, such high levels of involvement for a victim is inappropriate as it essentially 
allows the victim to control a criminal prosecution which could undermine the rights 
of the defendant.  Potentially, an evidentially weak case could be taken to court by a 
private prosecutor causing needless anxiety and distress to the defendant to result 
ultimately in an acquittal.  
  
The chapter will, therefore, conclude that the right of a private citizen to bring a private 
prosecution is of intrinsically limited value to victims of crime as a way of challenging 
decisions not to prosecute.  Private prosecutions do not provide a coherent way of 
holding the public prosecutor to account because they are so easily overcome by the 
public prosecutor who can overrule the decision of the private prosecutor and 




5.2 The development of private prosecutions 
 
Historically, private citizens brought all prosecutions.   In the early nineteenth century 
there were no organised police forces covering England and Wales with policing 
developing in a fragmented way across urban and rural areas.2  Therefore, it was the 
responsibility of the victim to bring a prosecution if he wished to do so.  Although as 
a result of industrialisation during the eighteenth-century property owners grouped 
together into prosecution associations in response to growing levels of crime.3  Police 
forces became more organised throughout the 1800s culminating in the County and 
Borough Police Act 1856 which required all counties to maintain an organised police 
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force.  As a result, prosecutions gradually became conducted by the police, although 
this was by practice and convention rather than any legislative change.4 
 
The office of Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) was established by the 
Prosecution of Offences Act 1879.  However, as Edwards identified, the DPP only 
conducted the prosecution in a minority of cases with majority being brought by police 
forces.5  The DPP only accepted cases of ‘importance or difficulty.’6  The majority of 
prosecutions were therefore brought by the police until in 1962 the Royal Commission 
on the Police recommended that the practice of using police prosecutors ended and 
that all forces considered introducing prosecuting solicitors’ departments.7  A further 
Royal Commission in 1980 identified that prosecutions were either conducted by 
county prosecuting solicitors or private practitioners instructed by the police.  
 
This Royal Commission was established to examine the investigation of offences and 
prosecution of offenders.8  Part II reviewed the arrangements for the prosecution of 
criminal offences.  The report stated that the arrangements: ‘defy simple and 
unqualified description.’9  The Commission noted the lack of uniformity across the 
country with a mixture of prosecuting solicitors departments and privately instructed 
solicitors conducting the prosecutions.  The report also observed that the relationship 
between the Chief Constable and the prosecuting solicitor was one of client and 
solicitor.10  The police were not obliged to seek legal advice from the prosecuting 
solicitor and even if they did so, they were not obliged to follow it.  Ultimately, the 
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The Commission noted that a high proportion of acquittals in the Crown Court were 
either ordered or directed by the judge without the case ever reaching the jury.11  The 
statistics for 1978 indicated that 43 per cent of acquittals were because the prosecution 
were unable to adduce sufficient evidence for there to be a case to answer.12   
 
The Commission recommended a ‘statutorily based prosecution service.’13  This 
would continue to be locally based and would conduct all criminal cases charged by 
the police.  The Commission's vision was that the point of charge would be the 
dividing line of responsibility between the police and the prosecutor.  The Commission 
also recognised that different evidential standards were applied across the country.  
The DPP's department had a higher test than many other prosecutors:  whether or not 
there is a reasonable prospect of conviction.  The Commission recommended that this 
test should be extended to all cases.14  The combination of low evidential thresholds 
for prosecution and the fact that the decision whether to prosecute was made by the 
police, rather than a lawyer, could have been responsible for the high number of 
evidentially weak cases being prosecuted before the Crown Court.  
 
The report noted that prosecutions brought by private citizens were rare and 
questioned whether the argument that the power to bring a private prosecution was a 
fundamental right of the citizen was justified.15  The Commission recommended that 
private citizens should be required to apply to the Crown Prosecutor prior to bringing 
proceedings who would apply the same test as for public prosecutions.  There would 
be a right a right of appeal to the magistrates’ court against the decision of the Crown 
Prosecutor.16   
 
However, the government established an interdepartmental working party which led 
to a government white paper that recommended that the Philips Commission’s 
proposals on private prosecutions were not followed stating that there was ‘no 
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sufficient justification’ for limiting the right to bring a private prosecution and it was 
retained in the legislation that followed.17 
 
The Prosecution of Offences 1985 established the CPS as the national public 
prosecuting body in England and Wales.  Section 6 of the Act specifically preserved 
the right to bring a private prosecution subject to the power contained within section 
6(2) to enable the DPP to take the prosecution over:  
 
(1) Subject to subsection (2) below, nothing in this Part shall preclude any 
person from instituting any criminal proceedings or conducting any criminal 
proceedings to which the Director’s duty to take over the conduct of 
proceedings does not apply. 
(2) Where criminal proceedings are instituted in circumstances in which 
the Director is not under a duty to take over their conduct, he may nevertheless 
do so at any stage. 
 
Although the CPS can use this power to take over and prosecute the case, it may also 
be exercised in combination with the power in section 23 of the Act to discontinue the 
prosecution.  Therefore, a fundamental issue for the private prosecutor is the 
circumstances in which the CPS will seek to adopt the prosecution and potentially 
terminate it.  As neither the legislation nor the Code for Crown Prosecutors specifies 
the circumstances when the CPS should consider taking over the prosecution or the 
criteria to be applied, reference needs to be made to the relevant prosecution policy. 
 
As will be explained below, the policy changed significantly in 2009 when the test to 
be applied by the Crown Prosecutor would be the same test that is applied to public 
prosecutions.  Prior to 2009, the test applied in relation to private prosecutions was 
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R v DPP ex parte Duckenfield clearly sets out the pre-2009 position.18  This case 
concerned the private prosecution of two police officers from the Hillsborough 
disaster.  The claimants sought judicial review of the DPP’s decision not to take over 
the prosecutions and discontinue them.  The approach taken by the DPP at that time 
was set out in the judgment of Laws LJ:  ‘The C.P.S. will take over a private 
prosecution where there is a particular need for it do so on behalf of the public’ namely 
‘there is clearly no case to answer’ as such a prosecution would ‘be an abuse of the 
right to bring a prosecution’ or  ‘the public interest factors tending against prosecution 
clearly outweigh those factors tending in favour’ as this would be ‘clearly likely to 
damage the interests of justice’.19  In correspondence cited by Laws LJ the CPS 
indicated that it would apply a different evidential test in relation to private 
prosecutions and that a private prosecution could continue even though it would not 
pass the evidential stage of the Code for Crown Prosecutors.20  Laws LJ was satisfied 
that the policy of applying the ‘no case to answer’ test to private prosecutions rather 
than the higher ‘realistic prospect of conviction’ test was lawful and indeed indicated 
that it would be inappropriate to apply the same test across all prosecutions as this 
would mean that ‘the DPP would stop a private prosecution merely on the ground that 
the case is not one which he would himself proceed with’ which ‘would amount to an 
emasculation of section 6(1) and itself be an unlawful policy.’21 
 
The issue of which test should be applied came to a head in 2009 when the DPP 
changed his policy to apply the same test for private prosecutions as was applied in 
public prosecutions.22  This policy remains in force.  In relation to taking over private 
prosecutions and discontinuing them, the current policy states: ‘A private prosecution 
should be taken over and stopped if, upon review of the case papers, either the 
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Therefore, this change of policy has had a profound effect on the individual’s right to 
bring a private prosecution.  Whereas previously the CPS would only take over the 
prosecution and discontinue it on evidential grounds if there was not a case to answer, 
under the amended policy they would do so if the public prosecutor’s assessment of 
the evidence was that there was not a realistic prospect of conviction.  The ‘no case to 
answer’ test is applied by the courts at the close of the prosecution case and is based 
on R v Galbraith:  the court has to be satisfied that there is a prima facie case, there 
must be sufficient evidence on which a properly directed jury could reasonably 
convict.24  The ‘realistic prospect of conviction’ test is a higher test as this is based on 
the Crown Prosecutor’s overall objective assessment of the evidence and includes any 
defences put forward and their likely impact on the trial.25  The lawfulness of this 
policy subsequently came before the Supreme Court and the decision has become a 
considerable obstacle for private prosecutors.  
 
The appellant in Gujra applied for judicial review of the decision of the DPP to take 
over and discontinue the private prosecution that he had brought against two men that 
he alleged had assaulted him.26  The issue for the Supreme Court was whether the use 
of the ‘realistic prospect of conviction’ test under the 2009 policy was lawful and 
rational in view of the right to bring a private prosecution under section 6(1) of the 
Prosecutions of Offences Act 1985.27 
 
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal with Baroness Hale and Lord Mance JJSC 
dissenting.  The appellant argued that the policy was unlawful as it undermined the 
right to commence a private prosecution that was specifically preserved by section 
6(1).  It was argued that the right of private prosecution was firmly established and of 
constitutional importance.  The appellant’s submission was that the correct test to be 
applied by the DPP was the ‘no case to answer’ test.  The obiter comments in the 
judgment of Laws LJ in Duckenfield were relied upon in which stated that ‘it would 
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not be right for the DPP to apply across the board the same tests’ and to do so would 
‘amount to an emasculation of section 6(1) and itself would be an unlawful policy’.28  
Lord Wilson JSC gave the leading judgment and after outlining the facts of the case 
he tracked the history of private prosecutions noting that a power to take over a private 
prosecution was first conferred by section 2(3) of the Prosecution of Offences Act 
1908 and that case law had established that this included a power to discontinue.29 
Lord Wilson was of the view that the realistic prospect of conviction test was much 
more relevant as it focuses on whether the prosecution is likely to result in a conviction 
rather than whether it is likely to survive a submission of no case to answer.30 He gave 
four additional reasons in favour of the 2009 policy.  Firstly, Parliament did not limit 
the discretion contained within section 6(2).  Secondly, the object of the Prosecution 
of Offences Act 1985 reflected the Philips Commission’s conclusion that there was a 
lack of consistency in prosecutions.  Thirdly, prosecutions which lack a reasonable 
prospect of success draw inappropriately on the resources of the court.  Fourthly, 
defendants would have a legitimate grievance if they were prosecuted for an offence 
which would not meet the evidential test of the public prosecutor.31  Lord Wilson also 
observed that decisions not to prosecute are amenable to judicial review.  He 
concluded that the policy was lawful and did not frustrate the policy and objects of 
section 6(1). 
 
Lord Neuberger also observed that the power in section 6(2) is unfettered.32  He also 
preferred the Full Code Test as to apply the same test to both private and public 
prosecutions would lend consistency which was the aim of the 1985 Act which was 
approved by the Philips Commission.  Lord Neuberger also made the point that it is 
logical to have the same test for private and public prosecutions as there could be a 
situation where the DPP took over a private prosecution with a view to continuing it, 
but subsequently decided to terminate the proceedings by applying the Full Code Test.  
He also referred to other relevant factors that would apply to private as well as public 
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prosecutions such as unfairness to defendants, costs and confidence in the criminal 
justice system.33   
 
Lord Kerr’s analysis was that a discretionary power was conferred on the DPP by 
section 6(2) and it was permissible for him to implement a policy as to how that 
discretion would be exercised.  The Act does not specify when that power should be 
exercised or the test to be applied.  Parliamentary intention could therefore have been 
that the same test be applied across both public and private prosecutions.34 
 
Lord Mance delivered the first dissenting judgment in which his view was that the 
DPP’s policy ‘exceeded his properly interpreted power’ and undermined the right of 
private prosecution.35  Lord Mance essentially submitted that the previous test had a 
sound historical and constitutional basis.  He referred to the speeches of Lord 
Wilberforce and Lord Diplock in Gouriet, the provisions under the previous 
Prosecutions of Offences Acts, the views expressed to the Philips Commission by the 
then DPP and the judgment of Laws LJ in Duckenfield.  He described private 
prosecutions as ‘a type of democratic long-stop or safety valve.’36  Although this 
clearly pre-dates the Victims’ Right to Review scheme which now provides an 
alternative way of challenging decisions not to prosecute.  Lord Mance agreed that the 
right of access to justice through section 6(1) is a constitutional principle which section 
6(2) ‘cannot have been intended to make ineffective or subvert.’37  His view was 
essentially that the new policy reduced the value of private prosecutions to situations 
where the private prosecutor was allowed to continue by the CPS or as a way of 
stimulating the CPS into action and that it effectively imposed a consent requirement 
on all offences brought by a private prosecutor. 
 
In the second dissenting judgment, Baroness Hale’s opening remarks were that she 
did not accept that Parliament intended to allow the DPP to reduce the right of private 
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prosecution ‘almost to vanishing point.’38  Baroness Hale also analysed the differences 
between the two tests.  In particular, she referred to R (B) v DPP39 where the 
‘bookmaker’s approach’ to applying the evidential stage of the Full Code Test on the 
basis of probability of a conviction was criticised and a merits-based approach was 
suggested as more appropriate.40 
 
In her judgment, Baroness Hale also referred to the possibility of a different prosecutor 
reaching a reasonable, but different, conclusion that there was a realistic prospect of 
conviction.  She commented that the decision as to whether the case should continue 
is effectively left to chance as to which prosecutor reviews the case.  In those 
circumstances, it is difficult to justify the case not being allowed to proceed.  Baroness 
Hale also drew a parallel with judicial review on the grounds of challenging the 
reasonableness of the prosecutor’s decision which she describes as ‘not a good enough 
safeguard’.41  Judicial review on this basis would only succeed if the decision was 
unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense and it is quite possible that the court would 
conclude that the decision not to proceed was just as reasonable as an alternative 
decision to allow the case to continue. 
 
Despite the dissenting judgments, Gujra has established that the DPP’s 2009 policy 
on private prosecutions is a lawful one.  As discussed below in relation to accessibility, 
the case has potentially created an insurmountable barrier for many potential private 
prosecutions.  It is possible that the DPP could change his policy:  either reverting to 
the ‘no case to answer’ test or implementing a different test.  However, such a decision 
could leave the DPP at risk of further judicial review proceedings if he were to adopt 
a policy which was inconsistent with the tests set out in the Code for Crown 
Prosecutors.   
 
It also seems unlikely that the courts would be persuaded to distinguish Gujra if the 
issue was the lawfulness of the DPP’s policy.  Although potentially the Supreme Court 
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could depart from its own decision, it is hard to anticipate a situation on the same point 
where the court would be prepared to reach a different decision.42  Therefore, although 
on preliminary analysis, the value of private prosecutions as a remedy for victims of 
crime wishing to challenge decisions not to prosecution has diminished significantly 
since the change in CPS policy, private prosecutions do arguably retain some value in 
other circumstances.  There is growing support for the use of private prosecutions by 
commercial and regulatory organisations to combat complex fraud or intellectual 
property matters.43  These cases are not mainstream criminal cases and perhaps benefit 
from the expertise of specialist prosecutors rather than being channelled through the 
police and the CPS with more conventional prosecutions.44  For some time, the 
RSPCA and other similar bodies have routinely used private prosecutions to bring 
criminal proceedings.45  
 
In the next section of this chapter the value of private prosecutions to victims will be 




5.3 Application of the criteria 
 
The previous section has provided an overview of the legal landscape of the right of 
private prosecution.  This section will evaluate private prosecutions as way for victims 
to challenge decisions not to prosecute against the criteria of accessibility, 
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This analysis will show that the right to bring a private prosecution now represents 
very little value for victims.  Although it facilitates high-level participation, which is 
approaching control, within the criminal justice process for the victim with the 
potential for the defendant to be convicted, it is a largely inaccessible remedy.  This 
inaccessibility flows from a number of factors, not least the DPP’s policy on private 
prosecutions and the decision in Gujra.  The effect of this is that it is ultimately highly 
unlikely to achieve a substantive favourable outcome for the victim or to hold the 




The concept of accessibility will be interpreted broadly showing that there are 
substantial barriers to bringing a successful private prosecution.  The following 
question will be addressed:  to what extent are private prosecutions appropriately 
accessible?  The most fundamental obstacle is the power of the DPP to take over 
private prosecutions and apply the Full Code Test to them terminating them if the CPS 
decides that there is insufficient evidence or that a prosecution is not in the public 
interest.  However, there are a number of other barriers including the consent 
requirements for certain offences, standing in the Crown Court and pragmatic issues 
such as lack of knowledge, expertise and the prospect of a costs order. 
 
The impact of the decision in Gujra should not be underestimated.46  The Supreme 
Court’s endorsement of the DPP’s post 2009 policy as lawful has severely restricted 
the value of the right of private prosecution preserved in section 6(1) of the 
Prosecution of Offences Act 1985.  The previous position set out in Duckenfield meant 
that the public prosecutor was less likely to intervene in a private prosecution than 
under the current policy.47  The fact that the DPP would not prosecute a particular 
case, did not necessarily mean that he would prevent a private prosecutor from doing 
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However, the application of the evidential and public interest stages of the Full Code 
Test to private prosecutions essentially means that all prosecutions are measured 
against the same standard.  In the majority of cases, a victim is only likely to consider 
bringing a private prosecution when the authorities have indicated that they are not 
bringing proceedings themselves or proceedings were commenced and subsequently 
terminated.  In serious cases, such as murder, manslaughter, serious assaults and 
sexual offences, the decision not to bring proceedings is likely to have been made by 
the CPS.  Therefore, if an aggrieved victim then launches a private prosecution that is 
subsequently brought to the attention of the CPS, the application of the Full Code Test 
in respect of the private prosecution is likely to reflect the decision not to bring 
proceedings made previously unless there has been some change in the evidence.  This 
was demonstrated in Campaign Against Antisemitism v DPP when a private 
prosecution was brought in response to a decision of the CPS not to prosecute an 
individual under section 5 of the Public Order Act 1986.48  The prosecution was 
subsequently taken over and discontinued by the CPS on the basis that it did not meet 
the evidential stage of the Full Code Test.  The claimant’s application for judicial 
review on the grounds that the CPS decision not to prosecute was irrational was also 
unsuccessful as the court concluded that the decision of the CPS that the prosecution 
was not likely to succeed was not unreasonable.  This decision reinforces the 
difficulties in using private prosecutions as a means to challenge the discretion of the 
public prosecutor. 
 
It was also held in Thakrar that although a decision to take over and discontinue a 
private prosecution is amenable to judicial review, the refusal of permission cannot be 
appealed to the Court of Appeal.49  The court applied the decision in Belhaj that such 
a decision would be excluded under section 18 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 as a 
‘criminal court or matter.’50  Therefore, the private prosecutor is limited to challenging 
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It is possible for decisions to take no further action to be made by the police rather 
than the CPS either because a case did not meet the evidential threshold for referral to 
the CPS or because it is a less serious offence.  In those circumstances, the first review 
by the CPS would be when the Full Code Test was being applied to the private 
prosecution.  This is a situation where the right to bring a private prosecution may 
retain some value for the victim.  Commencing a private prosecution would be a way 
of triggering the CPS into reviewing the evidence and potentially taking the case over 
and continuing it.  As there is no right of appeal to the CPS of a police decision to take 
no further action, this would be a useful mechanism for instigating a review by the 
CPS.  Although the victim could request a review under the individual police force’s 
VRR scheme, this would still only result in a further review by the police and not 
referral to the CPS.  A private prosecution following a police decision not to prosecute 
could compel the CPS to review the case with the possibility that they would take it 
over and prosecute it.  
 
A further potential benefit of bringing a private prosecution is that it allows the victim 
to have the case reviewed at a higher level within the CPS hierarchy than an ordinary 
referral from the Police.  The 2009 policy states that the reviewing lawyer’s decision 
must be endorsed or ratified at Chief Crown Prosecutor (or Deputy Chief Crown 
Prosecutor or Head of Division level) and is overseen by the Special Crime and 
Counter Terrorism Division to ensure that the policy is complied with.51  As a result, 
the case would potentially receive a more rigorous review in these circumstances due 
to the degree of scrutiny that the decision is likely to be subjected to.  Arguably, it is 
a more difficult decision to terminate proceedings that have already been commenced 
than to advise that no further action should be taken on a case that has not yet been 
charged. 
 
In addition to situations where the case does not meet the Full Code Test, the policy 
refers to circumstances ‘which would be damaging to the interests of justice if the 
private prosecution was not discontinued.’52  The examples given include private 
 
 





prosecutions that would interfere with other prosecutions or investigations or 
situations where the prosecution is deemed vexatious.  A further example in the policy 
is where the defendant has been issued with a simple or conditional caution in 
accordance with the appropriate guidelines or policy.  This final example highlights a 
further complication which could raise a barrier to a private prosecution:  The 
defendant has already received an alternative out-of-court disposal arising out of the 
same allegation.  This issue is illustrated by Jones v Whalley where a private 
prosecution was initiated against the defendant when he had previously been issued 
with a simple caution by the Police for the same offence.53   
 
The defendant successfully argued abuse of process in the magistrates’ court and the 
proceedings were stayed.  Mr Jones appealed the magistrates’ court decision by way 
of case stated to the Divisional Court who allowed the appeal and remitted the matter 
back to the magistrates’ court.  However, the Divisional Court granted leave to appeal 
to the House of Lords.  The House of Lords upheld the decision of the magistrates’ 
court and stated that the appropriate course of action would be for the appellant to 
challenge the police decision to caution by way of judicial review before commencing 
a private prosecution.  This was set out in the judgment of Lord Bingham: ‘If Mr Jones 
had legal grounds for attacking the police decision to caution Mr Whalley, he could 
apply for judicial review to quash that decision.  If successful, the slate would be 
clean… and Mr Jones would be free to prosecute.’54  However, in Lowden the court 
limited this barrier to private prosecutions to situations the terms of the caution 
specifically stated that the offender would not face any criminal proceedings.55 
 
The consequence of these decisions is that the private prosecution is an even more 
inaccessible remedy when the prospective defendant has been cautioned or 
conditionally cautioned for an offence arising out of the incident for which the victim 
wishes to prosecute when the caution specified that criminal proceedings will not be 
brought.  Before he can bring a private prosecution, he needs to successfully bring a 
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claim for judicial review to quash the original police decision.  This means that two 
separate sets of proceedings are required and that if the judicial review is not 
successful, an attempted private prosecution is likely to fail either by the defendant 
arguing abuse of process or by the CPS taking over the proceedings and discontinuing 
them.  If the judicial review proceedings were successful, it is not guaranteed that the 
public prosecutor would conclude that the Full Code Test was met and could adopt 
the proceedings and discontinue them after the time and expense of the judicial review 
proceedings had already been incurred.  Leigh has argued that the logical extension of 
Jones v Whalley is that a private prosecutor would have to judicially review a public 
prosecutor’s decision to discontinue a case before bringing proceedings himself.56  In 
any event, if the CPS has previously discontinued the same case, it seems unlikely that 
they would subsequently conclude that the case met the Full Code Test and that the 




A further barrier to bringing a private prosecution is that for a significant number of 
offences there is a requirement to obtain the consent of either the DPP or Attorney 
General.57  The list of offences for which there is a statutory consent requirement is 
long and illogical:  it was described by the Law Commission as ‘haphazard’ as the 
regime lacks clear principles and consistency.58  The Law Commission recommended 
the consent provisions be retained for three categories of cases:  those where a 
defendant’s rights under the ECHR could be violated, those involving issues of 
national security or some other international element and those where there is a high 
risk of abuse by private prosecutions being permitted where the proceedings could 
cause irreparable harm to the defendant.59  There are, however, a number of offences 
which an aggrieved victim may wish to bring a private prosecution for.  Examples 
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include child abduction,60 child neglect,61 corporate manslaughter,62 offences contrary 
to the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 following industrial accidents63 and theft 
of spousal property under the Theft Act 1968.64  
 
Although these requirements make the procedure for commencing a private 
prosecution more onerous as consent would need to be obtained from the Attorney 
General or DPP (whichever the statute requires) prior to commencing proceedings, it 
could be argued that the 2009 policy potentially imposes a consent requirement on all 
private prosecutions as cases will only proceed if a Crown Prosecutor determines that 
they pass the Full Code Test provided that the defendant refers the private prosecution 
to the CPS for review.  The 2009 policy states that if a private prosecution requiring 
DPP consent passes the Full Code Test it will be taken over by the CPS; if it fails, 
consent to prosecute will not be given.65   
 
Bringing the prosecution 
 
The private prosecutions policy also outlines the general position that a private 
prosecutor would not be entitled to access case material in the possession of the CPS.66  
The policy refers to R v DPP ex parte Hallas in which a mother sought judicial review 
of the DPP’s refusal to disclose to her evidence in relation to a road traffic collision in 
which her son died on the basis that there was no right of access to such material.67  
The CPS legal guidance indicates that the material would be disclosed if it is in the 
interests of justice, but this is not likely if the case has been reviewed previously and 
did not pass the Full Code Test; a ‘possible exception’ is where the private prosecutor 
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Therefore, the private prosecutor is at a distinct disadvantage compared to the public 
prosecutor who does have access to all the material gathered during the police 
investigation.  This would include the unused material retained in accordance with the 
Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 as well as the evidence.  Although in 
a commercial context, R v Zinga illustrates how a private prosecutor may still need the 
investigative resources of the police and if these are not forthcoming, the private 
prosecutor will be disadvantaged.69  In Zinga, Virgin Media brought a private 
prosecution and reached an agreement with the Metropolitan Police that they apply 
for a search warrant and arrest the defendant as well as conduct a financial 
investigation into his assets in order that Virgin could pursue confiscation proceedings 
under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 post-conviction. 
 
If a victim wishes to bring a private prosecution, he needs to lay an information for a 
summons or warrant under section 1 of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1980.  This is not 
an automatic process and a formal application does have to be made which can result 
in a refusal as the court does have a gate-keeping role to play.  The general principle 
is that the court should issue a summons, but there are authorities for not doing so 
where it would be vexatious or improper.70   
 
The judgment of Silber J in R (Charlson) v Guildford Magistrates’ Court sets out the 
principles that the magistrates’ court should apply when considering such an 
application.71  Firstly, the magistrates should not require special circumstances before 
they grant an application where the CPS has previously discontinued proceedings.  
Secondly, the court should consider a number of factors such as whether the offence 
is known to law, the essential ingredients are present, whether it is time-barred, 
whether the court has jurisdiction, whether any statutory consents to prosecute have 
been obtained and any other relevant facts.72  The judge did not elaborate on what 
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could be considered as coming within the ‘other relevant facts’ category.  Silber J did 
state that where the CPS are still proceeding the court should: ‘in the absence of special 
circumstances be slow to issue a summons.’73  This means that the court is unlikely to 
permit the victim to commence a private prosecution if the public prosecutor is already 
conducting one.  It may well be that this would be for a lesser charge than that which 
the private prosecutor was seeking to issue proceedings for.  The Administrative Court 
has quashed decisions to issue summonses for private prosecutions where there has 
been insufficient judicial consideration of whether the essential elements of the 
offence are present and whether or not the allegation is vexatious.74  A high profile 
example is the attempted private prosecution of Boris Johnson for misconduct in 
public office where the Administrative Court quashed the decision of the District 
Judge to issue a summons on the basis that the decision not to find the prosecution 
vexatious was flawed having reviewed the social media activity of the private 
prosecutor which suggested that the prosecution was politically motivated.75 
 
Similarly, the fact that the public prosecutor has decided not to prosecute a particular 
case may mean that the court refuses to issue a summons applied for by the private 
prosecutor.  In R (Kay) v Leeds Magistrates’ Court the court held that the private 
prosecutor and his legal representatives are under a duty to disclose information to 
enable the court to decide whether the application is vexatious, an abuse of process or 
improper.76  This would include details of any allegations made to the police and other 
decisions made by the public prosecutor.  This is also required by the Criminal 
Procedure Rules.77  Therefore, if the police or the CPS have previously determined 
that no further action should be taken in respect of the allegation or a prosecution was 
terminated, it is quite possible that the court will refuse to issue a summons for a 
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In the event that the court does accede to the application for a summons, unless the 
private prosecutor is legally represented, he will have to negotiate the procedural 
intricacies of the criminal justice system which has the potential to make the process 
inaccessible to the lay person.  The private prosecutor will need to comply with the 
obligations imposed by the Criminal Procedural Rules and to make and respond to any 
applications for bad character, hearsay or special measures in the prescribed form 
within the required time limits as well as complying with any other directions set by 
the court including those relating to disclosure issues.    
 
The private prosecutor has a duty to comply with both the statutory disclosure regime 
under the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 and the common law duty 
of disclosure under ex parte Lee.78  The prosecutor is required under section 3 of the 
Act to disclose to the defence any unused material which ‘might reasonably be 
considered capable of undermining the case for the prosecution against the accused, 
or of assisting the case for the accused.’  The concept of unused material is not 
something that a lay person would likely be familiar with, but could have a huge 
impact on the trial if the obligations under the act were not complied with.  It is quite 
possible that the victim may have material in their possession that they are not relying 
on as part of their case, which may meet the criteria for disclosure.  For example, they 
may have statements or records of conversations with third parties which support the 
defendant’s version of events rather than that put forward by the prosecution.  The 
private prosecutor also needs to be able to respond to applications for disclosure by 
way of a Defence Statement or a defence application for disclosure of unused material 
made to the court under section 8 of the Act.  The nuances of the disclosure regime 
are complex to even experienced prosecutors with disclosure failures being linked to 
miscarriages of justice.79  The disclosure of unused material is a potentially 
impenetrable area to the lay private prosecutor and another reason why legal 
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Prosecutions brought by aggrieved victims or their families are likely to be for serious 
offences which are either indictable-only or will be determined as not suitable for 
summary trial.  They will therefore be sent to the Crown Court for trial.  As trials on 
indictment are brought in the name of the Crown, the aggrieved victim acting in person 
may have difficulty obtaining standing to prosecute in person in the Crown Court.  
This issue was considered in the first instance decision of R v George Maxell 
(Developments) Ltd where a private prosecutor was refused standing to prosecute in 
person.80  In explaining his decision the judge stated  that the prosecutor was not a 
litigant in person as ‘once the indictment was signed the proceedings thereafter 
continued in the name of the Sovereign.’81  The judge further commented that unless 
he was legally represented or the prosecution was taken over by the DPP the 
prosecution would fail for want of prosecution.82  This issue was also aired in R v 
Southwark Crown Court ex parte Tawfick in which the Divisional Court dismissed an 
application for judicial review of a Crown Court decision to refuse a private prosecutor 
rights of audience on the basis that the court did not have jurisdiction to deal with the 
matter as it related to a trial on indictment.83  The obiter comment was made that the 
court may be able to exercise the discretionary power to grant rights of audience under 
section 27(1)(c) of the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990.84   
 
Clearly there is no guarantee that the discretion would be exercised in favour of the 
private prosecutor.  In Tawfick, the trial judge expressly found that he would not have 
done so.85  Buxton, writing extra-curially, has argued that all prosecutions in the 
Crown Court should be conducted by counsel and judges should not exercise the 
discretion to grant private prosecutors rights of audience.86  His rationale for this is 
that prosecutors should not have a personal interest in the case and have the training 
and professional insight that private individuals are likely not to have. 
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Disincentives to bringing a private prosecution 
 
As well as the difficulties that a victim may encounter in preparing and bringing a 
private prosecution, there are a number of other risks that may deter a private 
individual from bringing a private prosecution.  The Law Commission identified the 
cost of bringing a prosecution, lack of investigative resources and the risk of liability 
in tort as possible practical constraints when they examined the private prosecutions 
in the context of the consents regime.87  The issue of cost is likely to be a deterrent 
and possibly a barrier for some aggrieved victims considering a private prosecution.  
Even in the event of a successful prosecution, they may not recover all of the costs 
that they have incurred.  The fear of a civil claim being brought against the victim for 
malicious prosecution following an unsuccessful prosecution may also serve as a 
deterrent.88  Additionally, there is the risk of a costs order being made against the 
private prosecutor as happened in R (Haigh) v City of Westminster Magistrates’ Court 
where a private prosecutor unsuccessfully challenged by way of judicial review the 
decision of the magistrates’ court to order substantial costs against him on the basis 
that the application for summons constituted an unnecessary or improper act resulting 
in the other party incurring costs.89  Although the court did recognise that the costs 
provisions must not be abused so as to ‘have a chilling effect’ on private prosecutions, 
the reality is that this does remain a possibility.90 
 
The High Court indicated in Holloway that private prosecutors have an obligation to 
conduct an objective analysis of the evidence to determine whether there is a realistic 
prospect of conviction and failing to refer the matter to the authorities or to take legal 
advice may ‘give rise to an inference that a private prosecutor was determined to go 
ahead regardless of the prospects of success.’91  The possibility of a costs order 
therefore represents a real risk to the private prosecutor if the court subsequently 
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concludes that a case was pursued which did not reach the required evidential 
threshold. 
 
Therefore, although there can be some value in private prosecutions for victims this is 
only likely to be in quite limited circumstances as a mechanism for triggering the CPS 
into reviewing a case which no further action has been taken by the police.  As a result 
of the DPP’s 2009 policy, private prosecutions have largely been cut off as a potential 
remedy for an aggrieved victim.  The victim is likely to be considering pursuing such 
a remedy because the authorities have decided not to prosecute themselves.  Therefore, 
even if the private prosecutor is able to collate enough evidence to have a case and be 
able to persuade the court to issue a summons, it is likely that if the matter were 
referred to the CPS by the defendant the Full Code Test would not be met.  As a result, 
the CPS would be likely to exercise the power to take the prosecution over under 
section 6(2) of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 and then discontinue it under 
section 23 or 23A.  As will be apparent from the above analysis of accessibility, private 
prosecutions inevitably involve a high degree of participation on the part of the 
aggrieved victim of crime that will be examined in the next section.  
 
5.3.2 Participation   
 
The following question will be addressed under this criterion:  to what extent do 
victims have a meaningful participatory role?  The victim can experience a high 
level of participation in the criminal justice process through a private prosecution 
because they are the decision-maker and have conduct of the prosecution.  Unusually, 
it is initially the victim as the private prosecutor who makes the decision to prosecute 
although ultimately the decision whether to convict will be one for the court.  The 
victim of crime becomes a party to the prosecution contrary to the general position in 
the adversarial system where the prosecution is a contest between the State and the 
defendant.  However, as a result of the power to take over and continue (or 
discontinue) a private prosecution, the public prosecutor is not entirely excluded.  
Potentially the public prosecutor may participate by exercising his discretion to take 




prosecutor then replaces the private prosecutor and so the prosecution remains a two-
party contest.  
 
Participation is a way of measuring the extent to which the victim is involved in the 
prosecution process.  A victim normally has very low-level participation in 
prosecutorial decision-making.  When the prosecution is brought by the public 
prosecutor, the victim’s views tend to be taken into account in relation to certain 
decisions, such as the public interest and the acceptance of pleas, but they are just one 
of a number of factors.92  A private prosecution clearly engages the victim in higher 
level participation.  On Edwards’ model of victim participation, a private prosecution 
is likely to be the only way that a victim could participate to a degree approaching 
‘control’.93  The proceedings are launched by the victim who becomes the prosecutor; 
if he opts not to be legally represented, he will be the person presenting the case in 
court.  However, as the public prosecutor retains discretion to take the prosecution 
over, the private prosecutor does not retain complete control of the prosecutorial 
process.   
 
Unlike other ways of challenging a decision not to prosecute, the private prosecution 
brings the victim directly into the criminal justice process as a party to the proceedings 
rather than collateral to it.  The private prosecution potentially means that the victim 
is in control of the prosecution against the defendant; they have the decision-making 
power to decide which charges should be brought and how the case will be conducted 
in court.  For example, the victim can decide what evidence will be adduced and 
whether evidence such as bad character should be relied upon.  Although this 
demonstrates the high level of control the victim can potentially have over a private 
prosecution, they do not control whether the defendant is convicted as this remains a 
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The arguments in favour of such high-level participation arise out of the perceived 
constitutional importance attached to the right of a citizen to bring a private 
prosecution.  This right was specifically preserved by Parliament in section 6(1) of the 
Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 so there was a clear parliamentary intention to retain 
it.  The right to bring a private prosecution was debated in the House of Lords when 
the Prosecution of Offences Bill was passing through Parliament.  Lord Elton 
described the right of private prosecution as ‘an important safeguard’.94  In the same 
debate, Lord Renton suggested that it is ‘one of our fundamental rights and freedoms 
that there should be the right of prosecution as a safeguard against concealment or 
abuse by authority…’95  However, not all of their Lordships held such positive views 
about the value of private prosecutions.  Lord Wigoder felt that it should not be 
abolished, but stated: ‘…I still believe it to be, a very important freedom for the 
individual, even if very often it is for a highly eccentric individual.’96  Lord Hutchinson 
was more critical of the decision to retain it describing it as an ‘anachronism’ and a 
‘nuisance’.97   
 
The judgments of Lords Wilberforce and Diplock in Gouriet are often cited in favour 
of the retention of the right of private citizens to bring private prosecutions.98  Lord 
Wilberforce stating that the right to bring a private prosecution ‘remains a valuable 
constitutional safeguard against inertia or partiality on the part of authority.’99 Lord 
Diplock described it as ‘a useful constitutional safeguard against capricious, corrupt 
or biased failure or refusal of those authorities to prosecute offenders against the 
criminal law.’100  The Gouriet case did not concern a private prosecution or a challenge 
to the right to bring such a prosecution.  It was an appeal to the House of Lords arising 
out of the decision of the Attorney General not to bring a relator action for an 
injunction against the Union of Postal Workers who had indicated that their members 
would refuse to handle mail for South Africa for one week as a protest against 
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apartheid.  The concept of private prosecutions was used as an analogy as both 
situations involved a private individual bringing an action that would normally be 
brought by the authorities. 
 
More recent judicial support for private prosecutions can be found in the dissenting 
judgments in Gujra.101  Baroness Hale attached great importance to the right of private 
prosecution as a safeguard for the victim against the decision of the public prosecutor 
not to bring a case.  She argued against the dilution of the right by the 2009 policy:  
‘This is to leave the victim… to the chance of which among many no doubt entirely 
reasonable prosecutors handles her case.’102  Baroness Hale is of the view that judicial 
review is not an adequate remedy as providing the decision taken by the prosecutor is 
a reasonable one, it is unlikely that there would be grounds to bring a successful claim.  
The shortcomings of a test based on reasonableness has been discussed in the previous 
chapter on judicial review.  Baroness Hale’s judgment goes to the heart of the effect 
of the 2009 policy: ‘Now that the new policy has effectively removed it [the right to 
private prosecution], the victims of crime will have little prospect of challenging the 
prosecutor’s decisions.’103  These comments pre-date Killick and the VRR.  This 
would suggest that the period between the implementation of the new policy on private 
prosecutions in 2009 and the VRR coming into force in 2013 was a period when there 
was very little opportunity to challenge decisions not to prosecute; judicial review was 
the only real option.  
 
However, the importance attached to the right of private prosecution by the judiciary 
is not universal.  In his judgment in Jones v Whalley, Lord Bingham commented: ‘The 
surviving right of private prosecution is of questionable value, and can be exercised in 
a way damaging to the public interest.’104  A strong argument against private 
individuals having the power to commence a criminal prosecution relates to the lack 
of control, consistency or certainty as to when such a prosecution could be brought.  
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Unlike the public prosecutor, there is no overarching test that the private prosecutor 
must apply in relation to either the evidence in the case or the public interest.   
 
Private prosecutors are not constrained by guidelines or policies that lend a degree of 
consistency and certainty to potential defendants as to whether or not they are to be 
prosecuted.  Essentially, the power is one that could be used arbitrarily subject only to 
the rules of criminal evidence and procedure which might ultimately see the case 
dismissed by the court.  However, this would be after the defendant has been brought 
to court and endured many months of anxiety.  Although participating by bringing a 
private prosecution may be of psychological or emotional benefit to the victim, this 
does not mean that a prosecution unsubstantiated by the evidence can be justified.  The 
Philips Commission identified the need for consistency across prosecutorial decision-
making and recommended that private prosecutors should be subject to a requirement 
to obtain permission from the public prosecutor in order to commence proceedings.105 
 
This line of reasoning is also evident from the judgments of the majority in Gujra.  
Lord Wilson, for example, referred to the Philips Commission’s recommendations and 
the object of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 to introduce consistency in decision 
making.106  The Code for Crown Prosecutors was established under section 10 of the 
Act as a means of introducing a test to be applied in all cases as a way of introducing 
a degree of standardisation in criminal prosecutions.  Private prosecutors are not bound 
by any such test. 
 
As set out earlier in this chapter, there are numerous prosecution policies and 
guidelines covering a wide range of offences and circumstances.  These policies shape 
the exercise of the discretion delegated to the public prosecutor by the Prosecution of 
Offences Act 1985.  Although they should not be too restrictive, case law has 
established that it is permissible for public bodies to have policies to guide them in 
their decision-making.107  Such policies facilitate like cases being dealt with in a 
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similar way and therefore fairness to defendants.  A private prosecutor could consider 
any such policy, but would not be bound by or indeed required to take it into account 
when making a decision as to whether to bring a prosecution.  Although they will be 
considered by the public prosecutor in the event that the case is reviewed in order to 
decide whether it should be taken over by the CPS.  Buxton goes further than to 
highlight that private prosecutors are not constrained in their decision making by 
policies or guidelines.  He refers to the role of the prosecutor as a ‘Minister of Justice’ 
exercising independent judgement over a case with no personal interest in the case 
whereas a ‘private prosecutor will almost by definition have a personal interest in the 
outcome of the case’ as they will be bringing the case ‘as an extension of a personal 
dispute with other individuals or with officialdom; or an interest group dedicated to 
suppression of particular forms of allegedly criminal conduct.’108 
 
Stark argues that whether or not there is a criminal prosecution should not depend on 
who the complainant is and that ‘an experienced prosecutor is the most sensible 
candidate’ to assess the case.109  As well as the applying the Code for Crown 
Prosecutors, the public prosecutor will need to take into account relevant prosecution 
policies and guidelines which the private prosecutor is not required to do.  Young and 
Sanders describe public prosecutors as being subject to a number of ethical codes such 
as professional codes of conduct, the Code for Crown Prosecutors and the Attorney 
General’s guidelines on prosecution.110  They also refer to the statutory obligations 
imposed by the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 and the Criminal 
Justice Act 2003.111  The accused is protected to some extent by the requirement for 
the prosecutor to comply with these various obligations and policy considerations and 
if he fails to do so he could render himself liable to judicial review.112  The same would 
not apply to the private prosecutor.  By contrast, the recently formed Private 
Prosecutors’ Association has published its own voluntary Code for Private Prosecutors 
 
 
108 Buxton (n 85) 427-428. 
109 Findlay Stark, ‘The Demise of the Private Prosecution?’ [2013] CLJ 7, 9 
110 Richard Young and Andrew Sanders, ‘The Ethics of Prosecution Lawyers’ (2004) 7(2) Legal Ethics 
190, 193 
111 ibid 195 




which its members have committed to complying with.113  This includes the client 
relationship, disclosure and other matters which could be contentious.  This Code, of 
course, only applies to the group of professionals and academics who belong to the 
organisation and perhaps highlights the disparity between public prosecutors and the 
majority of individuals bringing private prosecutions as victims of crime.  
 
A further consideration is that the victim prosecuting in person is going to have to 
undertake a number of potentially conflicting roles in the trial process.  If he does not 
have a legal representative he will be both the advocate as well as a witness in the 
case.  This will make the examination-in-chief and cross-examination processes 
difficult for the defendant and the court as there could well be a blurring of evidence 
with speeches and submissions.  A further tension could be the victim having to lead 
evidence from other prosecution witnesses. 
 
Therefore, in theory at least, the level of participation in the prosecution process for a 
victim bringing a private prosecution is unsurpassable.  However, if the prosecution is 
brought through a legal representative, this participation may be reduced to some 
extent.  It is clear, however, that there are a number of challenges to the justifications 
for a private individual having a right to bring a criminal prosecution.  
 
Despite this apparent empowerment to allow the victim to bring his own prosecution 
and to be the decision-making force behind it, the reality is likely to be somewhat 
different.  The victim can make the decision to prosecute, but it will be subject to the 
decision of the Crown Prosecutor assessing the case if the matter is referred to him 
under the 2009 policy.  The terms of that policy mean that the likelihood of 
intervention is high and that public prosecutor’s decision-making will ultimately 
prevail over that of the private prosecutor.   This tension between the private 
prosecutor and the public prosecutor will be highlighted further when the next criterion 










This discussion of accountability will focus on the following question: to what extent 
are private prosecutions an effective mechanism for holding the public 
prosecutor to account?  The application of Bovens’ key characteristics of 
accountability to private prosecutions shows that they are not an effective way of 
holding prosecutors accountable and are arguably not an accountability mechanism at 
all.  The criminal prosecution is brought by the victim against the defendant; the public 
prosecutor is not a party to the proceedings and so the prosecutor is not properly before 
the court as the accountability forum.  There is, therefore, no obligation on the public 
prosecutor to explain his rationale for not prosecuting the matter himself to the court.  
The court has no power to require the public prosecutor to explain or justify his 
conduct or even to answer questions as the public prosecutor is not a party to the 
proceedings.  Indeed, he may not even be present in court when the case is being heard.  
Therefore, on Bovens’ criteria, private prosecutions in themselves do not amount to a 
formal accountability mechanism.  Consequently, it is more appropriate to categorise 
private prosecutions as a form of participation or a procedural right than as an 
accountability mechanism.  Nonetheless, bringing a private prosecution could bring 
about certain effects which could cause the prosecutor to bring proceedings or hold 
the prosecutor to account by publicly condemning the decision not to prosecute.  
 
It is possible that the public prosecutor will exercise the power in section 6(2) of the 
Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 to take the prosecution over.  This may mean that a 
CPS representative would be present in court to assess the nature and conduct of the 
case in order to decide whether to exercise that power.  If the proceedings are taken 
over and continued by the public prosecutor, the private prosecution has effectively 
challenged the decision and stimulated the public prosecutor into action.  This may 
particularly be the case if the original decision to take no action was made by the police 
independently.  It is also possible that the proceedings will have had the effect of 
reversing the decision not to prosecute.  However, this is now unlikely, as under the 
current policy the public prosecutor will apply the same test as he would have 




private prosecution may have had the benefit of new evidence that was not available 
at the time of the original decision not to prosecute. 
 
There have been a number of high-profile private prosecutions that have attracted 
media attention.  This could be seen as holding the public prosecutor to account 
through the publicity attached to it.  Examples would be the private prosecution that 
followed the investigation into the murder of Stephen Lawrence in 1993114 or the 
prosecution of former police officers connected to the Hillsborough tragedy.115  
Private prosecutions can also be politically motivated.116  Sanders et al highlight the 
symbolic value of a private prosecution:  ‘they can shame those responsible and 
highlight the suffering of the victims and their families’ and they ‘become part of the 
campaign against the wider social or political problems that caused the tragedies in 
the first place.’117  The possible effects of bringing a private prosecution will be 
examined in the following section in relation to outcomes.  
 
In the event that the public prosecutor does take over the prosecution and discontinue 
it, the victim could then consider holding the CPS to account by challenging this by 
way of judicial review or by requesting a review under the VRR.118  Although as we 




The final criterion is ‘outcomes’ which addresses the following question: do private 
prosecutions provide meaningful and satisfactory outcomes for victims?  The 
central theme to be considered here is the nature of the outcome if the victim were to 
successfully bring a private prosecution.  An important issue for a victim considering 
 
 
114 See R v Dobson [2011] EWCA Crim 1256, [2011] 2 Cr App R 8. 
115 Duckenfield (n 18). 
116 Examples include:  R (General Abdulwaheed Shannan Al Rabbat) v Westminster Magistrates’ Court 
[2017] EWHC 1969 (Admin) and R (Johnson) v Westminster Magistrates’ Court [2019] EWHC 1709 
(Admin) 
117 Andrew Sanders, Richard Young and Mandy Burton, Criminal Justice (4th edition, OUP 2010) 433 




challenging decision not to prosecute would be whether this course of action would 
be capable of resulting in a prosecution. 
 
In terms of outcomes, a private prosecution has the potential to achieve the same 
outcomes as a public prosecution.  If the prosecution were allowed to continue, the 
defendant could be convicted by the court of the offence charged.  To some extent, the 
identity of the prosecutor would be irrelevant to the magistrates or jury ultimately 
hearing the trial.  Indeed, if the private prosecutor instructed a legal representative to 
conduct the case in court, the bench or jury may not appreciate that they were hearing 
a private prosecution.  If the private prosecutor were to act in person (provided they 
were able to persuade the judge to grant them rights of audience in the Crown Court), 
it may be clearer to the tribunal that this was a private prosecution if the individual 
was not legally qualified.  This would particularly be the case if they were also giving 
evidence on behalf of the prosecution. 
 
However, it is not possible to argue that it is more likely that a defendant would be 
acquitted in a private prosecution were the case allowed to proceed to a full trial.  If 
the defendant were to be convicted, the court would have all the same sentencing 
options as for a public prosecution and the same range of ancillary orders would be 
available.  The private prosecutor could apply for orders such as costs, compensation 
and Restraining Orders in the same way as a public prosecutor. 
 
Therefore, although a private prosecution is a largely inaccessible remedy for many 
victims of crime and not an easy course of action to take, it does have the potential to 
achieve the same outcome as a public prosecution.  However, the numbers of private 
prosecutions brought by private individuals appears low.  A request under the Freedom 
of Information Act 2000 revealed that between September 2017 and August 2018 the 
CPS received only 40 notifications of private prosecutions.119  Furthermore, a number 
of these notifications relate to offences which are unlikely to have been brought by a 
victim of crime such as animal welfare and trademark matters.  Therefore, this does 
 
 
119 Response to request under Freedom of Information Act 2000 reference 8533 from CPS Information 




suggest that the take up of private prosecutions by victims is low although there are 
no official statistics available.  Perhaps for the reasons set out in this chapter, it is not 
likely to be a course of action that appeals to the majority of victims of crime. 
 
It may also be that the majority of victims are not seeking to instigate a prosecution 
themselves.  To some extent, this chapter has pre-supposed that victims would wish 
to pursue a private prosecution as a remedy for their dissatisfaction with a decision not 
to prosecute.  The previous two chapters have reviewed the VRR and judicial review 
which both provide ways of compelling the public prosecutor to take the case to court; 
a private prosecution involves the victim bringing the proceedings themselves which 




The right to bring a private prosecution is a historic right that still exists today albeit 
in a substantially reduced form in terms of prevalence and significance.  However, the 
right of a private citizen to commence a private prosecution was specifically preserved 
by Parliament and therefore remains as a potential remedy for an aggrieved victim of 
crime.  Although opinions vary on whether it should remain in its current form, it has 
been described as a safeguard against inaction on the part of the public authorities.   
 
The level of participation provided by a private prosecution is unparalleled for the 
victim of a crime.  However, although it is theoretically possible for an individual 
victim to prosecute a case through to trial (and sentence in the event of a conviction), 
it is now unlikely because of the reasons set out above under ‘accessibility.’  In 
particular, the DPP’s 2009 policy on private prosecutions and the Gujra decision that 
endorsed it.120  The private prosecution is always vulnerable to challenge by either the 
public prosecutor applying the Full Code Test or the court applying the ‘no case to 
answer’ test at the end of the prosecution case.  The spectre of costs may also provide 
a significant deterrent.  
 
 





Therefore, to some extent the right to commence a private prosecution has been 
reduced to a symbolic right for victims.  Although the right still exists, in reality, the 
aggrieved victim is unlikely to be able to exercise that right unrestrained.  They are 
likely to be in a different position to some other private prosecutors, such as those 
representing wider societal interests such as the RSPCA or those representing 
commercial interests like in Zinga.121   
 
The victim is likely to be pursuing the matter because they are dissatisfied with the 
decision made by the authorities; if they are bringing a prosecution to attempt to 
overcome an earlier decision not to prosecute or to terminate proceedings, this is likely 
to fail.  Their attempt at participation will effectively be ‘trumped’ by the public 
prosecutor who can extinguish the prosecution and therefore end their participation in 
the matter.  Generally, a private prosecution will offer little in terms of holding the 
public prosecutor to account for their decision.  The exception to this is in high profile 
cases which may result in media criticism of the CPS decision not to bring a 
prosecution. 
 
The other point to note, of course, is that even if the victim is permitted to continue to 
prosecute the case to conclusion, the ultimate decision as to guilt or innocence is not 
within the victim’s control.  This will be a matter for the jury or bench of magistrates 
as in any other prosecution. 
 
The next chapter will explore the findings these individual analyses of accessibility, 
participation, accountability and outcomes thematically across the three review 
mechanisms of the VRR, judicial review and private prosecutions.  This will allow an 
overall evaluation of the adequacy and coherence of these methods as a framework for 














This chapter will build upon the preceding three chapters which evaluated the 
individual review mechanisms of the VRR, judicial review and private prosecutions 
against the criteria of accessibility, participation, accountability and outcomes.  This 
chapter will report on the findings of these chapters by identifying and exploring key 
themes which have emerged from the evaluations of the individual mechanisms.  This 
analysis of these collective themes will show that the issues relating to the review 
mechanisms are more complex than the examination of each individual mechanism 
reveals.  In particular, the VRR provides a form of internal complaint procedure for 
victims as an alternative to court proceedings.  An initial impression of the VRR is 
likely to be that it is a victim-focussed measure which can only be beneficial to 
aggrieved victims of crime.  However, on closer analysis there are perhaps wider 
public policy reasons for encouraging victims to use this route rather than the 
alternatives.  Victims are being actively pushed in the direction of the VRR both by 
prosecution policies and the courts.  It will be argued, therefore, that the VRR could 
be interpreted as having a negative impact on the ability of victims to challenge 
decisions not to prosecute by diverting them from the courts to a private and less 
transparent form of dispute resolution.  
 
The analysis of these themes will enable a comparative assessment of the three 
mechanisms to show that whilst there are respective advantages and disadvantages of 
each, they do not form a coherent framework of rights for victims.  The mechanisms 
provide more of a patchwork of potential courses of actions for the victim of crime 
with some overlaps and some gaps.   
 
This chapter is, therefore, structured around four collective themes that have become 




evaluations of accessibility and participation led to the identification of procedural 
barriers as a theme.  The themes of the public/private nature of the review mechanisms 
and the ultimate decision-making authority are largely drawn from the evaluation of 
accountability.  The evaluation of participation also highlighted procedural justice as 
a theme warranting further analysis.   Each section of this chapter will focus on a 
particular theme:  the first section will concentrate on procedural barriers; the second 
section will focus on the public/private nature of the review mechanisms; the third 
section will examine the ultimate decision-making authority; finally, the fourth section  
will consider issues of procedural justice.  
 
 
6.2 Procedural barriers 
 
Examination of the individual review mechanisms against the criteria of accessibility 
and participation highlighted that for each there are procedural rules and requirements 
which may restrict victim engagement with the mechanisms.  This section will be 
further broken down into three categories of procedural barriers:  standing, procedural 
complexity and the impact of prosecution policy.  This analysis will show that the 
VRR has fewer formalities to be complied with compared to the procedurally 
burdensome court-based mechanisms.  The effect of these procedural barriers is to 
channel victims away from judicial review and private prosecutions towards the VRR.  
One barrier that is inherent in the VRR, however, is the restrictive standing criteria 




Standing was a major component of accessibility in the VRR and judicial review 
chapters.  Neither judicial review nor the VRR have automatic eligibility and the 
victim must establish that they have ‘standing’ to use these mechanisms to challenge 
a decision not to prosecute.  There are no statutory eligibility requirements placed on 
the victim who wishes to bring a private prosecution, although there are a number of 




regime and the power of the public prosecutor to take over the prosecution.1  If the 
private prosecutor could not show a real connection with the case, the likelihood of it 
being taken over and discontinued would potentially be greater. 
 
The standing requirements for judicial review do not only apply to challenges to 
prosecutorial discretion, but to all applications for judicial review.  Potentially, it 
would be easier for the victim of crime to successfully establish standing in judicial 
review than it would to meet the eligibility requirements of the VRR which is based 
on a particular conception of victimhood premised on the requirement of harm.  In 
judicial review proceedings it should be relatively simple for most victims of crime to 
persuade the judge at the permission stage that he had a personal or direct interest in 
the case.  In contrast, the victim using the VRR may be excluded from using the 
scheme because they were unable to show that they had alleged that they had suffered 
harm as a direct result of the criminal conduct.  The position is even more complex 
when the eligibility of individuals or groups who are not direct victims of the crime is 
considered.  As the connection between the victim and the original criminal conduct 
reduces, the less likely it is that the victim would be able to establish standing for 
judicial review or successfully engage the VRR.   
 
As was shown in chapter three, the construction of victimhood can be much wider 
than the conventional primary victim.  Although families of direct victims are likely 
to be accommodated if the primary victim is deceased or unable to challenge the 
decision themselves, a wider range of indirect victims may not be.  The notion of 
community victims or those that identify with the primary victim in a way that creates 
a nexus between the harm committed against the individual and this wider group are 
currently unlikely to be considered eligible for either judicial review or the VRR.  
Therefore, it is clear that both judicial review and the VRR take a restrictive approach 
as to who can use these mechanisms to challenge decisions not to prosecute as there 
are formal eligibility requirements which distinguish between different types of 
victims admitting some and excluding others. 
 
 





This narrow construction of victimhood is one of the key shortcomings of the VRR 
and an area which should arguably be considered for reform in the future to allow a 
wider range of victims to engage the mechanism.2  Compared to judicial review, the 
criteria for qualifying as a victim are quite rigid.  At least with judicial review, the 
potential claimant can argue their case to the court at the permission stage whereas the 
VRR uses a more ‘tick box’ approach to deciding whether the individual complainant 
meets the requirements of victimhood or not.  Standing is not the only impediment to 
using the review mechanisms as all the routes have a number of procedural 
complexities which may deter victims from using them.  
 
6.2.2 Procedural complexities 
 
It is clear from the analysis of accessibility that the court-based mechanisms of judicial 
review and private prosecutions are inherently more procedurally onerous than the 
administrative mechanism of the VRR.  As victims are a party to court proceedings in 
judicial review claims and private prosecutions, there are complex procedural 
requirements that must be complied with such as the relevant rules of court, disclosure 
and admissibility of evidence and strict time limits in relation to the filing of particular 
documents.3  From the victim’s perspective, this high degree of formality is likely to 
compare unfavourably to the VRR inevitably deterring some victims.  There is 
empirical evidence that lay people can feel excluded from the legal process in the 
courtroom environment; this could act as a further deterrent.4  By contrast, there are 
very few procedural requirements or formalities to the VRR and it is clearly a much 




2 In a similar way that Victim Personal Statements have been expanded to include Community Impact 
Reports:  R v Skelton [2014] EWCA Crim 2409, [2015] 1 Cr App R (S) 34  
3 See Accessibility in ch 3.1, 4.3.1 and 5.3.1  
4 Amy Kirby, ‘Effectively Engaging Victims, Witnesses and Defendants in the Criminal Courts: A 
Question of “Court Culture”?’ [2017] Crim LR 949; Jessica Jacobson, Gillian Hunter and Amy Kirby, 
‘Structured Mayhem: Personal Experiences of the Crown Court’ (2015) 
<http://criminaljusticealliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Structured-Mayhem1.pdf> accessed 




The demanding procedural requirements of both judicial review and private 
prosecutions means that a victim is almost inevitably going to need to engage legal 
advice and representation if they wish to pursue these routes.  This has clear costs 
implications.5  On the other hand, the VRR was specifically designed to be used by 
victims in person without legal representation.  Clearly, one of the greatest strengths 
of the VRR is the simplicity and flexibility of the requirements that it imposes on the 
victim.   
 
These characteristics are representative of the advantages and disadvantages of 
litigation and alternative dispute resolution (ADR) more generally.  One of the clear 
benefits of alternative methods of resolving disputes is the lack of procedural 
complexity and the potential to resolve the matter relatively inexpensively without the 
need for legal representation.  The VRR can perhaps be viewed as akin to ADR in that 
it is presented as a direct alternative to court proceedings.  However, it does not 
involve the degree of negotiation and the potential to reach a settlement compared to 
some of the conventional methods of ADR.  Nonetheless, it exists as an out-of-court 
mechanism which is a direct alternative to court proceedings.  There is a clear drive to 
use alternatives to judicial review both from the general principles of the Civil 
Procedure Rules and the pre-action protocol for judicial review.6  Although there has 
been some reluctance to use such alternatives in public law disputes, the courts have 
clearly indicated that ADR should be considered.7   
 
Specifically in relation to challenges to decisions not to prosecute, the courts have 
indicated an expectation that the VRR be used prior to judicial review proceedings 
both ahead of the implementation of the VRR8 and subsequently.9  In L v DPP, the 
court recognised the importance of the CPS implementing a review procedure and ‘no 
judicial review should be brought until the CPS has had an opportunity of conducting 
 
 
5 Alex Mills, ‘Reforms to Judicial Review in the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015: Promoting 
Efficiency or Weakening the Rule of Law?’ [2015] PL 583 
6 CPR r 1.4 and Pre-Action Protocol for Judicial Review para 9  
7 R (Cowl and others) v Plymouth City Council [2001] EWCA Civ 1935, [2002] 1 WLR 803 and R (S) 
v Hampshire County Council [2009] EWHC 2537 (Admin) 
8 L v DPP [2013] EWHC 1752 (Admin) [11] 




a further review under their Victim right of review procedure.’10  Sir John Thomas 
went on to emphasise that ‘if there has been a review in accordance with this 
procedure, then, it seems to me, that the prospect of success will, as I have said, be 
very small.’11  The court also indicated that in the event that judicial review 
proceedings were initiated before a VRR review, proceedings could be adjourned 
pending the outcome of the VRR process.12  The court also referred to the possibility 
of costs being ordered against victims who had unsuccessfully sought judicial review 
following a VRR decision.13  This approach was also taken in subsequent cases 
including R (D) v DPP where Gross LJ indicated that the courts would ‘proceed with 
caution’ on challenges on public law grounds such as irrationality where a case has 
previously been considered under the VRR scheme.14  It is also apparent from the 
judgment in Oliver that challenges on grounds of irrationality will potentially be more 
difficult to pursue as a result of the VRR process as the decision will have been 
considered by a number of prosecutors before reaching the court.15  The stance of the 
Administrative Court has, therefore, been that the VRR should be the primary method 
of challenging such decisions with judicial review being used as a last resort. 
 
6.2.3 Impact of prosecution policy 
 
Prosecution policies can themselves be barriers to accessibility for victims who are 
seeking to challenge decisions not to prosecute using any of the three mechanisms.16  
The VRR is itself a prosecution policy and arguably has an effect on the desirability 
and viability of bringing a claim for judicial review as well as determining whether a 




10 L v DPP (n 8) [12] 
11 ibid [13] 
12 ibid [14] 
13 L v DPP (n 8) [18] 
14 R (D) v DPP [2017] EWHC 1768 (Admin) [25] 
15 R (Oliver) v DPP [2016] EWHC 1771 (Admin) [58] 
16 See for example: Crown Prosecution Service, ‘Mental Health: Suspects and Defendants with Mental 
Health Conditions or Disorders’ <https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/mental-health-suspects-and-




Victims are potentially being funnelled through the VRR rather than having the matter 
litigated in court by way of judicial review.  There is an argument, therefore, that the 
VRR is itself acting as a barrier to victims bringing judicial review proceedings to 
challenge decisions not to prosecute.  This is perhaps suggestive of the more general 
criticism that ADR can potentially act as a barrier to the courts and justice.  Genn has 
noted the official pressure to divert parties away from the civil courts towards other 
methods of dispute resolution with court proceedings being used as a last resort.17  The 
author observes that ADR was promoted as a central feature of the civil justice reforms 
and that this coincided with major changes to public funding under the Access to 
Justice Act 1999.18  Bondy has alluded to the financial benefits of cases being referred 
to ADR rather than court proceedings which could also suggest an incentive for both 
public bodies and the courts to nudge potential claimants in the direction of alternative 
methods of resolution.19    This is not a new phenomenon with Sainsbury arguing in 
relation to social security claims that internal reviews were faster and cheaper.20  It has 
also been suggested that internal complaint handling procedures are a way of 
‘protecting adjudicative machinery’ from large numbers of complaints21 and that ‘a 
common way to ration judicial review is to require applicants to exhaust alternative 
remedies’ first.22  Indeed, it can be a specific strategy of defendant public bodies to 
use the lack of engagement with alternatives as a way of arguing against permission 
being granted.23  Findlay has also commented that a ‘defendant may well have its own 
complaints system in place which may be cheaper and easier for it to operate.’24  In L 
v DPP the court specifically referred to the fact that judicial review cases ‘consume 
considerable resources from the CPS.’25  There are other benefits for the CPS for 
 
 
17 Hazel Genn, ‘What Is Civil Justice for - Reform, ADR, and Access to Justice Representing and 
Contesting Ideologies of the Public Spheres: The Architecture of Justice’ (2012) 24 Yale Journal of 
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18 ibid 401–403. 
19 Varda Bondy, ‘Who Needs ADR’ (2004) 9 JR 306, 307 
20 Roy Sainsbury, ‘Internal reviews and the weakening of social security claimants’ rights of appeal’ in 
Hazel G Genn and Genevra Richardson (eds), Administrative Law and Government Action: The Courts 
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victims to be channelled through the VRR rather than applying directly for judicial 
review. 
 
The VRR enables the CPS to revisit the original decision and provides an opportunity 
to correct it.  Additionally, if the reviewer agrees with the original decision, a further, 
perhaps more comprehensive review can be written up which could be more resilient 
to any subsequent applications for judicial review.  As the courts have indicated that 
judicial review of decisions following VRR would rarely be successful, the VRR 
provides the opportunity to ensure that there is less likelihood of such cases being 
granted leave for judicial review.  Potentially, therefore, although the VRR has 
provided a simple and informal method of challenging a decision not to prosecute, it 
has also reduced accessibility to judicial review.  This should be viewed in the wider 
context of government proposals to reduce the availability of judicial review which 
were implemented in part by the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015.  The 
government had proposed a number of reforms to tackle the increase in applications 
for judicial review including changes to standing, costs orders and provisions for 
claims based on procedural defects which would not have made a difference to the 
outcome.26  Although following consultation, the changes to standing were not 
pursued, other provisions were implemented including the requirement on the court to 
refuse relief where it appears that it is ‘highly likely that the outcome for the applicant 
would not have been substantially different if the conduct complained of had not 
occurred.’27  This may also be considered at the permission stage and is mandatory if 
requested by the defendant.28  There were clear efficiency and resourcing 
considerations behind these reforms with the Secretary of State for Justice stating, ‘too 
often cases are pursued as a campaigning tool, or simply to delay legitimate proposals.  
That is bad for the economy and the taxpayer, and also bad for public confidence in 
the justice system.’29  These reforms have been criticised as weakening judicial review 
and the protection of the rule of law.30  Perhaps this provides an insight into other 
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drivers for the establishment and promotion of the VRR beyond the interests of 
victims.   
 
As well as providing the CPS with an opportunity to conduct a more robust review, 
the VRR provides the CPS with an appealing way of responding in the media to 
complaints about decisions not to prosecute.  Comments made by the CPS in such 
cases routinely refer to the fact that the original decision not to prosecute has been 
verified through the VRR and found to be correct in an attempt to provide a level of 
reassurance that robust procedures are in place to ensure that decisions not to prosecute 
are correct.31 
 
Clearly, the VRR is not the only prosecution policy which has an impact on the 
victim’s ability to challenge such decisions and all three of the individual mechanisms 
are affected.  Since the inception of the CPS in 1986, a raft of prosecution policies and 
legal guidance have been produced ranging from the Code for Crown Prosecutors to 
policies which guide decision-making on specific types of offending and particular 
issues including those which relate to victims and witnesses.32  The Code for Crown 
Prosecutors is the most significant and is relevant to all decisions to prosecute as well 
as to all three methods of challenging decisions not to prosecute.  
 
As was shown in chapter five, the right of a victim to bring a private prosecution is 
heavily curtailed by a combination of the CPS policy on private prosecutions and the 
Code for Crown Prosecutors.  Despite the fact that the prosecution is being brought 
on a private basis, the CPS retains a power to take over, and possibly discontinue, the 
prosecution if the public prosecutor concludes that the full code test is not met.  This 
approach has been endorsed by the Supreme Court.33  Therefore, the prosecution 
policy of the CPS has effectively undermined the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 
which specifically preserved the right of private prosecution.34  As a result, the 
 
 
31 See for example:  Hannah Dawson, ‘“Police won’t arrest man who raped me – even though he 
confessed”: Woman, 41, waives her right to anonymity to condemn CPS’ Daily Mail (London, 20 May 
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victim’s power to bring a prosecution is potentially more severely restricted than the 
potential to apply for judicial review or for review under the VRR. 
 
The existence of prosecution policies is also particularly relevant to the viability of 
judicial review proceedings.  On one hand, it could be argued that the increase in 
prosecution policy could provide more scope for judicial review claims as the courts 
have consistently indicated that they would be prepared to review decisions based on 
unlawful policies or where the prosecutor has not followed settled policy.35  If the 
prosecutor has departed from the relevant policy without good cause, the decision may 
be more susceptible to judicial review.  On the other hand, the policies can be used by 
the public prosecutor to defend his decision against judicial review and any allegations 
that the decision is wrong.  Policies can be drafted to reduce the risk of challenge by 
listing the factors to be taken into account without guidance as to how the different 
factors should be prioritised and by emphasising the importance of assessing the merits 
of the individual case.  As a result, this can insulate the CPS from allegations of 
fettering discretion or breaches of legitimate expectation.  A careful balance has to be 
struck when such a policy is drafted as if it is too prescriptive in how discretion should 
be exercised, it could be claimed that the policy fetters the discretion of the decision-
maker and that they did not assess the merits of the individual case and did not consider 
potential exceptions to the general policy.  Similarly, a victim could also claim that an 
inflexible policy generates the expectation that discretion would be exercised in a 
particular way.  One clear example of this approach is in relation to the application of 
the public interest stage of the Full Code Test which provides questions which 
prosecutors should consider when assessing the public interest together with a list of 
factors to be taken into account in relation to each one.  However, the Code specifically 
states that, ‘The weight to be attached to each of the questions, and the factors 
identified, will also vary according to the facts and merits of each case.’36  A further 
example of this concerns the VRR itself where the guidance has been amended to 
include a footnote to paragraph 11 that indicates that a case which would ordinarily be 
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excluded from the VRR may be reviewed under the policy in exceptional 
circumstances.37 
 
The policy on assisted suicide provides an example in the context of a particular type 
of offending.  In relation to the public interest stage of the Full Code Test, reviewing 
lawyers are required to take into account public interest factors in favour of, and 
against, prosecution.  However, the guidance also indicates that ‘each case must be 
considered on its own facts and on its own merits.’38  Such policies have in themselves 
been criticised as undermining the democratic process with the public prosecutor 
effectively deciding when to enforce the law.39  It has also been argued that 
prosecutorial working practices may develop that may be inconsistent with the 
prosecution policy, such as the practice of routinely applying for witness summonses 
to compel victims to give evidence in domestic abuse cases when the policy requires 
a more considered analysis on a case by case basis.40 
 
These policies are also relevant to the VRR as whether or not the original decision was 
wrong will be determined taking into account the relevant prosecution policies.  
Additionally, the VRR is itself a prosecution policy and one which limits the 
availability of the right to review.  As was shown in chapter two, the scope of the VRR 
is determined by whether a case falls inside or outside the policy, namely, whether it 
falls within one of the excluded categories such as where other charges are continuing 
or where charges were brought against other suspects.41  To a large extent, therefore, 
the CPS is determining the accessibility of the review mechanism as it is the policy 
which determines which cases will be accepted for review; the institution that controls 
access to the review mechanism is the one that the victim is attempting to challenge.  
Potentially, the reach of the VRR could be widened or narrowed in the future as the 
CPS desires perhaps based on factors such as the number of judicial review 
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applications against decisions which currently fall outside the VRR criteria.  For 
example, if a number of applications for judicial review were pursued based on 
decisions to accept lesser charges, the DPP could decide to widen the scope of the 
criteria to allow such cases to be reviewed under the VRR potentially limiting the 
number of applications for judicial review. 
 
It is clear that as the VRR does not cover a range of decisions which an aggrieved 
victim may wish to challenge, judicial review is of residual value in that it may be 
possible to use it to challenge those decisions which are excluded from the VRR.  
Examples could include decisions to caution, accept a particular basis of plea or plea 
to a lesser charge, or to prosecute some suspects and not others.  Additionally, judicial 
review can be used to challenge the lawfulness of a particular policy in a way that the 
VRR could not.  Although the courts have indicated that judicial review of decisions 
not to prosecute will only be allowed sparingly, the courts have not limited themselves 
by rigid criteria in the way that the VRR has.  However, applications for judicial 
review do have to be based on specific grounds which will be considered further in 
the next section. 
 
Therefore, there are clearly significant procedural barriers which must be overcome if 
the victim is to successfully initiate a challenge to a decision not to prosecute; this is 
without examining the substance of the challenge.  Specific rules on standing restrict 
the use of the mechanisms whereas the complex procedural formalities of bringing 
judicial review proceedings or private prosecutions are likely to have a deterrent effect 
on victims.  Prosecution policies also have a huge impact on restricting which 
mechanisms victims are able to use in particular circumstances and whether they are 
likely to be successful.  The VRR policy determines the availability of the VRR as 
well as potentially having a chilling effect on challenging decisions by judicial review.  
The viability of private prosecutions is heavily influenced by a combination of the 
CPS policy on private prosecutions and the Code for Crown Prosecutors.  These 
discussions will be developed further in the next section by an analysis of the 





6.3 The public/private nature of the review mechanisms 
 
A further identifiable theme from the reviews of the individual mechanisms is the 
difference between the public and private nature of the review mechanisms; this was 
particularly apparent from the examination of accountability which considered the 
nature of the forum conducting the review.  The values of transparency and 
independence are central to this discussion.  Whether the mechanism is transparent is 
determined by whether the process takes place in the public domain and the 
availability of information and reasons relating to the decision.  The independence of 
the mechanisms also relates to the location of the review mechanism and its proximity 
to the original decision maker.  The literature on accountability in the introduction to 
this part identifies the nature of the forum as being of central importance.42  This raises 
a number of issues including the independence of the reviewing body and whether it 
is internal or external to the original decision maker, whether it offers legal or a form 
of administrative accountability together with the transparency of the process.  In 
essence, it will be argued that although judicial review and private prosecutions are 
more transparent as they are open and public procedures, the transparency of each is 
heavily affected by the degree to which the reasons and information behind the 
original decisions are disclosed to the victim.  Similarly, the court-based mechanisms 
are more independent as the review process is conducted outside the CPS.  
 
6.3.1 Transparency  
 
A strength of the court-based mechanisms is that they place the grievance in the public 
domain where there is the potential for media coverage and reporting in the law 
reports.  This has the potential to generate a degree of public scrutiny and to develop 
a body of precedent for future cases.  The VRR, by contrast, takes place behind closed 
doors.  Although written reasons should be provided after the review has taken place, 
these are unlikely to include the level of detail that would be observed by the case 
being argued in court.  There is no opportunity for the victim, or anyone else, to be 
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present when the case is being decided and so there is no way of knowing what factors 
were in reality considered and the degree of weight attached to individual points.  
Therefore, the level of public scrutiny is much lower.  Although it is possible for VRR 
cases to be reported in the media, this will depend on the newsworthiness of the case 
and cannot be guaranteed.  The provision of the VRR therefore represents a shift from 
public to private form of accountability as the result of the VRR potentially restricting 
the accessibility of judicial review.  
 
Another identifiable aspect of transparency is the impact of the provision of 
information by the public prosecutor. The evaluation of private prosecutions has 
highlighted the difficulties that a private prosecutor may face in gaining access to case 
material in the possession of the authorities despite the fact that they will be required 
to serve evidence on the prospective defendant and to comply with disclosure 
obligations.  In any event, the victim will need sight of the case papers in order to 
determine whether to bring a private prosecution.  In a similar way, victims 
considering judicial review will need to have details of the reasons behind the decision 
not to prosecute in order to assess whether any public law grounds can be established.  
This would be particularly relevant to a potential challenge on grounds based on how 
a policy had been applied or where unreasonableness may be argued.  This links to a 
more general theme in administrative law, concerning the extent there is a duty on 
decision makers to give reasons for their decisions.  Although there is not a general 
duty to provide reasons, it can be required in certain situations, particularly those 
which are adjudicative in nature.43  It has been further established that the CPS is under 
a duty to give reasons in relation to death in custody cases44 and the CPS has now 
adopted a general approach of communicating reasons not to prosecute to victims.45  
However, the evidence from the CPS Victim and Witness Survey and the 
investigations of HM CPS Inspectorate is that these communications are not sent in 
 
 
43 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Doody [1994] 1 AC 53; Oakley v South 
Cambridgeshire District Council [2017] EWCA Civ 71, [2017] 1 WLR 3765; Dover District Council 
v Campaign to Protect Rural England (Kent) [2017] UKSC 79, [2018] 1 WLR 108. 
44 R v DPP ex parte Manning [2001] QB 330 
45 Crown Prosecution Service, ‘Victim Communication and Liaison Scheme’ <www.cps.gov.uk/legal-




all cases that they should be and the quality of those communications may not include 
adequate explanations for decisions.46 
 
Although the victim does not have to establish grounds or justify the decision to 
request a review under the VRR, the provision of information from the public 
prosecutor is relevant to whether the victim is aware of his rights under the scheme 
and whether he chooses to exercise them in a particular case.  Chapter three identified 
that there is some evidence that victims are not being properly made aware of their 
right to request a review under the VRR and so, to some extent, the VRR is affected 
by an erratic approach to providing information in a similar way to the other 
mechanisms.  
 
Clearly, the flow of information from the public prosecutor is highly relevant to the 
accessibility of each of the three review mechanisms and is an area which should be 
focussed on in order to improve the experience of victims and their ability to challenge 
decisions not to prosecute.  Decisions not to prosecute are not the only area of criminal 
justice where the provision of reasons to victims has been fundamental and recently 
subject to challenge.  The recent judicial review brought by two rape victims of the 
decision of the Parole Board to release a prisoner has demonstrated the increased 
recognition of the interests of the victim in decisions which were previously 
considered off limits and that a blanket prohibition on releasing information was not 




The VRR and judicial review contrast strongly in terms of the decision-maker’s 
independence.  Despite the second tier of the VRR being labelled as ‘independent’, it 
is clearly an internal review mechanism as the process takes places within the same 
institution that made the initial decision although it is conceded that there may be a 
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degree of separation between the reviewer and the original decision-maker.  Judicial 
review does provide independence in the sense that the court is conducting the review 
and, as will be discussed later in this chapter, is part of a different element of the 
separation of powers.  Private prosecutions are hard to position in terms of 
independence as although the proceedings are brought independently of the original 
decision maker, the CPS retains a power to take the prosecution over.  As a result, the 
level of independence would be compromised as the final decision on whether to 
continue the prosecution would be made by the public prosecutor who made the 
original decision not to prosecute.  The public prosecutor retains a high level of control 
over both requests for review under the VRR and private prosecutions although the 
way that this lack of independence manifests itself differs between the two 
mechanisms.  Despite the second tier of the VRR being labelled as ‘independent’, it 
does not claim to be an external process whereas, initially at least, private prosecutions 
do not appear to involve the CPS at all.  Clearly, the reality is different and the victim’s 
decision to prosecute could be overruled by the CPS, the organisation which made the 
initial decision that the victim is attempting to challenge.   
 
 
6.4 Nature and basis of the ultimate decision-making authority  
 
Many of the above points in this chapter have alluded to the significance of who makes 
the ultimate review decision.  This section will consider the grounds and scope of the 
individual review mechanisms before showing that the VRR is arguably an appeal 
mechanism rather than a form of review.  This will lead on to an examination of the 
identity of the ultimate decision-maker which, in reality, means a discussion of the 
extent to which the CPS as public prosecutor controls the final decision. This will 
show that the CPS controls the review of decisions within all three mechanisms to 
some extent.  This is greatest in the VRR as the decision-making power never leaves 
the CPS, but the CPS also asserts considerable power in relation both judicial review 
and private prosecutions with the decision whether to prosecute ultimately returning 





6.4.1 Grounds and scope of the review mechanisms 
 
In order to successfully apply for judicial review, the claimant has to articulate their 
challenge within established public law grounds.  There is no generic ‘unfairness’ 
category or a way of requesting that the court review a decision on the basis that it is 
incorrect.  Unless the proceedings are based on the grounds that a particular policy is 
unlawful or was not properly applied, the decision is likely to be challenged on the 
basis that it was unreasonable.  Compared to the test applied under the VRR of whether 
the original decision was correct, this is a more difficult ground to establish as 
Baroness Hale has highlighted in relation to the reasonableness test, ‘Just as a 
reasonable prosecutor could take the view that the case should proceed, a reasonable 
prosecutor could take the view that it should not.’48  This view was echoed in the 
Divisional Court in D: ‘if the decision is one as to which reasonable prosecutors may 
disagree, the possibility of any public law challenge succeeding is dramatically 
reduced.’49 
 
In contrast, there is no requirement under the VRR that the victim establish any 
grounds for review, provided the case is a ‘qualifying decision’ under the terms of the 
policy.  The availability of the VRR as a new mechanism for challenging decisions 
not to prosecute can be seen, on one hand, as beneficial to victims:  it provides a simple 
mechanism by which they can request the decision be reviewed without the burden of 
establishing grounds for judicial review.  Similarly, a private prosecution does not 
require specific grounds to be established.  However, as we have seen above the 
accessibility of this route of challenge is severely restricted in other ways.50 
 
6.4.2 The nature of the process:  Review or appeal? 
 
This thesis has categorised private prosecutions, judicial review and the VRR as 
different review mechanisms, but there are differences between them that suggest that 
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they could be classified differently as either an appeal or a review mechanism.  
Therefore, this section will explore how the three alternatives could be more 
appropriately classified showing that the VRR is arguably an appeal process rather 
than a review mechanism.  As will be discussed below, this classification is relevant 
to the nature of the outcomes offered by the individual mechanisms.  
 
Judicial review has been described as exercising a supervisory function based on its 
inherent jurisdiction rather than an appellate one.51  The focus of this supervisory 
jurisdiction is generally on the legality of the decision and the decision-making process 
rather than the substance of the decision.52  The court is unlikely to substitute its own 
decision in such circumstances.  In contrast, an appeal can involve the re-hearing of 
evidence and concentrates on the merits of the case with a view to potentially 
substituting a different outcome.53   
 
Despite its name, therefore, the VRR has features which suggest that it would be more 
accurately labelled as a ‘right of appeal’ rather than a ‘right of review.’  Firstly, the 
VRR involves a de novo assessment of the case in which the decision maker decides 
whether the original decision was wrong, which is akin to the re-hearing of evidence.  
If the reviewer concludes that the original decision is wrong, there is the potential to 
overrule it and substitute their own decision which may result in a prosecution being 
brought.  The fact that the test applied is whether the original decision was wrong is 
also indicative of an appeal process rather than a review as it goes to the substance or 
merits of the original decision.  The decision-maker is essentially re-assessing the 
evidence in the case and re-applying the Code for Crown Prosecutors to determine 
whether the decision was correct.  One factor that is contrary to the argument that the 
VRR is an appeal rather than a review is the lack of independence in that the decision 
is being made internally by the CPS albeit by a specialist unit in the second stage.  
Normally an appeal is conducted by a different entity, for example, a higher level of 
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court.54  However, overall the VRR has certain characteristics which are indicative of 
an appeal procedure rather than a review.  
   
Judicial review, in contrast, is largely focussed on the lawfulness of the decision and 
the decision-making process.  Clearly, there are arguments that certain grounds are 
more indicative of a review on the merits such as irrationality or breach of substantive 
legitimate expectation.55  However, judicial review has other attributes that 
differentiate it from an appeal procedure.  Firstly, the judicial review jurisdiction has 
developed incrementally through the common law, not as a result of a specific policy 
or statutory provision whereas appeals tend to have a statutory basis.  Secondly, in the 
event of a successful judicial review of a decision not to prosecute, the court will 
inevitably not substitute its own decision.  The most likely outcome is that the decision 
will be quashed and then remitted back to the CPS for further consideration.56  
 
These distinctions are arguably rooted in the constitutional position of the courts and 
the separation of powers.  The unwillingness of the courts to substitute their own 
decision for that of the prosecutor stems from the limits imposed on the courts by the 
separation of powers.  Although there is a strong argument that pure or complete 
separation does not exist in the UK, there is evidence of ‘partial’ separation of powers 
where the three branches of government provide ‘checks and balances’ on each other 
to prevent the concentration of power and the potential for the arbitrary exercise of 
power.57  Judicial review is arguably one of these checking mechanisms and creates 
an ‘acceptable’ tension between the courts and the executive regarding whether the 
executive is acting lawfully.58  However, there are limits as to how far the courts are 
prepared to intervene in the decisions which are within the remit of the executive.  As 
explained by Lord Brightman in Evans, there is a risk that the court may be ‘guilty of 
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usurping power’ if they were to impose their own decisions on the executive.59  As a 
result, therefore, the separation of powers has led to judicial restraint in judicial review 
proceedings.  The courts have accepted that in certain circumstances, Parliament or 
the executive is the more appropriate decision-maker.  Laws LJ has explained in the 
Court of Appeal that ‘greater deference is to be paid to an Act of Parliament than to a 
decision of the executive or subordinate measure’ and that where the decision-maker 
is ‘exercising a power conferred by Parliament, a degree of deference will be due on 
democratic grounds.’60  Although the concept of deference is not universally 
accepted61, essentially the courts are aware of the limitations imposed by the allocation 
of particular functions of government and for the courts to substitute their own 
decision would amount to a breach of the separation of powers. 
 
In the context of decisions not to prosecute, this explains why the courts have been 
unwilling to mandate that a prosecution should be brought, citing that they should 
respect the ‘constitutional position of the Crown Prosecution Service’ by adopting a 
‘very strict self denying ordinance.’62  The court alluded to the doctrine of separation 
of powers when it stated that it is for ‘good and sound constitutional reason that 
decisions to prosecute are entrusted under our constitution to the prosecuting 
authorities.’63  This deference for the public prosecutor as the decision-maker is central 
to the limitation of judicial review as a remedy.  At most, the courts are prepared to 
quash a decision not to prosecute where it can be established that it was made 
unlawfully.  This will be a rarity and will not result in the courts replacing the public 
prosecutor’s decision with their own.  This is a key characteristic of a review 
mechanism compared to an appeal procedure.   
 
Therefore, in terms of outcomes, the VRR is designed as a means for a victim to appeal 
a prosecutorial decision not to prosecute where the case is re-assessed independently 
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of the original decision and has the potential to be reversed.  This process takes places 
with the CPS itself.  Judicial review, by contrast, provides a partial remedy in that it 
has the potential to lead to the decision being quashed by the courts, but it will then 
return back to the CPS for a further review.  Although it might be more difficult when 
the decision was quashed on grounds which border on a merits-based review, it is 
possible that the CPS may on a reassessment of the case reach the same decision as 
previously, but in a procedurally correct way.  Private prosecutions cannot easily be 
categorised as either an appeal or review mechanism as the victim is essentially 
bringing the proceedings themselves as an alternative to requesting a review of the 
decision from either the CPS or the courts. 
 
6.4.3 Ultimate decision-making 
 
The discussion of the nature of the review processes explains why there is a general 
resistance to the removal of prosecutorial decisions from the public prosecutor in 
favour of either the courts or a private individual.  Parliament has allocated the 
prosecutorial function to the CPS as part of the executive branch of government.  
Although the courts are willing to review decisions to made by the prosecutor, and 
quash them if appropriate, they are not willing to substitute their own decisions as to 
do so would be to overstep the lines drawn by the separation of powers doctrine.  
Therefore, in the context of the review mechanisms, much of the decision-making 
power in relation to prosecutorial decisions remains with the public prosecutor.  That 
power never leaves the CPS in relation to the VRR.  The power exercised by the 
private prosecutor to bring proceedings can be re-claimed by the public prosecutor 
once he is notified of the case and there is little that the private prosecutor can do to 
prevent it.  Even decisions made by the court by way of judicial review are vulnerable 
as in the majority of cases the most that the victim can hope for is that the decision 
will be quashed by the courts, but this is likely to result in the case being remitted back 
to the CPS for further review.  However, if the decision is quashed on substantive 
rather than procedural grounds, there is less likelihood that the prosecutor could make 





6.5 Procedural justice 
 
The fourth theme to be examined is that of procedural justice and arises from the 
criterion of participation in the previous three chapters.  This theme is linked to, and 
builds upon, the previous three themes.  In particular, issues of independence and 
transparency of the decision maker are central to victims’ perceptions of procedural 
fairness.  Procedural justice is particularly relevant as it addresses the extent to which 
opportunities to challenge decisions increase victims’ confidence in, and satisfaction 
with, the prosecution process.  After a brief overview of the key principles of 
procedural justice theory, this section will review the extent to which the review 
mechanisms offer victims a degree of procedural justice by giving them a voice and 
participation rights in the prosecution process.   This analysis will show that although 
all three review mechanisms have the potential to satisfy the victim’s procedural 
justice needs, the VRR offers less than the other two mechanisms as it provides fewer 
opportunities to have a voice and to participate in the process.  Private prosecutions 
and judicial review, by contrast, have the potential to offer more as a result of the 
victim being able to argue their case before the neutral forum of the court.  
 
Tyler argues that people are more supportive and deferential to procedures that they 
perceive to be fair.64  Tyler identifies four procedural justice principles which people 
take into account when evaluating whether a particular procedure is fair:  voice (‘the 
opportunity to tell their side of the story’), the neutrality of the forum, respect (by the 
authority) and trust (in the authority).65  He argues that people value having a voice in 
the decision making even if it does not result in the outcome that they are seeking.  
Lens et al refer to early procedural justice research focussing on influencing the 
outcomes of procedures and Tyler’s later work which ‘emphasises that people’s 
motives for participating in such a procedure are more often defined in terms of 
participation as such:  expressing one’s arguments and point of view has its own 
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important function.’66  This links to some of the victimological research that suggests 
that victim participation in a process that is perceived as being procedurally fair can 
be beneficial to the victim. 
 
Wemmers and Cyr have analysed the extent to which victims wish to participate in 
criminal justice using procedural justice theory.67  The authors state that there are two 
aspects to procedural justice:  decision control and process control with the latter being 
the more important to victims.68  Process control is about having a voice in the 
decision-making process.  The concept of procedural justice is based on the perceived 
fairness of the procedures.  The authors state: ‘Victims place great emphasis on having 
a voice in the process, and having their voice heard.  They want recognition, respect 
and consideration’ but also that, ‘the majority of victims clearly felt that decision-
making power should remain in the hands of authorities.’69  It has also been argued 
that imposing too much responsibility on victims has to become a burden on them.70 
 
Research suggests that neutrality influences perceptions of procedural fairness; people 
believe that procedures are fairer when, ‘authorities are following impartial rules and 
making factual, objective decisions.’71  The relationship between the individuals and 
the authority is central to whether the authority is trusted.  Similarly, if people feel that 
they are being treated with dignity and respect, this also contributes to the perception 
that they are being dealt with fairly.  Laxminarayan explores the concept of trust in 
legal systems further arguing that it is vital for fostering victims’ cooperation and can 
result from perceptions of both procedural justice and outcomes.72  She argues that 
there is a link between trust and acceptance of the authority of the legal system:  if a 
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victim trusts the system because they feel that they have been dealt with fairly, they 
are more likely to accept the decision.   
 
A prominent theme to emerge from the evaluation of the review mechanisms in 
relation to participation was the extent to which the individual mechanisms give 
victims a voice in challenging decisions not to prosecute.  It is clear that neither the 
VRR nor judicial review give victims much in the way of a voice in the criminal justice 
system itself.  Both mechanisms allow the victim to challenge a decision not to 
prosecute, but this challenge is collateral to the criminal prosecution itself.  In each of 
these methods, the victim is in a contest against the state in the form of the public 
prosecutor, not against the defendant in criminal proceedings.  It is, in fact, only a 
private prosecution that offers this opportunity.   
 
Judicial review arguably affords the victim a greater opportunity to express themselves 
than the VRR as the victim does at least have the opportunity to argue against the 
decision not to prosecute, albeit that this is likely to be through a legal representative 
and is likely to be an argument regarding the decision making process rather than the 
nature of the original criminal conduct.  Indeed, it has been argued that the opportunity 
to participate is a ‘defining characteristic of court and tribunal hearings.’73  The VRR 
is little more than a trigger for an internal checking mechanism which, if engaged, 
requires the CPS to scrutinize the original decision to verify whether it is correct.  As 
was explored in the evaluation of the VRR in chapter three, the process does not 
encourage a dialogue or promote the idea of the victim submitting further evidence or 
information to persuade the prosecutor to reach a different conclusion.  At most, 
victims may decide to submit representations of their own volition which may or may 
not be taken into account.    
 
Procedural justice has been considered specifically in relation to the Victims’ Right to 
Review process by Iliadis and Flynn who interviewed professionals who work with 
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victims about the scheme.74  They argue that although the VRR engages both 
procedural justice ideals and substantive ideals, it ‘remains limited in its capacity to 
fully attend to victims’ procedural justice needs.’75  Their conclusions are that the VRR 
has a number of limitations that reduce the potential procedural justice benefits of the 
scheme.  They suggest that the VRR does give victims an opportunity to have their 
voices heard, to exercise a degree of control over the process and to receive more 
information about their case.76  The VRR certainly does appear to recognise the 
victim’s interest in the prosecution and to provide a new opportunity for victims to be 
involved in the decision-making process.  Participants suggested that the VRR did 
give victims a voice in the process even if ultimately the request for review was not 
successful by providing a ‘platform to voice their concerns’ and ‘some sense of 
empowerment and control.’77  However, it is clear from the analysis of the VRR in 
chapter three that the extent of the dialogue is limited and a considerable number of 
potential users of the procedure are excluded from it by the restrictive criteria.  
Therefore, it would appear that there is some evidence that the VRR generates a 
perception of giving victims a voice and involving them in the process, when the 
reality is perhaps somewhat different.  Even if victims do make extensive unsolicited 
representations regarding the decision not to prosecute, it is difficult to know the extent 
that those representations were considered by the reviewer and whether they had any 
bearing on the outcome.  Arguably, therefore, there are similarities between the VRR 
and VPS schemes.  Both claim to promote the interests of victims and allow them a 
voice in a particular part of the prosecution process, but it could be argued that neither 
actually provide as much as they appear to offer.  This issue also links to whether 
victims feel that they are being treated with dignity and respect as even though the 
procedure acknowledges, to some degree, their interest in the decision, this is not 
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One potential benefit of engaging the VRR is that it may result in the victim receiving 
more information about the decision not to prosecute including more extensive 
reasons.  However, although beneficial to individual victims, this should have been 
provided at an earlier stage as a result of the CPS obligations under the Victim Code 
and the requirements of the internal policy on communicating with victims which both 
require the CPS to communicate the reasons for a decision not to prosecute to the 
victim.78  Therefore, although the reasons given for not prosecuting might be more 
detailed under the VRR, this not the main purpose of the scheme. 
 
The two key aspects of procedural justice are ‘decision control’ and ‘process control’ 
with the latter involving the victim having a say in the decision-making process.  
Arguably, however, the VRR in particular does not provide the victim with sufficient 
involvement in either respect as they have control over neither the decision or the 
process.  Judicial review conceivably does allow a degree of process control as it is a 
mechanism which is particularly geared towards protecting the integrity of the 
decision-making process rather than the decision itself.  Ultimately, however, the 
decision itself will be made by the courts (whether the original decision not to 
prosecute is unlawful) and then the CPS (the new decision on remittal). 
 
Iliadis and Flynn maintain that the VRR offers increased accountability and 
transparency with the potential to increase victim satisfaction.  However, they do 
question the effect of the lack of independence when the review is conducted by the 
same institution that made the initial decision and note that the law may be perceived 
by some as a closed environment.79  The notion of the neutrality of the forum could 
be considered in terms of the identity of the decision-maker and their independence.  
It is clear that the court is likely to be viewed as a more neutral forum than a second 
decision-maker from within the CPS, even if they are from a different internal unit.  It 
is also evident that even if the process is successful, both mechanisms ultimately return 
the decision whether to prosecute to the CPS.  In the case of judicial review, the court 
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is likely to remit the case back to the CPS for further review after quashing the original 
decision.  As the VRR is a process internal to the CPS, the review decision will have 
remained with the CPS throughout.   
 
The extent to which private prosecutions may meet the procedural justice needs of 
victims is quite different to the VRR and judicial review.  In contrast, a private 
prosecution does facilitate a much higher level of control over the actual prosecution 
with the victim essentially having conduct of the prosecution.  The private prosecution, 
by its very nature, grants the victim party status in the prosecution itself through to 
sentencing (providing that it is not taken over) in a way that neither the VRR nor 
judicial review can.  At most, the VRR and judicial review result in a temporary 
increased level of involvement focused on the decision whether to prosecute.  Once 
this decision has been reviewed, perhaps in favour of the victim, the victim returns to 
their ordinary level of involvement in the criminal prosecution which largely involves 
participation as a witness providing evidence for the State.  Providing the private 
prosecutor can avoid an intervention by the CPS, they have a greater degree of control 
over how the case is conducted subject to the various decisions imposed by the court 
during the criminal justice process. 
 
Private prosecutions allow victims to express their account of the original allegations 
in the neutral forum of the first instance court.  Although this may be channelled 
through their advocate, this route does allow their story to be told in largely the same 
way as if a public prosecution had been brought.  However, these procedural justice 
benefits can be brought to an abrupt end if the CPS intervenes and takes the 
prosecution over.  At this point, the CPS arguably becomes the forum and the victim’s 
voice is lost with the decision being made by the public prosecutor as to whether the 
case should continue.  This would inevitably engender a certain lack of trust and 
confidence as the CPS is the body which the victim was attempting to challenge by 
bringing the prosecution.   
 
Therefore, all three mechanisms are capable of meeting the victim’s procedural justice 
needs as the victim may perceive that they have been granted an effective right to 




Although it is not possible to rank the three mechanisms in terms of which best meets 
procedural justice objectives as this may depend on the particular circumstances of the 
case, potentially private prosecutions offer the highest levels of procedural justice in 
that they permit such high levels of participation and ‘voice’ in the neutral forum of 
the trial court.  However, this has to be balanced against the strong possibility of the 
victim’s case being taken over by the prosecution causing a sharp decrease in victim 
satisfaction.  Although the VRR may give the perception of meeting procedural justice 
aims, this is heavily reduced by the limited opportunities for victims to make 
representations and the fact that the review takes place within the CPS itself.  
Therefore, judicial review is likely to engender higher levels of procedural justice as 
a result of the increased levels of participation and expression in the neutral forum of 
the High Court the independence and transparency of which should generate feelings 





This chapter has explored some of the broader themes exposed by the three previous 
chapters on the individual mechanisms for challenging decisions not to prosecute.   
This thematic analysis has examined four inter-linking themes which illuminate the 
wider context in which the individual mechanisms operate.  There is a clear distinction 
in terms of formality between the procedurally heavy and complex court-based 
mechanisms and the simplicity of the VRR.  The VRR can be viewed as a convenient 
and appealing form of internal complaint mechanism or ADR which victims are able 
to engage to challenge decisions not to prosecute as an alternative to bringing legal 
proceedings.  Therefore, on one level these internal and external mechanisms 
complement one another with the expectation that the internal route is exhausted 
before the external route is pursued.  However, the VRR and judicial review are not a 
perfect fit; judicial review does not provide a third tier to the VRR as the standing 
requirements and entry criteria are different.  Judicial review also provides a residual 
route for decisions which are excluded from the VRR such as decisions to caution or 





This thematic analysis has also shown that the victim’s choice of mechanism is not 
completely unfettered.  Victims are being driven away from judicial review and 
private prosecutions towards the VRR by a combination of CPS policy and recent 
judicial decisions.  The VRR does appear to offer a simple, accessible method of 
challenging a decision not to prosecute which could incentivise victims to view it as 
the preferable option.  The approach of the courts towards applications for judicial 
review of decisions to prosecute in light of the VRR also has the real potential to divert 
victims from the public and independent forum of the courts towards the private, 
internal appeal mechanism of the VRR.  The prosecution policy on private 
prosecutions has also meant that these are less viable then previously with the court 
endorsing the CPS approach of reviewing private prosecutions in the same way as 
public prosecutions.  This should all be viewed in the wider context of recent attempts 
to reduce recourse to the resource-intensive court system towards a more financially 
sustainable alternatives.  
 
The VRR does appear to generate a public perception which appeals to procedural 
justice norms on a superficial level as if the process is carefully managed it can lead 
to victims believing that they have been allowed to assert a level of control over their 
case and to express their views on whether a prosecution should be brought.  However, 
the reality is not as positive if the VRR is viewed as protecting the CPS from more 
intrusive and expensive forms of public scrutiny by reducing the likelihood of 
successful judicial review proceedings by offering victims a right to request an internal 
review which does not include the right to participate on any meaningful level in the 
review process.  Additionally, the VRR process allows the CPS to conduct a stronger, 
more resilient review of the case to further insulate it from judicial review proceedings 
as well as allowing the CPS to respond to grievances aired in the media about decisions 
not to prosecute by stating that the case has been reviewed through the VRR process 
which has concluded that the original decision was correct.  
 
Overall, therefore, victims are presented with a ‘patchwork’ of ways of challenging 
decisions not to prosecute rather than a coherent system.  The VRR does not fully 
tessellate with judicial review as internal and external mechanisms would normally be 




private prosecution, but these are heavily undermined by the amount of control over 
them that the CPS continues to possess.   
 
This chapter has focussed on the review mechanisms from the victim’s viewpoint.  In 
the next part, the three review mechanisms will be examined from the perspectives of 





Introduction to Part B – The Wider Context 
 
 
The chapters in the previous part of this thesis focused predominantly on the rights of 
review from the victim’s perspective.  The focus of this part will be on the interests of 
the defendant and the public interest.  Although there is growing recognition that there 
are three interests in a criminal prosecution, victims do not have full party status and 
the current adversarial system is based on a contest between the State and the 
defendant.1  The first two chapters in this part will, therefore, consider the impact of 
permitting victims to have rights of review on the other two interests in a prosecution:  
the defendant and the public interest.  For ease of reference, this will be structured in 
two separate chapters although these two interests are connected.  There are areas of 
considerable overlap as well as areas where the two interests diverge.  Each of these 
two chapters will draw on analysis of other prosecution rights of appeal to show that 
rights of review provide a necessary and appropriate form of fault correction that can 
be reconciled with the rights of the defendant. 
 
Chapter nine will use established criminal justice models to situate the review 
mechanisms in the wider criminal justice process. 
 
 
1 R v B [2003] EWCA Crim 319, [2003] 2 Cr App R 13, 27 (Lord Woolf); Attorney General’s Reference 
(No 3 of 1999) [2001] 1 Cr App R 34, 483-484 (Lord Steyn); R v Killick [2011] EWCA Crim 1608, 





Chapter 7 - An examination of the extent to which the rights 





This chapter will focus on the rights of review from the defendant’s perspective as in 
order for the rights of review to be principled and coherent, they need to adequately 
take account of the rights of defendants.  Although allowing victims to have rights of 
review would initially appear to be against the interests of defendants as decisions not 
to prosecute could be reversed, it is submitted that the rights of review do not heavily 
compromise the rights of defendants.  This is, however, in part because defendants 
have very few substantive rights in this area.  Although defendants cannot generally 
be prosecuted for the same offence twice, there are exceptions to this, and this right is 
no longer unqualified.  The defendant does not have an absolute right to finality as this 
principle has been eroded by other more radical reforms such as the exceptions to the 
double jeopardy rule.  The rights of review are a less extreme qualification to this 
principle as they generally take place in the pre-trial stage and do not result in a re-
trial following acquittal or conviction.   
 
Defendants also have limited rights to challenge the decision-making process of the 
review mechanisms.  The courts have taken a restrictive approach to the extent to 
which defendants can challenge reviews of decisions not to prosecute outside the trial 
process; they have been excluded from making representations through the VRR 
process and have limited opportunities to contest the decision through judicial review.  
It will be argued that defendants should be afforded greater opportunities to make 
representations as part of the VRR on the basis that they should have a right to be 
heard as a party directly affected by the review process in the same way that they have 





A central right of defendants in criminal proceedings is the right to a fair trial.  
However, in the vast majority of cases this right would not be undermined by the rights 
of review.  The reviews relate only to the decision whether to prosecute and defendants 
are protected by the same rules and safeguards at trial as other defendants.  A potential 
exception to this is if the defendant has been placed at a material disadvantage by the 
right of review which could result in him not having a fair trial.  The communication 
of a decision not to prosecute to a defendant will inevitably generate the belief that the 
matter is at an end and will not be prosecuted.  Although the reversal of the decision 
may cause inconvenience, anxiety and frustration, in the vast majority of cases the 
defendant’s right to a fair trial would not be compromised.  However, there may be a 
minority who would suffer a degree of detriment as a result of the representation that 
they will not be prosecuted.  This could, perhaps, include the loss of evidence or 
making admissions which were subsequently relied upon by the prosecution.  
Defendants who believe they have been prejudiced by the review decision are likely 
to have to rely on the doctrine of abuse of process to challenge the decision.  However, 
the requirements of the doctrine are strict and case law is not in the favour of a 
defendant unless they can show that there has been a breach of promise which has 
compromised the right to a fair trial.  Circumstances which fall short of these 
requirements are unlikely to result in a stay of prosecution.  The risk, therefore, is 
greatest to those defendants who have not appreciated that there is a possibility of 
review and have relied on the indication that they will not be prosecuted.  A 
comparison with other appeal mechanisms will stress how the VRR in particular 
should be reformed to incorporate additional safeguards to protect defendants to 
reduce further the likelihood of such circumstances arising.  This would include 
allowing defendants to make representations as part of the VRR process.   
 
The first section of this chapter will provide an overview of defendants’ rights that are 
relevant to victims having rights of review.  The second section will explore the extent 
to which defendants are able to challenge decisions to prosecute outside the trial 
process.  The third section will then focus on abuse of process as the primary way of 
contesting decisions within the trial process.  The fourth section will concentrate on 
the conflict with the private prosecutor.  The fifth section will compare other appeal 




to reduce the possibility of defendants being disadvantaged by the process which could 
undermine their right to a fair trial.  
 
 
7.2 The rights of the Defendant 
 
The defendant has a range of specific rights relating to particular parts of the 
prosecution process.  These include rights in relation to bail, the prosecution evidence, 
disclosure and many others.  However, the most relevant rights are the right not to be 
prosecuted for the same offence twice and the more nebulous principle of finality.  The 
discussion below will show that the rights of review do not breach the right not to be 
prosecuted for the same offence twice and that the principle of finality is not absolute.  
Therefore, the principle of rights of review does not undermine the rights of the 
defendant.  However, clearly there is the potential for such rights to have an impact 
on defendants which may ultimately result in them arguing that their right to fair trial 
has been undermined.  
 
7.2.1 The principle of finality 
 
A central aspect of the principle of finality is the autrefois doctrine.  The defendant is 
entitled to plead autrefois acquit if he had previously been acquitted of the same 
offence or autrefois convict if he had been convicted of the same offence on an earlier 
occasion.1  These principles are further supported by the courts staying prosecutions 
as an abuse of process when the autrefois principles do not technically apply because 
the charges are different, but the proceedings arise out of substantially the same facts.2  
However, the autrefois pleas only apply when the defendant has either been acquitted 
or convicted of a charge.  The ECHR also protects those accused of crimes from being 
tried or punished twice.3  Again, this right would only be engaged when the defendant 
 
 
1 Connelly v DPP [1964] AC 1254 and R v J [2013] EWCA Crim 569, [2014] QB 561 
2 R (SY) v DPP [2018] EWHC 795 (Admin), [2018] 2 Cr App R 15 





has been ‘finally acquitted or convicted.’4 This also means that prosecution appeals 
would not infringe the right.  Additionally, the article also permits cases to be reopened 
on the basis of new evidence or if there was a ‘fundamental defect in the previous 
proceedings.’5  Although this right has not yet been ratified by the UK, it is important 
to take it into account as it may be ratified in the future.6  In the context of rights of 
review, the majority of the reviews will take place in the pre-trial stage before such a 
determination has been made.  Therefore, on this basis rights of review do not breach 
either the autrefois rule or Article 4.     
 
Furthermore, the principle of finality has been significantly weakened by the reforms 
contained in Part 10 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 which allows re-trials for serious 
offences following acquittal and is an exception to the rule against double jeopardy.7  
There are also other forms of prosecution appeal which qualify the finality principle 
such as re-trials for tainted acquittals and the provisions on terminating rulings.8  
 
In essence, the defendant does not have a right to absolute finality.  There is a legal 
basis to the principle originating from the autrefois doctrine, but this is qualified and 
has clearly been diluted by other prosecution rights of appeal.  Allowing reviews of 
decisions not to prosecute are a less radical encroachment on these principles and there 
are no realistic grounds for arguing that such rights of review are fundamentally 
incompatible with the defendant’s rights.  However, it is still possible that an 
individual defendant’s right to a fair trial could be compromised by a specific review 





4 ibid Art 4(1) 
5 ibid Art 4(2) 
6 See the Council if Europe website:  <www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-
/conventions/treaty/117/signatures?p_auth=YvNLAydl> accessed 13 December 2020 
7 Criminal Justice Act 2003, ss 75-84. 





7.2.2 The right to a fair trial 
 
The right with overarching relevance to the prosecution process is the right to a fair 
trial under Article 6 of the ECHR.9  However, the focus of this right is the trial process 
itself and whether defendants receive a fair and public hearing by an independent 
tribunal.  There are rights in Article 6(3) for suspects while they are being questioned 
and are under investigation, that is pre-charge, not simply for those who stand trial.  
None of those five separate rights, nor the case law that expounds upon them, confer 
any right on a suspect/defendant not to have victims seek review of a CPS decision 
not to prosecute.  The trial process remains the same regardless of whether the decision 
was made following a request for review.  The prosecutor is not making a 
‘determination’ of either the defendant’s civil rights or his criminal liability; this will 
be as a result of an adjudication by the trial court.  The prosecutor’s decision is an 
exercise of his discretion as to whether the defendant’s case should be prosecuted, he 
is not making a decision as to whether he is criminally liable.10 
 
However, the defendant also has a common law right to a fair trial which is protected 
by the abuse of process doctrine.  There are two broad categories of abuse: the first is 
where the defendant cannot have a fair hearing; the second is where the integrity of 
the criminal justice system would  be undermined.11  Essentially, the defendant would 
apply to the court for a stay of proceedings on the basis that he cannot receive a fair 
trial.  However, the defendant would need to establish specific grounds.  In the context 
of rights of review this is likely to be on the basis of breach of promise or delay.  Abuse 
of process will be discussed in detail in the third section of the chapter.   
 
 
9 For a detailed discussion of Article 6 case law and principles, see Tom Barkhuysen et al ‘Right to a 
Fair Trial’ in Pieter van Dijk et al (eds), Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (Fifth edition, Intersentia 2018). Although the ECHR case law is clear that implicit in Article 6 
is the right of access to a court (in order once there to have a fair trial), this does not imply a right for 
victims to institute criminal proceedings: Helmers v Sweden (1991) 15 EHRR 285 [29] though in 
Assenov v Bulgaria (1998) 28 EHRR 652 [107]-[113] Article 6(1) was held to be applicable but only 
because civil proceedings were dependent on criminal charges having been instituted. 
10 By contrast, a prison governor’s decision that a prisoner had committed a disciplinary offence does 
engage Art 6:  Ezeh v UK (2004) 39 EHRR 1 





Abuse of process can only be argued once proceedings have commenced.  Therefore, 
a defendant may wish to contest the request for review by making representations as 
part of the decision-making process or externally through the courts.  This will be 
discussed in the next section.  
 
 
7.3 Challenging the rights of review outside the trial  
 
The rights of review may have a significant impact on the defendant as they have the 
potential to reverse the decision that has been made by the CPS not to bring 
proceedings or to terminate existing proceedings.  It is, therefore, inevitable that 
defendants may wish to contest the request for review or to make representations as to 
the outcome.  This could be either as part of the particular review mechanism being 
used or by challenging it externally through the courts.  This section will show that 
the defendant has very limited rights to argue his case from within the VRR process 
or by applying for judicial review of the decision to prosecute.  Defendants generally 
have to rely on the trial process which in the vast majority of cases means contesting 
the allegation at trial in the ordinary way.  For some, where they can show that the 
right to a fair trial has been compromised by the review decision, they will be able to 
rely on the doctrine of abuse of process on the basis that the prosecution has reneged 
on its earlier decision not to prosecute.  
 
7.3.1 Challenges within the review mechanisms (internal) 
 
Overall, defendants have limited opportunities to oppose the review process within 
the processes themselves; this is particularly the case in relation to the VRR.  Despite 
its close connection to the adversarial process, the VRR does not require the CPS to 
notify the defendant that a request for review has been made by the victim.  
Furthermore, it was made clear in R (S) v DPP that the defendant is not entitled to 
make representations to the CPS in relation to the review decision.  This was justified 




original decision-maker.12  The 2014 edition of the VRR guidance stated that, ‘[t]he 
reviewing prosecutor will only take account of information available at the time the 
qualifying decision was made.’13  However, the most recent edition of the VRR 
guidance omits this particular sentence and simply states that the reviewing prosecutor 
will review the case afresh.14   
 
This restriction on the defendant making representations is no longer justified,  
particularly in view of the fact that victims clearly do make representations as part of 
the VRR despite not being required, or encouraged, to do so.15  This point is more 
compelling following confirmation in R (FNM) v DPP that the victim has an 
opportunity to make representations as part of the VRR and that they will be taken 
into account in the review process.16  The court stated that paragraph 42 of the VRR 
guidance gave ‘the complainant a fair opportunity to make representations and to have 
them taken into account by the decision-maker…’17  Although the court would not go 
as far as to find a duty on the DPP to positively invite representations, this did confirm 
that that victims have a route to submitting information or arguments directly to the 
decision-maker.  Although it does not automatically follow that defendants should 
have the same rights as victims, there is an argument that the VRR is an administrative 
decision-making process which has a direct impact on the defendant and as such he 
should be permitted to make representations when victims, as third parties, are allowed 
this opportunity.  
 
The prosecution process generally, and trials specifically, are structured around a 
contest between the prosecution and the defence with both sides having a right to make 
representations at the various stages.  The defendant has clearly established rights to 
make representations in relation to these key stages, such as bail,18 venue19 and 
 
 
12 R (S) v DPP [2015] EWHC 2868 (Admin), [2016] 1 WLR 804, 810. 
13 Crown Prosecution Service, ‘Victims’ Right to Review Guidance’ (CPS 2014) [31] 
14 Crown Prosecution Service, ‘Victims’ Right to Review Guidance’ (CPS 2016) [31] 
15 See for example:  R (Monica) v DPP [2018] EWHC 3469 (QB) [12]-[13] 
16 [2020] EWHC 870 (Admin)  
17 ibid [45] 
18 Criminal Procedure Rules, r 14.2(1) 




sentencing.20  As was noted above, Article 6 also provides specific rights in relation 
to the defendant while still a suspect under investigation having an opportunity to 
prepare his case, defend himself, call witnesses and to challenge prosecution 
witnesses.21  Defendants also have the right to make representations through appeal 
processes.  Therefore, to confer on a defendant, as this thesis argues should be the 
case, the right to make representations as part of the review mechanisms falls within 
a conceptualisation of such a right as being integral to the fairness of the process.    
 
There is further support for this argument in the case law on the right to a fair hearing.  
Although it is not argued here that defendants should be entitled to an oral hearing, 
the argument being made herein is that they should have a right to make 
representations on the basis the VRR decision has the potential to have a clear impact 
on them as the person directly affected by it.22  The counter - that the defendant did 
not have a right to make representations at the point of charge, so should not be 
permitted to make them at the review stage - is undermined by the reality that they 
will have had an opportunity to respond to the allegations as part of the investigative 
process; the review decision has the potential to take into account new information, so 
the defendant should also be allowed the opportunity to make representations.  In 
judicial review proceedings the victim would be the claimant with the DPP as the 
defendant, but the suspect in the criminal allegation would be an ‘interested party’ and 
would have the opportunity to make representations to the court.23  Therefore, if the 
defendant is entitled to participate in judicial review proceedings, logically he should 
be allowed to have the same rights in the internal mechanism.  This would be in 
keeping with the spirit of the rights to participate as part of a fair trial under Article 6.   
 
This refusal by the CPS and the courts to allow the defendant a voice in the VRR 
process could lead to defendants challenging VRR decisions by judicial review 
 
 
20 Sentencing Council, ‘General Guideline:  overarching principles’ 
<www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/overarching-guides/magistrates-court/item/general-guideline-
overarching-principles/> accessed 17 December 2020 
21 ECHR, Art 6(3) (b)-(d). 
22 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Doody [1994] 1 AC 531, 560; R v Secretary 
of State for Home Department ex parte Al-Fayed (No 1) [1998] 1 WLR 763  




proceedings.  However, the courts have made a distinction between challenges by 
defendants to decisions to prosecute and decisions not to prosecute brought by third 
parties, rejecting the former on the basis that there is an alternative remedy available 
for defendants who can challenge the decision through the trial and appeal processes.  
The issue of whether the High Court was the appropriate forum to challenge decisions 
to prosecute was considered in Pepushi24 where the principles set out in Kebilene were 
followed.25  The court stated that ‘save in wholly exceptional circumstances’ decisions 
to prosecute should not be made by way of applications for judicial review and that 
defendants should ‘take the point in accordance with the procedures of the Criminal 
Courts.’26  In certain circumstances there may be clear advantages for the defendant 
of challenging the decision to prosecute by judicial review rather than relying on the 
trial process.  For example, in Robson the defendant challenged the decision to 
prosecute her rather than offer a conditional caution on the basis that the prosecutor 
had unlawfully applied the policy.27  The trial process would not have been an 
effective forum for defending the case as the defendant had made admissions to 
criminal damage.  There have been other occasions when defendants have sought to 
challenge the public interest aspect of the decision to prosecute.28  As well as 
challenges to the public interest stage of the decision to prosecute discussed above, 
there are other reasons why a defendant may attempt to contest the decision through 
judicial review rather than relying solely on the trial process.  Reasons could include 
where the defendant wishes to challenge the lawfulness of the prosecution policy or 
to avoid the scrutiny of the trial process.29   
 
A similarly restrictive approach has been adopted by the courts in relation to 
applications for judicial review of decisions to prosecute following a successful 
application under the VRR.  S concerned a rape allegation which was initially not 
 
 
24 R (Pepushi) v CPS [2004] EWHC 798 (Admin) 
25 R v DPP ex parte Kebilene [2000] 2 AC 326 
26 Pepushi (n 24) [49] 
27 R (Robson) v CPS [2016] EWHC 2191 (Admin), [2018] 4 WLR 27 
28 See R (O) v DPP [2010] EWHC 804 (Admin); R (E) v DPP [2011] EWHC 1465 (Admin), [2012] 1 
Cr App R 6 





proceeded with, but the decision reversed and proceedings brought as a result of a 
successful VRR request.30  The court took the same approach as in cases challenging 
decisions to prosecute stating, ‘the trial process provides the protection that the law 
affords to those charged with crime’ indicating that the defendant could challenge the 
prosecution by an abuse of process application or if the issue were an evidential one, 
by dismissal proceedings or by making a submission of no case to answer at the end 
of the prosecution case.31   
 
Although it is tempting to argue that defendants should have the same rights as 
victims, the two groups are fundamentally different.  Campbell et al rightly emphasise 
the importance of relying on unprincipled concepts of balance to justify procedural 
rights; the existence of particular rights for one group should not automatically result 
in another group having equivalent rights.32  Defendants are parties to the criminal 
proceedings whereas victims have limited rights within the criminal justice process 
itself.  As victims are unable to contest the decision through the trial process, the courts 
have been more willing to consider judicial review of decisions not to prosecute.  
Therefore, although there appears to be a disparity, the courts have used judicial 
review as a way to allow victims to challenge decisions which directly concern them, 
but which they would not be able to challenge in the criminal courts due to their lack 
of party status.   
 
In summary, there is limited scope for defendants to contest decisions to prosecute 
through the review mechanisms themselves.  Defendants are essentially excluded from 
the VRR and the courts have rarely entertained applications for judicial review of 
decisions to prosecute as a result of a VRR decision or otherwise.  The VRR should 
be amended to allow defendants to make representations in response to the request for 
review on the basis that they are directly affected by the review and should not be 
excluded from the process.  Defendants may have some opportunity to respond to a 
victim’s application for judicial review of a decision not to prosecute them, but this 
 
 
30 R (S) v CPS [2015] EWHC 2868 (Admin), [2016] 1 WLR 804 
31 R (S) v CPS [2015] EWHC 2868 (Admin), [2016] 1 WLR 804, 812 
32 Liz Campbell, Andrew Ashworth and Mike Redmayne, The Criminal Process (5th edition, Oxford 




would be limited to responding to the victim’s claim that the decision was unlawful.  
Accordingly, unless judicial review is exceptionally available, the defendant will need 
to rely on contesting the decision in the criminal courts. 
 
 
7.4 Challenging the decision in the criminal courts:  Abuse of process 
 
There is little that the defendant can do to contest the review procedure through the 
VRR or judicial review.  The defendant’s primary way to challenge the reversal of a 
decision not to prosecute is by arguing that the review decision is an abuse of process.  
However, as will be set out below, the authorities are very much stacked against a 
defendant seeking to argue that the prosecution should be stayed for abuse of process 
as the result of a successful VRR request.  If this is not successful, the defendant can 
still plead not guilty and contest the matter at trial having the same protections as any 
other defendant in a prosecution. 
 
Abuse of process allows the courts to halt a prosecution using its inherent powers to 
regulate and safeguard its integrity.33  Two broad categories of abuse of process have 
emerged from the case law, the first of which is concerned with whether it is possible 
for the defendant to have a fair trial; the second relates to the overall integrity of the 
criminal justice system and whether the defendant should be tried at all.34   
 
7.4.1 Breach of promise 
 
The most relevant ground or type of abuse of process in these circumstances is likely 
to be breach of promise on the basis that the prosecution has reneged on a previous 
indication that the defendant would not be prosecuted.  Breach of promise potentially 
engages both types of abuse of process:  it may no longer be possible for the defendant 
to have a fair trial as a result of his reliance on the promise not to prosecute and it may 
be ‘morally questionable’ to prosecute him in light of him being informed that he 
 
 
33 R v Beckford [1996] 1 Cr App R 94, 100 




would not be prosecuted.35  There are a series of authorities which set a high threshold 
for cases where it is alleged that the prosecution has been brought in breach of a 
promise not to.  The case of Dean concerned a 17-year-old who was given assurances 
by the police over a five-week period that he would not be prosecuted in connection 
with a murder case, but treated as a prosecution witness.  The court held that ‘a 
promise, undertaking or representation from the police that he will not be prosecuted 
is capable of being an abuse of process.’36  However, the case was described as ‘quite 
exceptional’ and the court was arguably persuaded partly by the defendant’s young 
age and the period of time over which he had been led to believe that he would not be 
prosecuted.37  In Townsend the court distinguished between situations where the 
defendant had not changed his position as a result of being treated as a prosecution 
witness and those where he was prejudiced as a result of the prosecution’s actions.  In 
this case, the defendant was held to have been seriously prejudiced by the service of 
his prosecution witness statement on the co-defendant.38  It has also been held to be 
an abuse to go back on a statement made before the court that the prosecution would 
offer no evidence when there was no change of circumstances justifying the change of 
decision.  Arguably, the fact that the representations were made in front of the judge 
substantially lead to the finding that the decision was an affront to justice.39 
 
In Abu Hamza, having reviewed the above authorities, the Court of Appeal concluded 
that there were two elements to ground an argument of abuse of process on the basis 
of breach of promise:  an unequivocal representation that the defendant will not be 
prosecuted and detrimental reliance on that representation by the defendant.40  This 
essentially means that the defendant must have been unambiguously informed that he 
would not be prosecuted and as a result the defendant has relied on that statement to 
his disadvantage.  A classic example of this would be where a defendant has made 
admissions to an offence as a result of assurances that he would be a prosecution 
 
 
35 Andrew Choo, ‘Halting Criminal Prosecutions:  The Abuse of Process Doctrine Revisited’ [1995] 
Crim LR 864, 867 
36 R v Croyden Justices ex parte Dean [1993] QB 769, 778 
37 ibid 779. 
38 R v Townsend [1997] 2 Cr App R 540, 552 
39 R v Bloomfield [1997] 1 Cr App R 135 




witness and would not be prosecuted.  This was held not to have been the case in Abu 
Hamza as the court concluded that an earlier decision by the police not to prosecute in 
relation to a number of items seized from the defendant could not amount to an 
‘unequivocal assurance’ that he would not be prosecuted in the future and that there 
was no evidence that he had relied upon it.41  Understandably, Ormerod suggests that 
the indication given by the police did appear to be ‘an explicit assurance’ that he would 
not be prosecuted.  Ormerod also observes that this category of abuse of process is 
grounded on the concept of ‘detrimental reliance’ which is narrower than ‘legitimate 
expectation’ as the defendant needs to show that he has changed his position to his 
disadvantage as a result of the representations which have been made to him.42  In 
Gripton, the court held that there was not an abuse in circumstances where there had 
been an unequivocal representation, but the appellant had not changed her position as 
a result and was, in fact, unaware of the representation.43 
 
The principles of Abu Hamza are relevant to an abuse argument on the basis of breach 
of promise as the result of a successful VRR as the defendant has generally not been 
induced into changing his position as a result of the actions of the authorities.  By 
contrast, the cases of Dean and Townsend, for example, arose in the context of the 
prosecutions of individuals who had been assured that they would be prosecution 
witnesses.  In R v AJ, the Court of Appeal observed that Abu Hamza ‘is not a binding 
rule, but it remains a valid observation and not a bad rule of thumb.’44  The court 
concluded that the ultimate question was whether ‘the prosecution was an affront to 
the integrity of the criminal justice system.’45  As a result, even if there has been a 
representation that the defendant will not be prosecuted on which he has relied, the 
court may refuse to stay the proceedings if it is not of the view that a trial would 
amount to an affront to the criminal justice system.  It may be that the court would 
conclude, as it did in R v AJ, that the issues in dispute should probably be determined 
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The approach of the courts to abuse arguments made in respect of reversals of 
decisions not to prosecute was first set out in Killick which resulted in the VRR in the 
first place.  In Killick the Court of Appeal considered whether prosecution as a result 
of a request for review of the decision not to prosecute by the victim was an abuse of 
process.  The court concluded that neither of the two communications sent by the 
police indicating that no further action would be taken against the appellant amounted 
to an unequivocal representation.  The court also stated that the appellant’s solicitors 
would have been aware of the possibility of a review as the Code for Crown 
Prosecutors states that in certain circumstances it may be appropriate to re-start a 
prosecution.  The court also made it clear that the prosecution has a duty to review 
decisions if the complainant requests one for a number of reasons.  Firstly, as it is 
possible to judicially review decisions not to prosecute, it would be ‘disproportionate 
for a public authority not to have a system of review.’46  Secondly, the decision is ‘in 
reality a final decision for a victim’ and the police have a right of review under the 
charging guidance.47  Thirdly, the court also referred to the right of review under 
Article 10 of the then draft EU directive establishing minimum standards on the rights, 
support and protection of victims of crime.48  Additionally, on the facts of Killick, the 
appellant does not appear to have suffered any prejudice as a result of the 
representations.  
 
It would be very difficult for a defendant to successfully argue for a stay of prosecution 
on the basis that the prosecution had breached a legitimate expectation by reviewing 
a decision not to prosecute.  In addition, it would be exceedingly difficult to argue 
abuse on the second ground, namely that the integrity of the criminal justice system 
had been undermined by a decision to prosecute following the review of a decision 
not to prosecute.  This ground is predicated on some kind of misconduct on the part 
of the prosecution; Rogers states that this ground depends on the identification of one 
of four types of impropriety:  misconduct, manipulation of process, malice or 
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frustration of legitimate expectation.49  Frustration of legitimate expectation could 
encapsulate a breach of promise, but it would be difficult to argue that the prosecution 
had acted with impropriety when the reversal of a decision to prosecute was based on 
established policy such as the VRR.   The prosecution would inevitably argue that the 
defendant was on notice of the possibility of a review, particularly if he had the benefit 
of legal advice.  Rogers accepts that a key consideration is whether the defendant 
would have been in a position to foresee that the original decision may be changed.50  
Essentially, abuse of process should only be utilised when there is impropriety 
affecting the fairness of the trial, rather than being used as a routine response to the 
reversal of a decision not to prosecute. 
 
As the VRR becomes more firmly embedded in the criminal justice system it is likely 
to become increasingly difficult to argue that the review of a decision could amount 
to an abuse of process under the second head of abuse (integrity of the criminal justice 
system) in the absence of impropriety on the part of the prosecution.  Firstly, it would 
be difficult to show that an unequivocal representation had been made.  Secondly, the 
defendant would need to show that the integrity of the criminal justice system had 
been undermined.   This is particularly the case in view of the approach of the courts 
in recognising the value and importance of the VRR.  Thirdly, in S, the Divisional 
Court held that the CPS was not required to inform the defendant of the VRR request 
or offer him an opportunity to make representations.51  The prosecution authorities can 
also ensure that notifications of decisions not to prosecute or to terminate proceedings 
are sufficiently carefully worded to ensure they do not amount to an unequivocal 
representation that the defendant will never be prosecuted.  Indeed, any 
correspondence should specifically refer to the victim’s right to request a review of a 
decision and the possibility that the original decision could be changed.   
 
An alternative approach would be for the defendant to argue that the first head of abuse 
is engaged, namely that it is no longer possible for him to have a fair trial as a result 
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of his reliance on the representation that he would not be prosecuted.  The defendant 
would still have to overcome the requirement that the assurance that he had been given 
was unequivocal and it is submitted that in the vast majority of cases where a review 
has taken place the defendant will not have acted to his detriment as a result of being 
informed that he was not being prosecuted.  However, there remains an argument that 
some of the authorities, such as Bloomfield, support the case for upholding abuse of 
process without the requirement of prejudice, particularly where the representation not 
to prosecute has been made before the court.52  The court reached a similar decision 
in Smith where the prosecution had agreed in court to dispose of the case by way of a 
restraining order on acquittal, but then reneged on the agreement at the next hearing.53  
Although the defendant in Smith had not really changed his position as a result of the 
prosecution’s retraction, he had been deprived of the opportunity initially offered to 
him.  However, Bloomfield and Smith pre-date the VRR and a decision to prosecute 
on the basis that the original decision had been reviewed as a result of a request made 
by the victim could potentially justify such a change of decision.  The Court of Appeal 
has also indicated that the courts did not intend to create ‘a comprehensive binding 
rule’ in either Bloomfield or Abu Hamza and that the courts are ‘concerned with 
considerations of fairness’ and ‘must be free to respond to the circumstances of each 
case.’54  Therefore, abuse of process arguments are unlikely to be successful on the 
basis of breach of promise unless there has been an unequivocal representation 
followed by an element of detrimental reliance that also amounts to an affront to the 
integrity of the criminal justice system on the basis of R v AJ.55  However, if that 
representation is made in front of the court, the possibility of success is perhaps 




Another potential abuse argument would be based on delay.  Again, the authorities 
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held that a stay should only be granted on this ground in ‘exceptional circumstances’ 
and the defendant must establish on the balance of probabilities that he would suffer 
serious prejudice as a result of the delay and would not be able to have a fair trial.56  
The Court of Appeal has also emphasised the importance of not eliding the principles 
of abuse of process with whether there is a case to answer or whether the conviction 
would be unsafe.57 
 
A particularly relevant ‘delay’ case in relation to the review of decisions not to 
prosecute is R v LG where the prosecution contested the trial judge’s decision to stay 
the prosecution on grounds of delay after the decision not to prosecute had been 
reversed following a complaint to the IPCC.58  As a result, the case involved issues of 
both delay and breach of promise.  The court concluded that the was no evidence that 
the integrity of the criminal justice system had been jeopardised and as such the second 
limb of abuse of process was not relevant.  The issue was therefore whether the 
defendant would be able to have a fair trial.  The court recognised that for a stay on 
the basis of delay to be justified, there would need to be evidence that the defendant 
had suffered prejudice as a result.      
 
R v LG is analogous to decisions made under the VRR as the reversal of the decision 
not to prosecute was triggered by the complaint made by the victim’s family.  The 
case illustrates how an abuse of process application is likely to depend on whether the 
defendant has been placed at a disadvantage by the review of the decision not to 
prosecute to the extent that he cannot have a fair trial.  The defendant would need to 
persuade the court that he had suffered ‘serious prejudice’ to obtain a stay for delay or 
‘detrimental reliance’ if he were arguing breach of promise.  As in R v LG, both 
grounds could be argued together as circumstances which amount to ‘serious 
prejudice’ for delay may also amount to ‘detrimental reliance’ for the purposes of 
breach of promise.  Potentially the two arguments could strengthen one another, the 
longer the delay the more likely the defendant may suffer detriment as a result of his 
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reliance on a representation that he will not face proceedings; although it will remain 
difficult to establish that the defendant has been disadvantaged to the extent that it is 
not possible to have a fair trial.  
 
A situation with potentially more traction would be that the defendant had been 
informed that the original decision had been reviewed under the VRR and the decision 
not to prosecute had been upheld.  If he were then to be prosecuted (as a result perhaps 
of a successful judicial review), he may then be able to put forward a more convincing 
argument that he had received an ‘unequivocal representation’ that he would not be 
prosecuted.  He would, however, still have to prove that he had relied on that 
representation to his detriment.  It may be possible to prove this if, as a result of the 
VRR outcome, the defendant had disposed of certain evidence that he would wish to 
rely on at trial, for example.   
 
7.4.3 Justifications for a restrictive approach to abuse of process 
 
Despite the expectation that the defendant relies on the abuse of process doctrine to 
resist decisions to prosecute, the requirements of arguments based on breach of 
promise or delay are demanding and likely to be insurmountable in most cases.  
However, such onerous requirements are justifiable.  The doctrine protects those 
defendants who have genuinely been disadvantaged and their right to a fair trial 
compromised by the improper actions of the prosecution.  However, it should not 
permit the doctrine to be used to thwart a legitimate prosecution merely as a result of 
the amount of time that has elapsed since the original decision or because the 
prosecution has changed its position on prosecution as a result of a lawful request for 
review.  
 
The doctrine does, and indeed should, provide a residual safeguard against the 
defendant’s right to a fair trial being compromised by a review decision; it provides a 
means for the defendant to argue that it is no longer possible for him to receive a fair 
trial as a result of the review process and the courts should be prepared to consider the 
circumstances of the individual case to determine whether the rights of the defendant 




be where the review has taken place after the expiry of the published time limit or 
where the prosecutor has conducted an ad hoc review outside the parameters of the 
VRR.  
 
Therefore, it is right that the doctrine of abuse of process should only cover 
exceptional situations.  On the basis of the current authorities, it protects the defendant 
in situations when their fair trial rights have been compromised by the prosecution 
indicating that they would not prosecute and the defendant has relied on this to the 
extent that he would be disadvantaged in a subsequent trial.  In other situations, such 
as where no real detriment has been suffered, the defendant retains the standard 
safeguards that are built into the trial process as would any other defendant.  For 
example, he can still contest the admissibility of evidence, cross-examine witnesses 
and make a submission of no case to answer.  Furthermore, the defendant is still able 
to maintain his not guilty plea and contest the matter at trial.  The burden of proof 
requires that the prosecution prove the case against the defendant in the same way as 
if he had been prosecuted as a result of the original decision.  These safeguards are 
sufficient provided the defendant has not been prejudiced by the review process.  To 
mitigate the risk of such prejudice, additional safeguards will be identified in the final 
section of this chapter which should be incorporated into the VRR process to increase 
the protections given to defendants.  
 
 
7.5 Conflict with the private prosecutor 
 
The contemporary criminal justice system is traditionally based on a two-party contest 
between the State and the defendant.  The review mechanisms do recognise to some 
extent the interest of victims and facilitate them asserting their views on whether a 
prosecution should proceed (even if these views are not proactively invited by the 
prosecution).  In the case of private prosecutions, the decision to prosecute has been 
made by the individual victim without the requirement to objectively appraise the 
evidence or to act in the public interest.  As a result, private prosecutions clearly do 
have the potential to conflict with the interests of the defendant.  This was particularly 




defendants do not have a right not to be prosecuted apart from perhaps on the basis 
that they have a legitimate expectation that the DPP will apply the Full Code Test to 
private prosecutions as per the policy.  
 
As was identified in chapter five, private prosecutions allow victims to have high 
levels of participation and control of the conduct of the prosecution.  The risk to the 
defendant is that this would have the potential to introduce arbitrary decision-making 
by victims who have not conducted an objective analysis of the evidence and are 
potentially emotionally attached to the case.  A private prosecutor may not have 
reviewed the case in the same way as a public prosecutor whose discretion is structured 
by prosecution policies and guidance aimed at ensuring that prosecution decisions are 
consistent, evidence-based and in the public interest.  Therefore, there must be 
legitimate concerns about the extent to which private prosecutions could undermine 
the interests of defendants.  From this perspective, the DPP’s policy that private 
prosecutions will be reviewed against the Code for Crown Prosecutors using the same 
test as for public prosecutions is justified.  This policy brings an element of 
consistency to prosecutions and potentially addresses the concerns that arbitrary 
decision-making by victims bringing private prosecutions could undermine the rights 
of the defendant.  The application of the Full Code Test ensures that a benchmark 
evidential standard is met and that the defendant is not prosecuted in evidentially weak 
cases.   
  
 
7.6 Comparison with other appeal mechanisms 
 
This section will identify safeguards from other appeal mechanisms that could be 
incorporated into the review mechanisms to protect defendants from the risk of being 
placed at a disadvantage by the rights of review which could lead to their right to a 
fair trial being compromised.  
 
The principal impact of the review mechanisms on defendants is that they qualify the 
principle of finality as defendants can no longer completely rely on confirmation that 




defendants cannot be confident that the courts would grant a stay of prosecution on 
the basis of breach of promise or delay.  There is a risk, therefore, that in a limited 
number of cases that the defendant could be disadvantaged by the victims successfully 
having a decision not to prosecute reviewed.  Rights of review are not the only 
circumstances in which a previously concluded decision is re-opened and reversed; 
the prosecution have a number of specific rights of appeal that can have this effect.  
These prosecution rights of appeal show that there are a number of additional 
protections that could be incorporated into the VRR, in particular, to preserve the 
rights of the defendant.  
 
7.6.1 Time limits and notice requirements 
 
Of particular relevance to the issue of finality is that the majority of prosecution rights 
of appeal require compliance with strict notice requirements and time limits.  The 
prosecution may appeal to the Crown Court a decision of the magistrates’ court to 
grant bail provided they give oral notice of appeal to the court that granted bail 
followed by service of a written notice within two hours on both the court and the 
defendant.59  Similarly, in order for the prosecution to challenge a judge’s terminating 
ruling, the prosecutor must indicate their intention to appeal immediately or request 
an adjournment to consider whether to appeal.60  Appealing a magistrates’ court 
decision by way of case stated to the High Court or challenging an unduly lenient 
sentence in the Court of Appeal both have to made within 21 or 28 days respectively.61  
Challenges to terminating rulings and unduly lenient sentence applications both 
require leave of the court.62  The point that can be drawn from this is that appeal 
mechanisms which have the potential to set aside previously ‘final’ decisions 
generally have strict time limits and require notice to be given to the defendant in the 
event that the prosecution wish to exercise these rights.  There are similar procedural 
requirements for judicial review with strict time limits and notice requirements.  These 
principles could be applied to the VRR to mitigate the effect on the defendant of 
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having what was previously considered to be a final decision unpicked.  Although 
there are time limits under the VRR there is a lack of clarity around when which time 
limit applies.  Reducing the VRR time limit of three months to 21 or 28 days could 
shorten the period of uncertainty for defendants whilst still allowing sufficient time 
for victims to request a review.   
 
There is also no requirement that the defendant be put on notice of the request. The 
effect of the VRR on the defendants’ rights could be significantly improved by 
ensuring that all defendants are made aware that a case may be subject to a request for 
review if it is eligible regardless of the method of termination.  This would perhaps be 
a relatively simple task when a notice of discontinuance is issued, but less straight-
forward when the defendant is notified that no further action is being taken by the 
police or another third party or when the matter is brought to an end in the courtroom.  
Additionally, the CPS could notify the defendant when a request for a review has been 
received.   
 
One exception to the requirements of notice and short time limits is the provisions 
which allow for re-trials for serious offences under Part 10 of the Criminal Justice Act 
2003, also known as the exception to the double jeopardy rule.63  Although the 
provisions only apply to a limited number of offences and must involve new and 
compelling evidence, there are no time restrictions and an application could be made 
many years after the original acquittal. Generally, rights of review can be distinguished 
from the exception to the double jeopardy rule on the basis that rights of review do not 
permit a defendant to be re-tried after he has been acquitted.  They can facilitate a 
reversal of a decision not to prosecute or not to continue a prosecution, but this 
happens at an earlier stage when the public prosecutor decides not to pursue the matter.  
Although it could potentially happen during the trial, it is unlikely that the prosecutor 
would terminate the matter after the jury had retired to consider the verdict.64  It clearly 
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would not be relevant after a jury had returned a not guilty verdict as this would be a 
jury acquittal, not a decision by the prosecutor not to continue.  By comparison, 
therefore, the rights of review are a much less radical encroachment on the rights of 
defendants than the exception to the double jeopardy rule.  
 
7.6.2 ‘Interests of justice’ requirement 
 
The provisions under Part 10 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 also include an 
‘interests of justice’ requirement which requires the court to specifically consider 
whether a fair trial would be unlikely when determining whether to grant leave for a 
re-trial.65  This compels the court to take into account the effect of the decision on the 
rights of the defendant.  
 
Although the VRR has the ‘public confidence’ requirement, the incorporation of a 
broader ‘interests of justice’ provision would compel the prosecutor to explicitly 
consider the impact of the decision on the defendant’s fair trial rights as well as the 
interests of the victim and public confidence in the criminal justice system.   The 
‘public confidence’ test would not necessarily identify cases where the defendant 
might be disadvantaged by the reversal of a decision not to prosecute which would 
leave the defendant having to rely on the abuse doctrine.  The application of an 
‘interests of justice’ test would take place as part of the review process and would, 
therefore, be at a much earlier stage than an abuse argument which might only be heard 
by the court several months after the decision to prosecute.  
 
7.6.3 Right to make representations 
 
Defendants are entitled to be present and make representations in relation to 
applications to the Court of Appeal for permission for a re-trial post acquittal.66  This 
enables defendants to argue against leave being granted including making 
representation as to why it would not be in the interests of justice to have a re-trial.  In 
 
 
65 Criminal Justice Act 2003, s 79(2) 




a similar way, defendants would have a right to make representations as an interested 
party in judicial review proceedings.  Therefore, this reinforces the arguments set out 
in the first section of this chapter that defendants should have a right to make 
representations in relation to requests for review under the VRR.  
 
A variation of this right should be incorporated into the VRR to allow defendants to 




The above analysis has shown that defendants have very limited rights in relation to 
rights of review.  The concept of rights of review is not fundamentally in conflict with 
defendants’ rights.  None of the rights of review permit a prosecution when a 
defendant has previously been acquitted and therefore potentially have less impact 
than the reforms to the double jeopardy principle.  Although rights of review clearly 
do have the potential to be contrary to the interests of defendants, there are limited 
opportunities for them to contest the decision to prosecute.  To a large extent, 
defendants have to rely on the trial and appeal processes and if they wish to 
specifically contest the review decision to prosecute, they are likely to have to argue 
that the prosecution should be stayed on grounds of abuse of process.  In order to 
successfully argue abuse of process, defendants will need to be able to show that they 
can no longer have a fair trial as a result of the representation that they would not be 
prosecuted on the basis that they relied upon that representation to their detriment.   
 
There is more than a negligible risk of defendants being placed at a disadvantage at 
trial by their actions following the initial representation that they will not be 
prosecuted.  Therefore, rather than rely entirely on the abuse doctrine to protect such 
defendants, it would be preferable to introduce a number of measures to reduce the 
likelihood of defendants suffering any such detriment.  The VRR guidance should be 
amended to increase safeguards for the defendant by reducing the likelihood of 
reliance on decisions which may be reviewed.  The defendant should routinely be 
made aware that a decision could be reviewed and notified when such a request is 




not to prosecute, it would seem reasonable to permit them to make representations as 
part of the VRR; it would then be for the reviewing prosecutor to decide how much 
weight to place on those representations.  If this were combined with an interests of 
justice requirement, the level of protection for the defendant would be enhanced.  
Tighter time limits and notice requirements should also be implemented to further 
mitigate the risk of defendants relying on a decision not to prosecute to their detriment.  
 
The purpose of these proposals would not be to prevent the review of decisions, but to 
ensure that the defendant was no worse off as a result of the review process than 
defendants for whom the initial decision was to prosecute.  The abuse of process 
doctrine remains a useful fallback procedure to protect those defendants who are 
disadvantaged by the retraction of the decision not to prosecute, but not as a way of 
routinely frustrating a legitimate review decision.  Generally, there is nothing to 
suggest that defendants who are prosecuted following a review procedure would 
endure substantially more anxiety and distress than defendants who had been 
prosecuted from the outset.   
 
Private prosecutions justify separate consideration as potentially they could lead to 
inappropriately brought prosecutions subjecting defendants to unnecessary stress and 
anxiety.  However, defendants do have the option of referring these to the CPS to have 
the prosecution reviewed.  The rights of defendants would be further protected by a 
provision that either required the CPS to be notified of all private prosecutions or 
alternatively, required the courts to specifically inform the defendant when the 
summons was issued of the power of the CPS to take over prosecutions so that they 
were aware of this particular route for contesting the decision to bring a private 
prosecution.  In the event that the prosecution does not meet both stages of the Full 
Code Test, the prosecution should be taken over and discontinued. 
 
Many of the issues discussed in this chapter will be developed further in the next 




Chapter 8 - An examination of the compatibility of the 






The previous chapter examined the impact of the rights of review on the rights of 
defendants and argued that the VRR and judicial review pose only a slim risk of 
undermining the defendant’s right to a fair trial, which could be reduced further by the 
incorporation of additional safeguards.  It was also argued that private prosecutions 
have greater potential to conflict with the rights of the defendant.  This chapter will 
focus on the relationship between allowing victims to have rights of review and the 
public interest.  This is critical to the examination of the overall impact of victims’ 
rights of review on other interests in the criminal justice system and the assessment of 
whether the rights of review are coherent and principled.   
 
As the basis of modern prosecutions is a two-party contest between the State and the 
defendant, an analysis of the public interest is central to this discussion.   However, 
the conceptual and political basis of this contest is disputed and raises fundamental 
questions about the extent to which the State should be involved in conflicts which 
arise out of disputes between individuals.   With the exception of private prosecutions, 
prosecutions are brought by the CPS or another prosecution agency purportedly acting 
for the State in the public interest.  Therefore, the first section of this chapter will 
examine the concept of the public interest.  As there are competing views on what the 
role of the State should be in the prosecution process and the extent to which it should 
intervene in disputes between private individuals, this section will discuss different 
notions of the role of the State and the nature of the public interest.   
 
The second section will then review whether the rights of review are, individually and 
collectively, compatible with the public interest.  It will be argued that, in principle, 




recognise another interest in the criminal prosecution, these are still consistent with 
the public interest rather than running counter to it.  More specifically, both the VRR 
and judicial review can be accommodated within the criminal justice process without 
compromising public interest values.  In contrast, private prosecutions it will be 
suggested, are not consistent with the wider public interest as a result of the increased 
control and party status that they permit a victim to have.  The effect of this is that 
private prosecutions can be disproportionately based on the private interests of the 
individual without taking into account the wider interests of society.  This could, for 
example, mean that an evidentially weak case is brought to court causing reputational 
damage to the criminal justice system.  
 
 
8.2 The nature and basis of the public interest 
 
Notwithstanding the historical nature of dispute resolution, the modern system of 
criminal prosecutions in England and Wales is a contest between the State and the 
defendant.1  There is, however, no formal definition of the role of the State, or the 
related concept of the public interest, in this context.  This section will show that the 
traditional criminal justice model is based on a conflict between the State and 
individual defendants leading to the requirement that public prosecutions are brought 
in the public interest.  Prosecutions are brought by the State acting in the public interest 
as a sanction against the defendant for breaching the criminal law.  As a result, the 
concept of the public interest is firmly rooted in both adversarial and inquisitorial 
criminal trial systems.2  However, the nature and basis of the State’s involvement in 
the prosecution process and the public interest is contested.  
 
The orthodox view of criminal justice can be described by reference to the work of 
Andrew Ashworth.  Ashworth has argued that the purpose of criminal liability is ‘to 
declare public disapproval of the offender’s conduct’ and to ‘punish the offender by 
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imposing a penal sanction.’3  This focus on the imposition of sanctions and punishment 
distinguishes criminal liability from civil liability which is primarily concerned with 
financial restitution for the harm caused to an individual.  It is important to note, 
however, that crime and criminal liability are social constructs; conduct is not 
intrinsically criminal, the decision to criminalise particular types of behaviour is 
essentially a political one.  Hulsman has argued that there is no ‘ontological reality’ 
of crime in that crime is ‘not the object but the product of criminal policy.’4  The 
criminalisation of particular types of conduct originate from political decisions made 
in the historical context of the time when the modern criminal law was developed.5  
 
Ashworth describes this difference in terms of ‘offences against society as a whole 
rather than mere matters between individual citizens.’6  This distinction between 
public and private wrongs is not without controversy; conduct could be criminalised 
on the basis of the public value in doing so that goes beyond the harm or potential 
harm to individuals.7  Ashworth argues that it should be ‘a fundamental role of the 
State to maintain a system for the administration of justice’ to ensure full procedural 
safeguards for defendants.8  This conceptualisation of the State providing the 
machinery of justice is based on the notion of a social contract in which citizens ‘agree 
to obey laws in return for protection of their vital interests.’9  These principles arguably 
underpin the concept of the public interest; the State prosecutes on behalf of citizens 
collectively including the individual victim of the offence.   
 
Prosecution by the State is, therefore, about more than achieving redress for the 
individual victim; it is an official response to offending behaviour, or censuring, which 
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includes a punitive element based on the principle of retributive justice.10  On this 
basis, Campbell et al have argued that, ‘the primary interests in the application of the 
criminal sanction… are those of the State and the suspect/defendant/offender.’11  This 
model prioritises culpability on the part of the offender and the application of a 
proportionate sanction based on the seriousness of the offending.  For proponents of 
this view, there is little justification for permitting victims to have procedural rights in 
the criminal justice system which is a contest between the State and the defendant and 
to do so could introduce inconsistency depending on the particular victim’s feelings 
towards the offender.12  Ashworth argues that the ‘victim’s interest is surely not greater 
than yours or mine’ but the ‘victim’s interest is as a citizen.’13  Ashworth’s concerns 
are that increasing victim participation could undermine the principle of 
proportionality in sentencing by introducing an element of inconsistency between 
offenders of similar offences as ‘some victims will be forgiving, others will be 
vindictive.’14  To increase victim involvement could result in too much weight being 
placed on the effect of the crime on the victim and less focus on the culpability of the 
offender; particularly, as some victims would be much more vengeful than others. 
 
Fenwick has identified a ‘discernible movement towards a “private” ordering’ when 
the system was previously dominated by public interests.15  Contemporary examples 
of this movement would include the VPS and compensation payments from the 
offender or the State.  Fenwick concludes that it may be possible to accommodate 
some procedural rights for victims within the criminal justice system provided they 
were ‘subject to supervision and scrutiny’ and that levels of ‘objectivity, consistency 
and impartiality’ were maintained.16  MacCormick and Garland have described the 
development of a more ‘dialogic’ relationship between public and private interests 
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with this division being ‘re-drawn.’17  Gradually individual victims are able to assert 
their rights in a range of contexts within the criminal justice system, but without 
fundamentally changing the nature of the adversarial contest between the State and 
the defendant.  This suggests that it is possible to gently introduce individual 
procedural rights for victims without overriding the public interest foundation to the 
criminal justice system.  
 
The traditional justice system based on culpability and proportionality principles as 
expounded by Ashworth is not universally accepted and has come under attack from 
a range of perspectives.  Some of these are more radical than others.18  The most 
prominent alternative models originate from the various incarnations of restorative 
justice.  Nils Christie’s seminal article exemplifies this distinction by challenging State 
control of criminal proceedings on the basis that victims are so ‘thoroughly 
represented that she or he for most of the proceedings is pushed completely out of the 
arena.’19  Christie argues that they have ‘lost participation’ as their conflict has been 
stolen by professionals on behalf of the State.  He proposes a ‘victim-oriented court’ 
which would incorporate additional stages to focus on the impact and needs of the 
victim and offer appropriate support to the offender separately from punishment.20  
Therefore, there are two dominant schools of thought:  those that view crime as 
offending against society and those that support a restorative or community-based 
paradigm.  The former group is more firmly associated with prosecutions in the public 
interest with the latter broadly focussing on crime being committed against individual 
victims.  The institutional framework for the second group is not based on State 
criminal justice agencies bringing a prosecution against the individual, but often 
involves a community-based forum which only relies on the courts as a ‘back up’ 
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system.21  Dignan and Cavadino’s typology identifies five models with different 
institutional frameworks:  the retributive model, the welfare model, the civilian model, 
the victim/offender reparation model and the communitarian model.22  The last three 
of these models represent different forms of restorative justice.  The civilian model 
relies on the civil courts as a means of returning disputes to the parties using tortious 
principles and largely fails to take into account that the dispute could have had a wider 
societal impact beyond the individual victim.23  The victim/offender reparation model 
‘seeks to balance and serve the interests of victims and offenders’ and could be 
accommodated within the existing criminal justice framework.24  The authors’ 
favoured option is the Communitarian Model which is based on Braithwaite’s 
reintegrative shaming theory.25  This model results in the ultimate reintegration of the 
offender rather than stigmatization as part of conventional justice models.  Dignan and 
Cavadino note that this model recognizes both the harm done to the individual victim 
and wider public interest.26 
 
These types of communitarian models offer an alternative paradigm of justice to the 
conventional criminal justice system.  A number of different restorative justice models 
have been proposed some of which envisage a complete alternative criminal justice 
system, such as Braithwaite and Pettit’s republican theory.27  Such a model would not 
be based around the notion of State prosecutions brought in the public interest, but 
would locate responses to criminal behaviour in the community with the victim as the 
injured party.28  Braithwaite and Pettit argue that an alternative is required to the 
conventional criminal justice system that is ‘comprehensive’ rather than simply 
focusing on individual ‘sub-systems.29  Such a system would be based on four 
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presumptions:  parsimony (only using the minimum criminal justice interventions 
necessary); checking of power; reprobation (disapproval); reintegration (of both the 
victim and the offender back into the community).30  This alternative is not intended 
to merely provide an alternative means of sentencing offenders, but should completely 
reconceptualise the theoretical basis for the entire criminal justice system.  In fact, 
Braithwaite has argued that restorative justice should go further than reforming the 
legal system by providing ‘holistic change’ across many aspects of society including 
family life, work and politics.31 
 
Zehr describes restorative justice systems as based on the notion of a conflict between 
the victim and the offender as an alternative to the State justice which is based on the 
concepts of guilt and punishment.32  This alternative conception of justice is based on 
the notions of causing and repairing harm rather than blame and punishment.33  Zehr’s 
analysis proposes a new paradigm of justice based on restorative principles which 
highlights that the traditional retributive model, with its particular interpretation of 
what is in the public interest, is not the only model of criminal justice.  Essentially, 
therefore, although the prevailing criminal justice system is based on a model of public 
prosecutions brought by the State acting in the public interest, other models have been 
proposed.  
 
It is submitted, however, that despite the existence of alternative models of justice, the 
contemporary criminal justice system based on retributive principles remains more 
conceptually and politically defensible.  Restorative justice would shift the focus of 
criminal justice towards a personal conflict between the victim, minimising the role 
of the State.  This would mean that the victim and the community would become more 
dominant than the State, potentially resulting in arbitrary and inconsistent decisions as 
these would be severely influenced by the individuals involved.  This could lead to 
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unfairness to defendants in individual cases and less recognition that defendants have 
offended against society as a whole, not just the individual victim.  This paring back 
the role of the State in the ‘social contract’ to this extent is not justified; however, it is 





Another theme that has changed the concept of the State acting in the public interest 
is the development of managerialism and consumerism in criminal justice.  Although 
different commentators have argued that managerialism emerged at different times, it 
is clear that by the end of New Labour’s period of government in 2010 it had a grip 
on the public sector and was noticeable in criminal justice.  Garland states that a 
‘managerialist, business-like ethos’ had developed by the mid 1980s with an emphasis 
on ‘economy, efficiency and effectiveness.’34  Lacey described a ‘managerial 
approach’ in which the public sector was compared to the ‘idealised image of the 
private sector’ which resulted in a new focus on ‘efficiency’ and ‘value for money.’35  
This managerialist criminal justice system is characterised by performance measures, 
efficiency targets, the publication of business plans and ‘measurable and quantifiable 
outputs and cost-effective outcomes.’36  This was accompanied by increased 
contracting out or privatisation of specific criminal justice functions, such as privately 
run prisons and transport services, and a new focus on ‘consumers’ in the criminal 
justice system.37   
 
Allowing individual victims increased rights through initiatives such as the Victim’s 
Charter situates them far more easily if not as consumers then at least as beneficiaries 
 
 
34 David Garland, The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society (OUP 
Oxford 2001) 116. 
35 Nicola Lacey, ‘Government as Manager, Citizen as Consumer: The Case of the Criminal Justice Act 
1991’ [1994] MLR 534, 534. 
36 Eugene McLaughlin, John Muncie and Gordon Hughes, ‘The Permanent Revolution: New Labour, 
New Public Management and the Modernization of Criminal Justice’ (2001) 1 Criminal Justice 301, 
313. 




of the criminal justice system.  This aligns much more with those notions of public 
sector managerialism on the basis that they allot victims individual social rights that 
are often not enforceable, potentially distracting from the more significant structural 
problems in the criminal justice system.38  Porter has described how managerialism 
has manifested in the CPS as being ‘effectively encouraged to compete with itself for 
improved conviction rates, victim satisfaction, efficiency and meeting reduced 
budgetary targets’ as, in reality, it has no competitors and has not been privatised.39  
This has resulted in increased emphasis on the volume of cases, conviction and guilty 
plea rates, and performance analysis in a way that can be measured statistically.40  
Garland observes that the criminal justice institutions have largely set their own 
performance measures against which they prefer to be judged.41   
 
The VRR could be viewed as a managerialist tool for the CPS to monitor and justify 
its own performance.  VRR annual data provides details of the number of eligible 
cases, the number of requests and the number of successful VRR requests.  A 
breakdown by offence category is also provided together with a percentage figure for 
the number of successful reviews.42  Although not formally presented as performance 
data, the recording and analysis of this data by the CPS could be used as such.  The 
2015-2016 Business Plan did suggest this stating, ‘we will have published data on the 
performance of our Victims’ Right to Review scheme’ and this is specifically linked 
to levels of victim and witness satisfaction.43  The CPS subsequently decided not to 
include VRR data in the annual business plans as ‘this measure did not serve as a clear 
indicator of corporate performance’ suggesting, therefore, that it had been considered 
as such and then discounted.44  The annual report of 2014-15 declares that the VRR is 
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‘fully embedded and continues to operate well, with steady uptake by victims and 
statistics indicating that the number of decisions being overturned remains low’ 
suggesting that the VRR has been utilised as a performance measure.45  It could be 
argued that it is in the public interest to have some form of monitoring device of 
prosecutorial decision-making and that the VRR fulfils this function. 
 
8.2.2 Public interest under the Code for Crown Prosecutors 
 
Despite the different models of criminal justice, the contemporary criminal justice 
system is clearly dominated by the traditional retributive model of which the concept 
of prosecution in the public interest is integral.  Although historically prosecutions 
were brought by private citizens, the decision to prosecute has gradually been 
appropriated by the Crown purportedly acting in the public interest.46  From the outset, 
it was clear that the CPS would act in the ‘public interest’ and not on behalf of 
individual victims with the legislation creating a national prosecuting authority to be 
headed by the DPP.47  This is reasserted by the Code for Crown Prosecutors which 
clearly states the public function of the service as ‘the principal public prosecution 
service for England and Wales’ and emphasising its independence from investigatory 
bodies and other persons and agencies.48  The distinction between the private interests 
of the victim and the assessment of the public interest is stressed by the requirement 
that prosecutors ‘take into account the views expressed by the victim about the impact 
that the offence has had’, but the Code also emphasises that ‘the CPS does not act for 
victims or their families in the same way as solicitors act for their clients, and 
prosecutors must form an overall view of the public interest.’49 
 
The concept of the public interest is embedded in the Code for Crown Prosecutors as 
the second stage of the Full Code Test and is defined in the Code by reference to a list 
of factors which the Crown Prosecutor is instructed to consider having satisfied 
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themselves that the evidential stage is met. 50  The prosecutor has to weigh up these 
factors to decide whether it is in the public interest to prosecute.  These factors include 
the seriousness of the offence, the culpability of the offender, the circumstances of and 
the harm caused to the victim, the suspect’s age and maturity, the impact on the 
community, whether prosecution is a proportionate response, and whether the sources 
of information needed protecting.51  As a result of this structuring of the exercise of 
the prosecutor’s discretion, two points are of note.  Firstly, the interests of the victim 
are incorporated into the public interest stage of the test by the Code and as such the 
interests of the victim fall to be considered as part of the public interest assessment as 
one of the ‘unprioritised’ list of factors.52  Secondly, the list of factors does not really 
define what the public interest is; the only factor that really focuses on the public at 
large is the need to consider the impact of the offence on the community.53  There is a 
certain vagueness to what amounts to the public interest on a practical level.  Arguably, 
the concept involves a degree of subjectivity on the part of the decision-maker as some 
cases may not be clear-cut as to whether it is in the public interest to prosecute.  As a 
result, this could be a source of tension between the victim and the prosecutor which 
could lead to the victim challenging a decision not to prosecute. 
 
The interests of the victim may correspond with the assessment of the public interest, 
but alternatively they may be incompatible.  For example, a victim in a serious 
domestic abuse case may not support a prosecution, but the prosecutor has decided 
that a prosecution is in the public interest.  Conversely, there may be occasions when 
a victim feels very strongly that a prosecution should be pursued, but the Crown 
decides that it is not in the public interest to prosecute perhaps because the suspect is 
suitable for a caution or a prosecution would not result in a meaningful sentence.  In 
terms of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, the interests of the victim are 
considered as part of the public interest assessment.  However, it has been recognised 
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by the courts that these interests are distinct.54  For the remainder of this chapter, the 
public interest will be treated as representing the wider, collective interest of the public 
at large as opposed to the specific interests of the victim as an individual.  
 
It is clear that the public interest basis of prosecutions is firmly rooted in the State 
against the defendant model of justice.  Although alternative models of justice have 
been proposed, the arguments in favour of replacing the existing model are not 
sufficiently compelling; to have a system based on restorative principles would 
unjustifiably marginalise the role of the State to the extent that the criminal justice 
system would resemble a variation of civil proceedings.  The prosecution process is 
fundamentally a conflict between the State and the defendant although there is 
evidence of a gradual willingness to accommodate the interests of the victim in a 
number of ways.  The next section of this chapter will examine whether the rights of 
review are compatible with the public interest requirement. 
 
 
8.3 Are rights of review compatible with the public interest requirement? 
 
In this section, it will be argued that judicial review and the VRR are consistent with 
the public interest.  Victim participation through the VRR and judicial review can 
properly be accommodated within the adversarial system as a form of fault correction 
in relation to decisions not to prosecute in a way that allowing private prosecutions 
cannot.  The VRR and judicial review permit the victims to challenge a decision, but 
do not allow victims to force a prosecution on the basis of their own private interests 
which may be contrary to the wider public interest.  Private prosecutions, it is 
submitted, are potentially in conflict with the conceptual basis of the modern criminal 
justice system.  Whereas neither judicial review nor the VRR undermine the 
adversarial criminal prosecution between the State and the defendant, the private 
prosecution does so by allowing the victim full party status without appropriate 
 
 




safeguards to ensure that prosecutions are only brought that are in the public interest 
and not purely in pursuit of the victim’s personal agenda. 
 
To this end, two key areas will be explored:  firstly, drawing on the previous chapters, 
the participatory role of the victim in the rights of review; secondly, an analysis of 
established appeal mechanisms to show that judicial review and the VRR do not 
override the public interest requirement and can properly be part of the adversarial 
system. 
  
8.3.1 The role of victims in the rights of review 
 
As the modern criminal justice system in England and Wales is based on a two-party 
adversarial contest between the State and the defendant, an important factor in 
determining whether victims should be permitted rights of review is the status and 
influence of the victim in these processes.  Essentially, it will be argued that a process 
which allows the victim control of the decision-making or full party status is less 
defensible that one which allows the victim a voice, but control is retained by the State.  
The greater the level of participation on Edwards’ model, the less compatible the 
review mechanism is with the adversarial system.55  It will be suggested that on this 
basis, judicial review and the VRR are justifiable and thus consistent with the public 
interest, whereas private prosecutions are not.  
 
As we saw in chapter six, the ultimate decision-making authority for judicial review 
claims and the VRR is the court and the CPS respectively.  The victim may initiate a 
judicial review claim and indeed has full party status and conduct of the case in those 
proceedings.  However, the judicial review proceedings are collateral to the criminal 
prosecution.  In addition, the defendant in the judicial review proceedings is the CPS, 
not the individual accused of a criminal offence.  Citizens have a right to bring judicial 
review proceedings in relation to decisions made by public bodies and the High Court 
has an inherent right to review them; this right is not limited to prosecutorial decisions, 
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but public decision-making generally.  However, the victim has no real control over 
the outcome as an adjudication is made by the court which may include remitting the 
matter back to the public prosecutor for further review.    
 
Similarly, the VRR exists outside the formal criminal prosecution.  The VRR provides 
an administrative or private right to challenge decisions not to prosecute provided 
certain criteria are met.  As has been seen in chapter three, the VRR does not attribute 
victims a particularly expansive participatory role; essentially, victims are limited to 
requesting that the decision not to prosecute is reviewed internally by the CPS to check 
that it is correct.  Neither of these mechanisms entitle victims to control the decision-
making process or to have much influence over the ultimate decision as to whether the 
previous decision should be set aside.   
 
By contrast, the right of private prosecution does have the potential for the victim to 
make their own decision as to whether to prosecute and to have conduct and control 
of the prosecution throughout.  The victim has full party status.  Although this is 
subject to the right of the CPS to take the prosecution over, in principle at least, the 
victim becomes the prosecutor.  This arguably may result in a decision which is 
contrary to the public interest.  In Jones v Whalley, Lord Bingham questioned the 
continuing value of private prosecutions now that we have a public prosecution service 
and a system of law enforcement which is no longer dependent on prosecutions 
brought by private individuals:  ‘It is for the state by its appropriate agencies to 
investigate alleged crimes and decide whether offenders should be prosecuted.’56 
 
The decision in Gujra also provides some insight into the view of the majority in the 
Supreme Court regarding the value of private prosecutions and whether prosecutorial 
decisions should properly be exercised by a public prosecutor rather than private 
individuals.  Lord Neuberger indicated that he preferred the former over the latter 
stating, ‘An objective, expert, and experienced assessment of the prospects [of 
obtaining a conviction] appears to me to be generally more reliable than the 
 
 




assessment of a person who will normally be (probably wholly) inexperienced in the 
criminal justice system.’57  He also comments that as they are also the victim they can 
be ‘far from dispassionate’58 which is described by de Than and Elvin as ‘an inbuilt 
conflict of interest’ not taking into account the public interest when they bring a 
prosecution.59  One of the key benefits of a public justice system is that they ‘turn hot 
vengeance into cool, impartial justice’ potentially avoiding the risk of ‘escalating feud 
and vendetta’ if victims were solely responsible for responding to criminal 
misconduct.60 
 
De Than and Elvin further argue that the dual roles of being a victim and a prosecutor 
are problematic and argue that, in the absence of being abolished, private prosecutions 
should be reformed to have a pre-trial filtering mechanism, a statutory code and 
sanctions for inappropriate conduct of a private prosecution.61  Arguably, these 
concerns regarding arbitrary decision-making would not exist in relation to judicial 
review or the VRR as although they allow victims to have a voice, the ultimate 
decision-making power sits with either the court or the public body allocated the 
function of making prosecutorial decisions.  These concerns about the legitimacy of 
allowing victims a right of review to the cost of other interests will now be explored 
further by way of a comparison with other prosecution rights of appeal. 
 
8.3.2 Comparison with other appeal mechanisms 
 
The previous chapter highlighted that not all decisions in the prosecution process are 
irrevocable and that there are exceptions to the general principle that decisions are 
final.  A central argument to this discussion relates to the concept of finality in criminal 
justice and whether it is justifiable to delay a final decision or re-open a decision which 
was previously believed to be final.  The very nature of appeal mechanisms is that 
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they can set aside existing decisions with the possibility that they are reversed.  As a 
result, the principle of finality is not absolute and can be subordinate to other priorities.  
Prosecution rights of appeal may be justified on the basis that it is in the public interest 
to have procedures for remedying incorrect decisions.  Sjolin has argued that appeal 
procedures are necessary on the basis that unremedied wrongful acquittals could lead 
to a loss of public confidence in the criminal justice system.62 
 
An alternative perspective would be that procedures which undermine the principle of 
finality could be perceived as damaging the reputation of the criminal justice system.  
Roberts argues that departure from the ‘culturally acceptable mode of forensic fact-
finding’ has the potential to ‘threaten the capacity of procedural due process to deliver 
justice.’63  Diluting the principle of finality too heavily could reduce public confidence 
in the criminal justice system.  Roberts also argues that the principle provides an 
important limitation on executive power in that the State cannot routinely set aside 
jury verdicts and bring another prosecution.64  However, it could also be argued that 
the need to remedy obviously incorrect outcomes is also relevant to the issue of public 
confidence in the prosecution process and that absolute finality without exception 
could be damaging reputationally in itself.  The double jeopardy rule provides a useful 
comparison.  As the Law Commission observed, the fact that the system was prevented 
from reacting to new evidence of guilt following an acquittal for a serious offence may 
‘undermine public confidence in the criminal justice system as much as manifestly 
wrongful convictions.’65  These sentiments were echoed by the Court of Appeal in 
Dunlop which concerned an application to quash an acquittal after the defendant 
subsequently confessed to murder with the court stating that the public would be 
‘outraged’ if the exception to the double jeopardy rule were not applied in that case.66  
There is, of course, a strong argument that wrongful convictions should be treated 
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differently to wrongful acquittals as someone has lost their liberty.67  It is clear, 
however, that if exceptions to the double jeopardy rule are permitted, these have to be 
assessed on a case by case basis which is why the legislation has an ‘interests of 
justice’ requirement.  
 
The requirement that it must be in the interests of justice for the Court of Appeal to 
permit a retrial means that the court must have regard to a number of factors including 
whether a fair trial would be likely and whether the authorities acted with due diligence 
and expedition since the original proceedings.68  An interest of justice requirement 
could arguably take into account the different interests in the prosecution including 
the defendant and the wider public interest.  Dennis has argued that to be legitimate 
an outcome must be ‘factually correct and morally authoritative’ and although there 
are strong arguments supporting the double jeopardy rule, ‘the interests of finality of 
legal process ought to be subordinate to the interests of the legitimacy of the 
process.’69  Essentially, Dennis argues that it is in the interest of justice to have a means 
of remedying mistakes.    
 
Other forms of prosecution ‘appeal’ are also geared towards rectifying mistakes and 
errors that have been made.  These mechanisms that have a specifically corrective 
function include the provisions to challenge judges’ rulings which have the effect of 
terminating proceedings70 and the power to challenge unduly lenient sentences.71  
Harris has suggested that the original principles of the ‘unduly lenient’ scheme were 
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Similar arguments to these could be put in favour of and against permitting reviews of 
decisions not to prosecute.  Although the finality arguments are relevant in this context 
as well, they are clearly not as powerful as a request for review cannot overturn an 
acquittal and is likely to be an early stage of the criminal justice process, ordinarily 
before the matter has come to court.  Additionally, there are clearly finality arguments 
against the prosecution being able to routinely change its decisions on whether to 
prosecute and it must be conceded that this could be damaging to the reputation of the 
prosecution process if it were to become the norm.  However, as with the justifications 
for relaxing the double jeopardy rules, it would undermine the integrity of the criminal 
justice system and those working within it if there was no way of correcting an 
erroneous decision.  Clearly, it would not be in the public interest to have a system 
which never had a power to review or regulate its own decisions.  The potential 
corrective function of the VRR has been recognised by Manikis who views victims as 
‘agents of accountability’ in relation to decisions not to prosecute.73  Essentially, 
Manikis argues that the VRR allows victims a monitoring role where they can, 
‘scrutinise and question certain prosecutorial decisions to point out potential errors.’74  
Similarly, Rogers also highlighted that a potential benefit of the VRR is that it reduces 
the likelihood of errors in the application of the Code test resulting in an incorrect 
decision not to prosecute.75  It would not be possible to completely prevent errors 
being made as generally decisions whether to prosecute are made by a single 
prosecutor and some decisions may be finely balanced.  The rights of review can, 
therefore, provide a safety valve to reduce the risk of unremedied errors. 
 
The VRR recognises the importance of public confidence in prosecutorial decisions 
and this is reflected in the application of the policy.  Although there is a public interest 
stage to all prosecution decisions under the Code, there is an additional ‘public 
confidence’ filter which has to be applied when reconsidering prosecution following 
a successful request for review.76  This could be seen as a variation of the ‘interests of 
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justice’ test although clearly it is narrower as it focuses on the public at large and does 
not take into account the interests of specific individuals involved in the case such as 
the victim and defendant.  As set out in the previous chapter, the ‘public confidence’ 
test should be replaced with an ‘interests of justice’ test to strengthen the extent to 
which the VRR process takes into account the overall public interest in deciding 
whether to bring a prosecution following a successful review.  Such a test would not 
solely be focused on whether public confidence would be increased or decreased by a 
prosecution, but could also consider factors such as the seriousness of the allegation, 
the nature of wrong decision and whether a fair trial is possible.  A prosecution could 
still be brought in circumstances where to do so could damage public confidence in 
the criminal justice system, but the nature of the offender and the harm caused by it 
were so overwhelming that it would be in the interests of justice. 
 
Judicial review clearly also has an important role to play in maintaining the integrity 
of the criminal justice system. With a focus on the lawfulness of the decision-making 
process, judicial review acts as an external control on the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion.  Although individual decisions may be contrary to the interests of a 
particular defendant, it must be in the public interest to ensure that such decisions are 
made lawfully and that any that are not are quashed. 
 
A further justification for prosecution appeals is what Sjolin describes as ‘legal 
development’.77  Appeals mechanisms, including rights of review, have the potential 
to advance how the law is interpreted and applied; reviews may challenge the policy 
basis of how discretion is exercised as well as decision-making in individual cases.  If 
victims were unable to contest decisions not to prosecute, the approach of prosecutors 
to particular types of case may ossify and become inflexible.  Reviews, therefore, may 
provide the opportunity to stimulate new policies and change attitudes to particular 
types of cases.  Examples of this in the context of prosecutorial discretion include 
 
 




Manning78 in relation to the obligation to give reasons and Purdy in relation to the 
development of a policy on assisted suicide.79 
 
This comparison of the different appeal mechanisms brings to the fore the unique 
attributes of the right of private prosecution which make it a poor fit within the 
contemporary criminal justice system.  Although private prosecutions can be used as 
a means of countering a decision not to prosecute, they are not, in reality, a form of 
appeal or review; they are essentially a power to bring criminal proceedings 
personally.  As a result, it arguably lacks any kind of corrective function in that there 
is no prerequisite that an original decision or stage in the process was in some way 
incorrect, wrong or unreasonable.  There is no requirement that the public interest or 
interests of justice are considered per se.  Although these considerations could be taken 
into account by the CPS in the event that they review the prosecution when considering 
whether to take it over, that does not in itself justify allowing victims to bring such 
proceedings.   
 
The reference to other appeal mechanisms has shown that it can be difficult to 
determine precisely where the public interest lies and how these mechanisms can be 
harmful to the reputation of the criminal justice system and confidence in it as well as 
the possibility of augmenting it.  A private prosecutor does not have to consider any 
such factors; the focus of the private prosecutor is likely to be on whether they can 
prove their case, not on whether the fact that they are bringing proceedings may be 
damaging to the wider system and the public’s appreciation of it.   Therefore, the lack 
of controls on private prosecutions means that they are more likely to be contrary to 
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It is clear that the rights of review impact on all three elements to the criminal 
prosecution:  the victim, the defendant and the public interest.  It would not be 
satisfactory to evaluate rights of review solely from the perspective of the victim.  This 
chapter and the previous one has shown that the rights of review do impact on the 
defendant and the public interest. 
 
In principle, victims having rights of review through judicial review or the VRR is 
compatible with the public interest dimension of prosecutions.  The right to challenge 
decisions not to prosecute by judicial review or the VRR does not compromise the 
adversarial contest between the State and the defendant.  Although these two rights of 
review recognise the victim’s interest in the case, they do not override the public 
interest basis of prosecutions.  Furthermore, there is a public interest in obviously 
wrong decisions being corrected and therefore rather than defeating the public interest, 
these mechanisms actually serve it.  The entitlement of a victim to challenge a decision 
not to prosecute can be seen as providing a checking mechanism against the possibility 
of mistakes being made in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.  These processes 
do not undermine the public nature of prosecutions; the victim can request a review 
but cannot mandate it and does not control the outcome.  This is in the public interest 
in the same way that it is in the public interest to have other appeal and review 
mechanisms which relate to particular parts of the criminal justice process, such as the 
exception to double jeopardy, unduly lenient sentences and appeals on points of law.  
These mechanisms contribute towards ensuring that the inevitable mistakes that are 
made can be rectified.  The fact that the system is sophisticated enough to have multi-
layered appeal mechanisms relating to specific parts of the process is perhaps a virtue 
rather than a weakness.  The VRR, in particular, provides a safety valve against 
incorrect decisions being final without any form of redress with minimal impact on 
defendants.  Although it could be argued that the VRR provides a form of performance 
measure which could be used by the CPS for managerialist reasons, this does not 
detract from the fact that it has the potential to lead to a preferable outcome in 





The exception to these general conclusions in favour of rights of review is private 
prosecutions.  These do have the potential to conflict with the public interest.  The full 
party status in the prosecution as the result of bringing a prosecution cannot be justified 
in the modern criminal justice system as it shifts the focus of the adversarial system 
from a prosecution brought on behalf of the State to one that may be arbitrary or 
capricious brought by a private individual.  Private prosecutions blur the distinction 
between prosecutions brought in the public interest and those brought in pursuance of 
a private agenda.   
 
Private prosecutions do not have a sound conceptual basis compared to other methods 
of challenging decisions not to prosecute which essentially take place outside the 
prosecution process rather than allowing the victim to be fully integrated and to take 
control of the decision making.  As a result, private prosecutions go beyond what is 
an acceptable level of participation in censuring criminal misconduct with the 
potential to introduce inconsistency, arbitrariness and even vengeance into the 
decision-making process.  Additionally, whereas the need to have a procedure for 
remedying errors can justify the existence of judicial review and the VRR to contest 
decisions, this cannot be extended to the private prosecution; it cannot justify private 
prosecutions as there is no requirement that the original decision was flawed.  In fact, 
it is also possible that a private prosecution could be brought by the victim following 
a decision which was legally correct, but which the victim disagreed with.     
 
Although the rights of the defendant and the public interest have been discussed in 
individual chapters, clearly these interests overlap.  In particular, it is also in the 
interest of defendants that the criminal justice system has mechanisms for correcting 
mistakes and that victims’ rights are kept within reasonable limits which do not 
overwhelm the rights of defendants or the public interest by de-stabilising the system.  
It is also in the public interest, as well as the interest of defendants, that there are 
appropriate safeguards in place to prevent capricious decision-making, such as 
evidentially weak private prosecutions or those brought in pursuance of a personal 




of all three parts of the ‘triangulation of interests’ in criminal prosecutions that the 
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This chapter will use established theoretical frameworks developed by legal scholars 
to re-evaluate whether there is a sound conceptual basis for allowing victims to have 
rights of review.  Each of these models will be used as a lens to examine the victim’s 
participatory role in the review mechanisms.  This is directly relevant to the issue of 
whether the review mechanisms amount to a principled and coherent framework.  This 
analysis will show that the three review mechanisms do not fit neatly within one 
particular model or theoretical framework and there may be competing arguments for 
locating them in different models.  Similarly, the three mechanisms cannot easily be 
located within the same model and there are strong arguments for positioning them 
separately.  In particular, it will be advanced that although judicial review and the 
VRR could justifiably be placed within a victim-focused model such as Roach’s 
punitive model, the VRR is a better fit within Packer’s crime control model which has 
the effect of drawing victims away from judicial review.  Private prosecutions are by 
their nature so distinct that they do not fit easily within any of the established models 
which focus on systems of public, rather than private, prosecutions.  This further 
highlights their lack of compatibility with the contemporary criminal justice system.  
A conclusion to be drawn from this is that the three review mechanisms do not amount 
to a coherent framework, but a collection of distinct mechanisms with different 
conceptual bases. 
 
This chapter has two sections.  The first section will provide an overview of each 
theoretical model and how they help us to understand the review mechanisms.  The 
second section will focus on each of the review mechanisms in turn evaluating the 





9.2 The rights of review and the criminal justice models 
 
In this section the theoretical criminal justice models developed by Packer, Beloof, 
Sebba, Roach, Ashworth, Edwards and Manikis will be used to evaluate the three 
review mechanisms.  
 
9.2.1 Packer’s Crime Control and Due Process models 
 
Despite not examining the role of victims in criminal justice, Packer’s original models 
provide a useful means of evaluating the review mechanisms which are more 
conceptually complex than they would initially appear.  If the result of the successful 
use of a review mechanism is a prosecution and potentially a conviction, rights of 
review could be viewed as supportive of the crime control value of the suppression of 
crime.  However, the crime control model emphasises the robust and efficient 
repression of criminal conduct.1  There is also a ‘premium on speed and finality’ which 
depends on ‘minimising the occasions for challenge.’2  Therefore, it would initially 
appear that rights of review do not sit comfortably with the values underpinning the 
crime control model: they recognise the interests of victims and allow them to 
participate in the preliminary stages of the criminal process reducing system efficiency 
both in terms of speed and finality. 
 
Private prosecutions fit awkwardly with the assembly line imagery of the crime control 
model as the private prosecutor is more likely to be dealing with a single case than a 
high volume.3  As such, the private prosecutor’s focus is more likely to consist of a 
dogged determination to obtain a conviction than efficiency concerns.  The values of 
efficiency, speed and finality are not easily identifiable with private prosecutions.  
Crime control stresses the value of screening out weak cases, high guilty plea rates 
and effective plea bargaining.4  Victims who bring a private prosecution are unlikely 
to be aware of, or be guided by, these values.  This is, perhaps, because crime control 
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operates at a more macro level: the focus is on the broader objective of crime reduction 
rather than the minutiae of individual cases.  The crime control model also identifies 
the public prosecutor as the official who should control the decision to charge which 
a private prosecution undermines.5   
 
However, despite the emphasis on efficiency, the crime control model still recognises 
the need for ways of addressing errors and appeal procedures.  Whereas the due 
process model treats appellate procedures as of central importance, the crime control 
model views them as more marginal and existing to ‘correct those occasional slips’ in 
the fact-finding process.6  The VRR is essentially a simple appeal mechanism for 
correcting errors in the charging process.  With strict time limits and qualifying 
criteria, the VRR mitigates the amount of delay and uncertainty caused by more formal 
procedures for appealing such decisions.   
 
Packer distinguishes between appeals and ‘collateral attacks’ outside the trial and 
appeal processes which in the context of American criminal justice were challenges 
brought in the federal courts rather than within the state system that brought the 
prosecution.7  The crime control model favours appeals brought within the state 
jurisdiction rather than a claim being re-litigated in the federal courts.  The essence of 
this distinction could also be applied to judicial review and the VRR in England and 
Wales.  The VRR provides an internal mechanism of review whereas judicial review 
is a form of collateral attack in the High Court outside the jurisdiction of the criminal 
courts.  The crime control model favours administrative or extra-judicial decision-
making procedures over judicial ones.8  The alacrity of decision-making of the crime 
control model would be slowed down by this questioning of the prosecutor’s decision 
through the courts.  Certainly, in the context of judicial review proceedings, the victim 
is arguing their case that the prosecutor’s decision be quashed and ultimately reversed.  
In this sense, the entitlement of the victim to apply for judicial review could be seen 
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as generating satellite litigation which has the effect of drawing out the pre-trial 
process. 
 
Packer suggests that a feature of crime control is that it operates on an ‘administrative, 
almost a managerial model’ with uniformity of procedure through workers at fixed 
stations who each conduct certain elements of the procedure until the case reaches the 
end of this linear process.9  Compared to judicial review, the VRR could be classified 
as an administrative procedure which is relatively informal with the flexible approach 
to requesting reviews and the initial local resolution stage.  Again, it is also 
administrative in the sense that the decision is reviewed by the same executive 
department, namely the CPS, that made the initial decision.  This potentially has the 
effect of reducing the risk of increased inefficiency caused by victims challenging 
decisions through the courts which would be more consistent with crime control.  
There are also clear financial and resourcing benefits for the public prosecutor of 
victims pursuing grievances through an internal route which would be consistent with 
the efficiency objectives of crime control.  
 
Sanders et al comment that ‘limited’ safeguards are required in the crime control 
model to ensure reliability and, therefore, ‘promote confidence in the system.’10  The 
VRR could also be viewed as a way for the CPS to claim that decision-making by 
prosecutors is reliable and to demonstrate high levels of victim satisfaction.  The VRR 
could be labelled as what Ashworth has described as a ‘sweetener’ to make victims 
feel valued to encourage their co-operation in the criminal justice system.11  A more 
cynical interpretation of the VRR could be that it is a managerialist tool for measuring 
performance and victim satisfaction.  VRR annual data provides details of the number 
of eligible cases, the number of requests and the number of successful VRR requests.  
A breakdown by offence category is also provided together with a percentage figure 
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for the number of successful reviews.12  Although not formally presented as 
performance data, the recording and analysis of this data by the CPS could be used as 
such.  In this sense, the VRR is a valuable addition to crime control, it provides an 
informal, administrative method for quality assuring decisions made by prosecutors.  
As a result, it can also generate confidence in prosecutorial decision-making by 
demonstrating that such a safety net is in place and the published data can create the 
perception that the vast majority of decisions are correct because only a small number 
of decisions are referred for review and of those which are only a minority result in 
the original decision being declared incorrect.   
 
The VRR also excludes victims from encroaching on areas which are valued by the 
crime control model.  For example, the VRR cannot be used to challenge out-of-court 
disposals, selection of charges or acceptance of pleas.13  These areas are protected 
from challenge and the existence of the VRR does not compromise these key tenets of 
crime control.   
 
Additionally, although it can be viewed as an appeal or review, a different 
interpretation of the VRR would be classify it as simply an additional step in the 
routine procedure of making a decision whether to prosecute.  As the VRR becomes 
more established in the criminal justice system, it may be viewed as simply part of the 
normal course of events that at the point that a decision not to prosecute is made, the 
victim has the opportunity to request that a specific ‘quality assurance’ stage is 
conducted to verify that this decision is correct. 
 
Due process values are less easy to identify in the review mechanisms as the due 
process model is focused on the protection of the accused.  However, there are values 
from the model that are relevant, such as the preference for formal fact-finding over 
informal procedures.  The due process attribute of ‘judicializing’ decisions could be 
associated with judicial review as it involves transferring the decision whether to 
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prosecute to the court.  A procedure, such as the review mechanisms, which could 
introduce an element of inconsistency and arbitrariness into the decision-making 
process or allowed victims to influence it, could be seen as contrary to the values of 
the due process model.   
 
9.2.2 Beloof’s Victim Participation model 
 
Beloof argues that Packer’s two models do not recognize all the different sets of values 
applicable to the criminal justice system and proposes the victim participation model 
to complement Packer’s models.14  Beloof recognises the value of normative 
modelling as a way of identifying the ‘value choices’ of the criminal process and 
viewing it as a ‘dynamic’ rather than ‘static’ process.15  The purpose of the victim 
participation model is to recognise the interest in protecting the victim from both the 
harm caused by the original offence and secondary harm caused by the criminal justice 
system.  This is done by integrating the victim-oriented values in the criminal justice 
system such as fairness, respect and dignity.16  These values are present in the 
increased service and procedural rights given to victim through both legislation and 
the Victim Code.17   
 
Beloof represents the victim participation model with the image of the victim 
following his own case along the assembly line being consulted and making 
representations to public officials along the process.18  Beloof accepts that the 
dominance of the victim participation model in a particular case will depend on the 
individual victim in that some will wish to participate more than others.19  He then 
examines the extent of victim participation in a number of key stages of the criminal 
process alongside crime control and due process values.  This allows him to conclude 
that his ‘three-model concept’ is more ‘functional… because the law now reflects the 
 
 
14 Douglas Evan Beloof, ‘The Third Model of Criminal Process: The Victim Participation Model’ 
[1999] Utah Law Review 289, 290–292. 
15 ibid 291. 
16 ibid 293. 
17 Ministry of Justice, ‘Code of Practice for Victims of Crime’ (October 2015)  





significance of genuine values of victim participation.’20  Beloof’s incorporation of a 
third model strengthens Packer’s original dichotomy as it allows an assessment of the 
criminal justice system to consider the extent of victim rights and participation.  
 
Beloof’s victim participation model is based on the notion of the victim consulting 
with criminal justice professionals and making representations, not the victim 
prosecuting the case themselves.21  The representation of the victim following their 
case along the assembly line consulting with the police and the prosecutor resonates 
with judicial review and the VRR as, at most, victims are able to make representations; 
they are unable to control the prosecution themselves.22  However, this is perhaps 
suggestive of a form of consultation which exists throughout the course of the 
prosecution.  The VRR and judicial review only really come into play when a decision 
is taken not to prosecute or to end existing proceedings.  Furthermore, the model is 
based on the notion that victims would have more influence in the charging process 
than they actual do: the victim participation model would prefer victims to determine 
which charges should be brought rather than the state, which might have its own 
agenda on which cases to pursue.23  However, Beloof concedes that if the decision to 
prosecute remains within the control of public prosecutors there should be a review 
process by which victims can challenge the decision.24  This potentially resembles the 
VRR although this is a single right and is not necessarily representative of victims 
having a more dominant role in the prosecution process.  Beloof’s model cannot be 
used to justify private prosecutions as he is specific that ‘the victim cannot control 
critical decisions’ and these remain with professionals.25  The victim participation 
model places a limit on the victim’s role as its purpose is to recognise the victim’s 
interest in the case, not to allow them to take it over.  Although this model supports 
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As with Packer’s models, Beloof does not propose that the victim participation model 
should represent an ideal which excludes the other models; it should be seen as a 
spectrum which can be used to measure the extent of victim participation in the 
criminal justice system.  It is, therefore, valuable in relation to the rights of review as 
it allows us to identify certain characteristics of the review mechanisms as compatible 
with the values of the victim participation model.   
 
9.2.3 Roach’s Punitive Model 
 
Kent Roach has offered two models, the punitive and non-punitive model.  He argues 
that actual and potential crime victims should be included in any new models of 
criminal justice.26  Roach’s punitive model is based on the conventional criminal 
justice system and relies upon the imposition of a criminal sanction.27  It is, however, 
more critical of the criminal justice participants than Packer’s crime control model.  
Victims, and others, can challenge the system if it does not meet their expectations.28  
Roach uses the analogy of a roller-coaster to represent his punitive model of victims’ 
rights which is a combination of the assembly line of crime control and the obstacle 
course of due process.29  He describes the model as in a ‘state of constant crisis as it 
responds to the inadequacies of crime control to protect and serve victims’ which is 
less deferential to police and prosecutors with victims, as well as the accused, 
scrutinising their decisions.30  Roach accepts that under this model the assertion of 
victims’ rights has the potential to disrupt the efficiency of the crime control model. 
 
Rights of review have a stronger association with Roach’s punitive model than the 
non-punitive ‘circle’ model as generally victims will be pursuing punitive aims when 
they use the mechanisms; ultimately, victims are pressing for a charge when initially 
one has been refused.  This is compatible with the notion of victims being less 
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deferential to criminal justice professionals and challenging their decisions.  Judicial 
review, for example, could be viewed as victims demanding the protection of the 
criminal law by enforcing their rights through the courts consistent with Roach’s 
punitive model.31   
 
Under Roach’s punitive model victims scrutinize police and prosecution decisions to 
‘demand their rights to protection and solicitude from… criminal justice professionals 
in strong and sometimes emotional terms’ and the model ‘encourages the expression 
of grievance.’32  This suggests a level of assertion of the victims’ rights which are not 
provided under the VRR; the scheme is limited to providing victims who meet the 
qualifying criteria, with the right to request a review of a decision.  The VRR does not 
anticipate or encourage the victim to express their view on why they believe the 
original decision to be incorrect or submit evidence or information in support of that 
view.  In essence, the VRR does not encourage a dialogue with the victim and is quite 
narrow in focus.   
 
Similarly, the VRR does not facilitate victims being as involved as Roach’s model 
would appear to want.  The VRR is not a generic right of review in that it is only those 
cases which meet the strict qualifying criteria that are eligible for review.  The scheme 
does not allow victims to challenge decisions to prosecute some suspects and not 
others, some charges and not others nor decisions to accept particular charges or bases 
of plea.  The VRR arguably does not prioritise or support the rights of victims to the 
extent that a victims-oriented model of criminal justice would envisage.   
 
Private prosecutions do not fit comfortably within Roach’s punitive model as although 
they are clearly in pursuit of a punitive outcome and the analogy of the roller-coaster 
swerving around the due process obstacle course is perhaps an apt one, this model is 
still based upon a system of public prosecutions.33  Roach’s model is a variation of 
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crime control and due process models with prosecutions being brought by the State 
rather than individuals. 
 
Manikis has proposed a new model to complement Roach’s models which focuses on 
victim participation through parsimony and moderation.34  Manikis cites victim 
participation in prosecutorial decisions in support of her model on the basis that not 
all victim interventions in relation to prosecutorial decisions are to advance 
punitiveness.  However, in order to argue this, Manikis groups judicial review and the 
VRR together and relies on the fact that a victim could potentially apply for judicial 
review of a decision to prosecute as well as one not to thereby concluding that it is 
‘not an inherently punitive process.’35  The limitation of this approach, however, is 
that if the mechanisms for reviewing decisions not to prosecute are considered 
individually, the VRR is incapable of being used to review decisions to prosecute.  As 
such, without a radical change of policy, the VRR inevitably advances punitive 
objectives in that victims could only use it to seek a prosecution when none was 
forthcoming following the original decision.   
 
9.2.4 Sebba’s Adversary-Retribution and Social Defence-Welfare models 
 
Leslie Sebba argues that it is illogical not to include the victim in the prosecution 
process particularly as the roots of the adversarial tradition were as a contest between 
the victim and the defendant. However, he concedes that the modern conceptualization 
is a contest between society and the offender.36  Sebba argues that Packer’s models 
need updating to accommodate the role of the victim and outlines two alternative 
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The adversary-retribution model emphasises the role of the victim through the trial 
and sentencing phases by giving evidence against the defendant and the sentence being 
based on the impact of the offence on the victim.  The State adopts a more ‘subsidiary’ 
role as ‘overseer and enforcer’ rather than dominating the proceedings.38  The social 
defence-welfare model tackles the offender as a threat to society subsuming the 
welfare of the victim into this.  This model is based on the notion of the State playing 
the dominant role in the proceedings by controlling both the threat of the offender and 
accommodating the needs of the victim.39  These models are not presented as 
‘blueprints’ by Sebba, but as a framework to evaluate the prosecution process.40  It is 
not easy, however, to apply them to parts of the prosecution process that fall between 
the two extremes.  Most stages of the contemporary criminal justice system have some 
degree of victim involvement, the difficulty is how this competes with other 
potentially conflicting rights such as those of the defendant and the wider public 
interest. 
 
Sebba’s adversary-retribution and the social defence-welfare models also provide an 
insight into the review mechanisms.  The latter currently dominates the prosecution 
process with the State prosecuting the defendant on behalf of the victim.  This model 
emphasises the relationship between the State and the victim and minimises the 
relationship between the victim and the defendant.41  As such both judicial review and 
the VRR could be seen as in line with this model as neither facilitate the victim directly 
challenging the defendant; in each case, the victim contests the decision directly with 
the prosecutor or through the courts.  Sebba cites the provisions in Israel for appealing 
decisions not to prosecute through an internal mechanism and by application to the 
High Court as an illustration of the social defence-welfare model.42  These provisions 
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Private prosecutions, by contrast, could fit within Sebba’s adversary-retribution 
model.  Unlike most commentators, he specifically considers private prosecutions as 
a means of enhancing victims’ involvement in criminal prosecutions.43  However, the 
criminal justice system in England and Wales does not currently provide the 
conditions envisaged by Sebba for such a radical shift from a public prosecution 
system.  To come within the adversary-retribution model the State would provide ‘the 
machinery for the victim himself to achieve the desired objectives’ which would 
essentially require a fundamental re-structuring of the contemporary criminal justice 
system which is geared towards State prosecutions.44   Although Sebba identifies many 
of the main arguments against expanding private prosecutions, he does not adequately 
address the conflict between the victim’s personal interest in the case and the public 
interest.  His argument is that a system of magisterial leave could be implemented, but 
concedes that this may be seen as a breach of the separation of powers.45  Although 
private prosecutions have ‘obstinately survived’, there is clearly not the political or 
judicial appetite for augmenting their role to the extent that they could replace the 
public prosecution system.46 
 
9.2.5 Ashworth’s Human Rights model 
 
Andrew Ashworth has developed an alternative rights-based model which is firmly 
rooted in retributive justice and the notion of the State as the ‘guarantor’ of rights 
which is now adopted by Campbell et al.47  They argue that international and domestic 
law provides a framework of rights which can be balanced and prioritized against one 
another.  Their approach to victims is quite distinct to the more victim-focused models 
as they distinguish between ‘service’ rights and ‘procedural’ rights.48  Although they 
support the improved treatment of victims by the criminal justice system, they argue 
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that the primary interests in the criminal justice system are those of the State and the 
defendant as a result of the State’s law enforcement obligations.49  On their 
interpretation, therefore, there are ‘no convincing arguments’ for victims having ‘a 
right to influence any of the key decisions in the criminal process.’50  Their argument 
is that the law should not take into account the personal views of victims which may 
be vengeful or forgiving depending on the individual victim, but should be taken in 
accordance with the rule of law.  The authors also warn against claiming to take into 
account the views of victims when they do not influence the decision as this could 
leave victims frustrated having had their expectations raised.  Although there is weight 
in the normative arguments underpinning this approach, the reality is that victims are 
gradually acquiring procedural rights and so perhaps the central issue is the extent to 
which they should be permitted rather than not permitting them at all.  
 
The review mechanisms could be viewed as a way that victims can enforce their rights 
against the State.  Judicial review could be seen as having a strong connection with 
the human rights-based approach as the criminal process is still controlled by the State; 
the victim does not have control of the decision to prosecute.  Proceedings for judicial 
review of a decision not to prosecute allow victims to apply to the court for review of 
the lawfulness of the decision.  In chapter four, case law was discussed which enforced 
the State’s positive obligations towards victims under specific articles of the ECHR 
demonstrating that individual human rights are potentially protected by judicial 
review.  Arguably, the traditional grounds of judicial review can also protect 
individual rights.   
 
As VRR is a more informal mechanism, it is more difficult to explain this on the basis 
of enforcement of specific rights.  Victims are not required to articulate their request 
in terms of their rights or how they have been breached, providing they meet the 
criteria they can simply request a review.  The decision-maker has to determine 
whether the original decision was wrong, but that does not inevitably mean that 
individual rights were infringed as a result.  The decision could be wrong on the basis 
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of an error of law, for example, which would not necessarily involve a human rights 
issue.  The VRR is perhaps evidence that victims’ interests in prosecutions have been 
recognised and that they have a right to request a review, but it difficult to explain in 
terms of human rights. 
 
Private prosecutions clearly do not fit within the rights-based approach developed by 
Campbell et al as this values State enforcement and adjudication with procedures 
which ensure that decisions are ‘more consistent, more predictable, and less 
arbitrary.’51  This model advocates that decisions, including the decision to prosecute, 
are taken ‘impartially and independently, and not influenced by the wishes of a 
particular individual.’52  Private prosecutions are, therefore, incompatible with this 
approach as they allow victims to be a party to the prosecution and to conduct it 
throughout.   
 
9.2.6 Ian Edwards/Marie Manikis’ models of participation 
 
Although the models discussed above identify different sets of values and interests in 
prosecutions, they do not measure different levels of victim participation.  Edwards’ 
typology provides a way of distinguishing between different degrees of participation.53  
This shows that the review mechanisms do increase victim participation to varying 
degrees. 
 
Judicial review accords a high level of participation to the victim for the duration of 
the proceedings, akin to consultation on Edwards’ model.54  However, this does not 
continue beyond the judicial review proceedings with the victim returning to his non-
party role as a witness.  Chapter three concluded that participation under the VRR 
could be categorised on Edwards’ model as ‘expression’ or ‘information provision’ at 
most as the process does not seek out the victim’s preferences.  These two mechanisms 
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provide an ex post facto form of participation at most, with the victim who has been 
largely excluded from the process thus far, having a brief opportunity to participate by 
challenging the prosecutor in the event he decides not to prosecute.  These are 
essentially rights to participate in ‘non-prosecutions’ as they only apply in 
circumstances where no prosecution is being brought. 
 
Chapter five identified private prosecutions as allowing private prosecutors a high 
level of participation approaching ‘control’ on Edwards’ model of participation.  This 
is because the role of the victim in the criminal justice system is fundamentally 
changed by becoming a private prosecutor.  The victim is no longer a marginalised 
provider of evidence, but becomes the controlling force of the prosecution, making 
the initial decision to prosecute including the selection of specific charges and 
defendants.  This is very different to the limited, conventional role of the victim.  This 
high level of participation and control would potentially continue throughout the 
prosecution to sentencing. 
 
Manikis proposes an ‘agents of accountability’ category to Edwards’ model to 
recognise the ‘monitoring and oversight role’ of victims scrutinising and challenging 
the decisions of criminal justice decision-makers.55  Manikis categorises this role as 
‘non-dispositive’ in that victims do not have overall control over the decision; their 
role is to request the review.  Judicial review and the VRR are used as examples in 
this jurisdiction of relevant review mechanisms for this category.  However, this 
amendment describes the victim has having an obligation to request a review if they 
identify a possible error with a requirement on the criminal justice decision-maker to 
seek out and consider the review.56  These obligations arguably go beyond what is 
currently required of both participants, particularly the victim who is not obliged to 
request a review even if they do identify an error.  A valuable aspect of this model is 
that it characterises judicial review and the VRR as checking mechanisms on public 
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decision-making rather than simply identifying them as concerned with enforcing the 
interests of the victim.   
 
 
9.3 Locating the individual mechanisms 
 
This section will return to each of the review mechanisms in turn to consider how each 
of them is best located within the theoretical models based on the above analysis.  This 
will also examine what each of these mechanisms means for the participatory role of 
victims.  Essentially, this shows that the review mechanisms generally are expanding 
victim participation in the prosecution process with procedural rights to review 
decisions not to prosecute.  As such, both judicial review and the VRR elevate victims’ 
involvement predominantly during the pre-trial stage to allow them to contest the 
public prosecutor’s decision.  However, this is a moderate level of change as neither 
mechanism allow the victim to become the decision-maker.  Judicial review 
potentially allows the victim to assert their challenge more forcefully than the VRR 
by presenting formal arguments as to why the decision should be overruled.  An 
alternative, and perhaps more convincing, analysis of the VRR is that it is a further 
crime control measure which diverts victims from judicial review.   
 
Private prosecutions were difficult to accommodate within the various models 
examined above which further highlights their poor fit within the contemporary 
criminal justice system. 
 
9.3.1 Private prosecutions 
 
In the context of the criminal justice models, private prosecutions appear an anomaly; 
they do not fit easily within the majority of the different criminal justice models which 
are based on public forms of justice system.  Although Sebba’s adversary-retribution 
model does consider private prosecutions, they would be as part of a criminal justice 
system where the role of the State was minimised and the adversarial structure was 




system, private prosecutions brought by victims are a rarity and are clearly at odds 
with publicly brought prosecutions.   
 
Application of Edwards’ model identified an increased level of participation 
throughout the prosecution which is quite different to the conventional role of the 
victim in prosecutions.  The private prosecutor has full party status and is the primary 
decision-maker behind the prosecution both in relation to the decision to charge and 
the overall conduct of the case.  This goes far beyond the conceptualisation of the 
victim envisaged by even the victim-focused models developed by Beloof and Roach 
which contemplate a role for victims, but not as a replacement for the State.  This 
increased role also goes beyond the enforcement of rights or challenging the 
lawfulness of the original decision.  Although there is increasing acknowledgement of 
the victim’s interest in the case and the gradual accrual of procedural rights, the 
participatory role of the private prosecutor is in excess of the cautious development of 
rights that has taken place in relation to public prosecutions.  It is, however, important 
not to overstate the extent to which victim have control over, and are the decision-
makers in, the prosecution process as these are very much the exception rather than 
the norm and are heavily restricted by the statutory provisions which allow the CPS to 
take over the prosecution and the CPS change of policy in 2009 on private 
prosecutions.57  The adoption of a policy which requires the Full Code Test to be 
applied for any private prosecutions which are referred to it severely curtails the victim 
benefiting from the full potential of bringing a private prosecution in response to a 
decision not to prosecute. 
 
Overall, therefore, this lack of fit within the established models, further indicates that 










9.3.2 Judicial review 
 
The application of these models identifies judicial review as consistent with the 
gradual expansion of victims’ rights.  Judicial review falls comfortably within Roach’s 
punitive model and Beloof’s victim participation model with the victim challenging 
the prosecution and enforcing their position through the courts.  It also identifies with 
Ashworth’s rights-based model on the basis that judicial review can provide a way for 
victims to challenge infringement of their rights.  Judicial review clearly allows 
victims to challenge prosecutorial decisions in a robust and controlled way.  Although 
this is in tension with some aspects of crime control which is the dominant value 
system in the prosecution process, it is an example of the interests of victims being 
provided for without de-stabilising or re-structuring the existing criminal justice 
framework.  Victims are not permitted to become a party to the criminal prosecution 
or confront the defendant directly, but are able to challenge the decision of the public 
prosecutor by attempting to have the decision quashed by the courts.   Judicial review 
proceedings are collateral to the criminal prosecution as a public law claim brought in 
the High Court by the victim as claimant against the CPS as defendant.  This preserves 
the traditional role of the victim in the criminal matter, but still allows them to insist 
that their grievance is heard.  
 
Although judicial review clearly does allow victims a significant level of participation, 
as well as being outside the prosecution itself, it predominately takes place during the 
early stages of the prosecution and does not extend beyond the judicial review 
proceedings; after these are complete, the victim returns to their non-party role as a 
witness.   Despite this, the fact that judicial review applications of this kind have been 
entertained by the courts demonstrates the formal recognition that victims do have a 
stake in the decision to prosecute consistent with the victim-focused models as well 
as the rights-based models of criminal justice.  
 
9.3.3 Victims’ Right to Review 
 
The position of the VRR is more complex.  On one hand, it could be argued that the 




by Beloof or Roach; on the other hand, it could fit more neatly within the crime control 
model.  The VRR does recognise the interests of the victim in a prosecution and 
provide them with a means of challenging public decision-makers.  It provides victims 
with a procedural right to challenge decisions which they believe to be incorrect.  The 
right to request a review is a change to the participatory role of the victim although it 
is most significant in the pre-trial stage of the process and is only relevant in the event 
of a decision not to prosecute as it is essentially a right to participate in non-
prosecutions.  As a result, realistically it only slightly changes the victim’s role and 
only for the duration of the review process.  The general position remains that the CPS 
makes the decision whether to charge a suspect on the basis of the Code for Crown 
Prosecutors.58  However, rights of review mean that victims are not entirely excluded 
from that process.  
 
The VRR could also, therefore, be located within Ashworth’s human rights approach 
as a form of accountability and fault correction.  This model recognises that there 
should be some limits to prosecutorial discretion and enforcement of rights.  However, 
the victim does not have to prove, or even claim, that their rights have been breached 
to apply for review under the VRR.  Therefore, depending on the circumstances of the 
case, it may not be possible to show that victims’ rights have been infringed.   
 
The analysis of these models has demonstrated how the VRR tentatively gives rights 
to victims, but these are modest and limited in their application and focus.  An 
alternative, more compelling, approach would be to categorise the VRR within 
Packer’s crime control model.  Although Packer’s work did not acknowledge the 
rights of victims, there are particular features of the VRR which make it consistent 
with the crime control model.  Roach acknowledged that there are ‘significant 
similarities’ between the crime control model and his own punitive model in that both 
are concerned with factual rather than legal guilt and both assume that ‘the enactment 
of a criminal law, prosecution, and punishment controls crime.’59  As set out in relation 
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to Packer’s models in section one above, the VRR is supportive of certain features of 
crime control.   
 
The VRR provides an administrative, informal mechanism for fault correction which 
diverts claimants from bringing ‘collateral attacks’ through the courts with minimal 
disruption to the crime control process.  Although it is a form of appeal procedure, as 
an internal mechanism it is less inefficient and resource-intensive than ‘collateral’ 
challenges through the courts.  The VRR allows the CPS to retain control of the 
process which involves little more than an additional quality assurance stage being 
incorporated into the ‘assembly line’ of the prosecution process.  It also has a number 
of benefits for the public prosecutor in addition to diverting victims from the courts.  
It provides an opportunity for the prosecutor to check and correct erroneous decisions 
internally without the involvement of the courts.  It also acts as a useful tool for the 
prosecution to demonstrate the efficiency of public prosecutions and generate 
confidence in the process by showing low levels of incorrect decisions and high rates 
of victim satisfaction.  
 
Regardless of whether the VRR is considered better accommodated within crime 
control or a victim-oriented model, the VRR actually strengthens crime control values.  
Roach suggests that both due process values and victim rights can ‘enable and 
legitimate crime control.’60  In a similar way to victim personal statements being used 
to increase sentences, rights of review increase the likelihood of a suspect being 
charged with an offence.  Rights of review could also be seen to legitimate crime 
control in this context as it would be difficult to justify public prosecutors having a 
second opportunity to review the same case without some external element.  The fact 
that the request has originated from the victim who was not party to the original 











Overall, the provision of rights of review to victims has expanded the participatory 
role of the victim in the criminal justice system by increasing their procedural rights.  
However, this is a moderate, rather than extensive or fundamental, expansion of the 
victim’s role largely within the pre-trial stage of the process.  The three rights of 
review are not the same and have different effects on the overall role of the victim.   
 
An examination of the rights of review in relation to the established criminal justice 
models has shown the review mechanisms have increased victim involvement in the 
criminal justice system.  An increase in the procedural rights of victims would 
normally be associated with a victim-oriented model such as those proposed by Roach 
and Beloof.  However, these models contemplate levels of victim engagement which 
arguably are not present in all of the three review mechanisms.  A closer analysis 
suggests that the VRR, in particular, is not as firmly rooted in victims’ rights as it 
would first appear.  The VRR has strong crime control characteristics drawing 
potential claimants away from the other mechanisms towards the internal mechanism 
which could be seen to support the crime control efficiency agenda.  
 
The VRR is clearly the easiest mechanism to engage, but actually allows only minimal 
participation on the part of the victim and the procedural rights acquired by the 
implementation of the VRR policy are not extensive, only allowing victims to request 
a review in certain pre-defined circumstances and giving the victim limited rights of 
allocution in the matter.  The VRR has been carefully constructed to increase victims’ 
rights of participation in the prosecution process only slightly and in such a way that 
are more palatable to the prosecution.  The VRR uses only limited resources and has 
minimal impact on the efficiency of the prosecution process compared to the 
alternative route of judicial review.  Judicial review clearly does have the potential to 
remove the decision from the control of the prosecutor to the courts resulting in 
increased costs and delay; as such it is conflict with the values of crime control and is 
more appropriately associated with the victim-oriented models which specifically 





Private prosecutions clearly have the potential to change the role of the victim most 
fundamentally by expanding the existing parameters of their conventional role both in 
terms of the level of involvement within the criminal justice process and the high level 
of control that bringing a private prosecution has the potential to achieve.  However, 
although historically it was the role of citizens to bring prosecutions, this is now out 
of place in the contemporary criminal justice system.  This lack of fit is emphasised 
by the difficulty in locating private prosecutions within the criminal justice models 
used in this chapter.  The potential conflict between private prosecutions and crime 
control values can perhaps explain the restrictive approach that has been adopted by 
the CPS (and ultimately the court) towards prosecutions brought by private 
individuals.  Although theoretically private prosecutions have the most scope of the 
three mechanisms to fundamentally reshape victims’ involvement in the criminal 
justice system this is severely reined in by the more dominant crime control principles.  
 
This re-evaluation of the review mechanisms using the theoretical models has 
demonstrated how each of the three mechanisms are conceptually quite different.  
Although judicial review can comfortably be identified as victim-focussed, the VRR 
has strong crime control characteristics.  The use of these models has also further 
emphasised how difficult it is to justify the existence of private prosecutions in the 
contemporary criminal justice system as they do not fit easily within any of the 
established models.  The conclusion to be drawn as a result is that the three 
mechanisms do not amount to a coherent framework, but are a collection of separate 





Chapter 10 - Conclusions 
 
 
This thesis has evaluated the law and CPS policy in England and Wales that confers 
on victims a right to challenge decisions not to prosecute: the right of review under 
the VRR, the right to bring judicial review of such CPS decisions, and the right to 
institute a private prosecution.  It has done so individually and collectively, 
considering the extent to which they provide a coherent framework for the protection 
of victims’ rights.  It found that while there is merit in each of the individual 
mechanisms, together they do not provide a systematic approach to allowing victims 
to have rights to review decisions not to prosecute.  
 
This conclusion will be structured into two sections.  The first section will provide an 
overview of the key arguments from each of the individual chapters.  The second 
section will focus on the resolution to the primary research question posed in the first 
chapter:  
 
To what extent does the law and CPS policy in England and Wales provide 
victims of crime with a coherent and principled framework for challenging 
decisions not to prosecute? 
 
Its two sub-questions will also be answered:  
 
1. Do the mechanisms of the VRR, judicial review and private prosecutions 
provide victims with principled and coherent rights to challenge decisions 
not to prosecute?  
2. To what extent do these rights of review encroach on the rights of the 
defendant and the wider public interest?  
 
This conclusion will also identify some tentative thoughts about the role of victims 
more widely in the criminal justice system, and to iterate some suggested lines of 






10.1 Overview of key arguments from the individual chapters 
 
Chapters 2 and 3 – the Victims’ Right to Review 
 
Chapters two and three, on the VRR, showed that the scheme partially fills the gap 
identified by the Court of Appeal in Killick in that it provides a way for victims to 
challenge certain decisions not to prosecute without resorting to judicial review.1  The 
VRR is a free and simple procedure which on some occasions will successfully 
provide a catalyst for a prosecution following a decision not to prosecute.  However, 
the VRR is intrinsically unprincipled in that it unjustifiably excludes certain decisions 
from the remit of the scheme, such as where some charges are terminated and others 
are continuing, or where only some suspects are prosecuted.  Furthermore, it 
artificially recognises some victims and not others whilst not fully promoting victim 
participation and engagement as it does not encourage victims to make representations 
in support of their request for review.  
 
Chapter 4 – Judicial review 
 
In chapter four we observed that while decisions not to prosecute are amenable to 
judicial review, the courts have adopted a more restrictive approach following the 
implementation of the VRR.  There is a clear expectation that the VRR is used rather 
than judicial review proceedings although they remain a valuable course of action for 
victims whose case is not eligible for the VRR or where the request under the scheme 
has been unsuccessful.  However, judicial review is procedurally complex and requires 
victims to challenge the decision on established public law grounds.  Although they 
potentially allow victims an increased participatory role, this takes place outside the 
criminal proceedings.  Additionally, if the case is successful, the court is likely to 
quash the decision and remit it back to the CPS for further review.  Therefore, although 
 
 




judicial review does publicly hold the CPS to account, it does not compel the 
prosecutor to bring a prosecution.  
 
Chapter 5 – Private prosecutions 
 
Although private prosecutions by individual victims are less common than they were 
historically, they are still worthy of consideration as they were specifically preserved 
by Parliament in the Prosecution of Offences Act 1986.  Potentially, private 
prosecutions allow victims more control of the prosecution process than the other 
review mechanisms as, in theory at least, the victim controls the decision-making in 
terms of the decision to prosecute and the overall conduct of the case.  However, this 
mechanism is substantially reduced in value by the power of the DPP to take the 
prosecution over and discontinue it.  This power is even more significant as a result of 
the 2009 CPS policy to apply the same test to private prosecutions as public ones.  
Private prosecutions are not, therefore, principled or coherent as they have become 
contradictory.  Despite being preserved by statute, in practice they have been rendered 
largely obsolete by the exercise of the CPS power to take the prosecution over; they 
have been reduced to a symbolic right as the true decision-maker behind the private 
prosecution is the public prosecutor.  The original CPS lawyer will have determined 
the course of the case by that initial decision; provided the CPS gets notified of the 
private prosecution it is likely to be discontinued on the basis that it is essentially the 
same case as was initially determined.  
 
This chapter also confirmed that private prosecutions are not an accountability 
mechanism as they wield no real power over the CPS; in fact, the CPS holds the power 
over the private prosecutor.  
 
Chapter 6 – Thematic comparison of the review mechanisms 
 
This chapter examined four themes that emerged from the analysis using the four 
criteria in the preceding three chapters on the individual mechanisms:  procedural 
barriers; the public/private nature of the review mechanisms; the ultimate decision-





The theme of procedural barriers highlighted the different standing requirements of 
the mechanisms, including the more rigid and restrictive standing requirements of the 
VRR.  It was also clear that the victim’s use of each of these mechanisms is heavily 
controlled by prosecution policy.  The CPS controls access to the VRR by setting 
boundaries through the qualifying criteria as to when it can be used.  Similarly, 
carefully drafted prosecution policies can become a barrier to judicial review as 
compliance with established policy will help protect the CPS from challenges.  The 
CPS policy on private prosecutions also restricts the use of private prosecutions to 
those cases which the CPS would prosecute itself.   
 
This chapter also recognised that the VRR is not entirely victim-focused and has clear 
benefits for the CPS.  The VRR generates a perception that victims’ procedural justice 
needs are being met by giving them a voice in the decision-making process, although 
the extent of this participation is much more limited than it appears.   
 
Chapter 7 – Rights of the defendant 
 
This chapter concluded that defendants have very limited rights in relation to rights of 
review.  The review mechanisms are not in conflict with defendants’ rights per se, 
although they could undermine their right to a fair trial in certain, limited 
circumstances.  Defendants are largely dependent upon the doctrine of abuse of 
process to protect their right to a fair trial if this has been adversely affected by a 
review decision.  This chapter proposed a number of reforms that could be 
incorporated into the VRR to reduce the likelihood of defendants being disadvantaged 
by the process, such as stricter time limits and defendants being notified when a 
request had been received.  Defendants could be better protected against spurious 
private prosecutions by a stronger system for ensuring that such prosecutions were 







Chapter 8 – The public interest 
 
It was argued in this chapter that the VRR and judicial review are compatible with the 
public interest.  Although they both recognise the legitimacy of the victim’s interest 
in the decision to prosecute, they do not allow the victim to control the decision-
making and the public nature of prosecutions is not compromised.  These two 
mechanisms provide means of fault correction which is clearly in the public interest.  
Private prosecutions, by contrast, can be distinguished on the basis that they do not 
necessarily arise out of a flawed decision not to prosecute and could be contrary to the 
public interest.   
 
Chapter 9 – Locating the review mechanisms within theoretical models of criminal 
justice 
 
This chapter re-evaluated the review mechanisms using established criminal justice 
models to show that the review mechanisms only amount to a moderate expansion of 
the victims’ rights in the pre-trial stage of the prosecution process.  There were 
competing arguments for how the individual review mechanisms could be located 
within the different models.  One approach might be to locate all of the mechanisms 
within one of the victim-oriented models.  Judicial review, in particular, fits 
comfortably within such a model as it can be clearly associated with increasing 
victims’ rights. 
 
However, there are also compelling arguments for associating the VRR, in particular, 
with Packer’s original ‘crime control’ model.  The VRR has a number of distinct 
‘crime control’ characteristics which could interpret it as a ‘quality assurance’ process 
within the traditional prosecution process.  It can also be seen as protecting some of 
the values that are closely protected by crime control, such as efficiency and a 
preference for administrative processes, by diverting victims away from the more 





Analysing the review mechanisms against theoretical models also identified that 
private prosecutions are difficult to locate within any of the established models.  This 
confirmed their lack of fit within the contemporary criminal justice system which is 
based on a contest between the State and the defendant.  
 
 
10.2 The Research Questions 
 
This section will discuss the individual sub-questions before answering the primary 
research question.   
 
Do the mechanisms of the VRR, judicial review and private prosecutions provide 
victims with principled and coherent rights to challenge decisions not to 
prosecute?  
 
The first sub-question addresses the issue of whether the mechanisms of the VRR, 
judicial review and private prosecutions provide victims with principled and coherent 
rights to challenge decisions not to prosecute.  Essentially, the answer to this question 
varies according to the individual mechanism.   
 
Although the VRR has the clear potential to result in a satisfactory outcome for some 
victims, it is only internally coherent or principled to a limited degree.  The VRR 
originated from the Court of Appeal’s dicta in Killick inviting the DPP to review the 
arrangements for victims to contest decisions not to prosecute.  However, the scheme 
which followed only applies to a relatively narrow range of possible decisions.  This 
is partly as a result of the limited construction of who can use the scheme, which has 
a prerequisite of harm embedded within the definition of victimhood.  The effect of 
this is to unjustifiably exclude certain factual victims from the reach of the scheme 
and to limit it to conventional primary victims. Although the VRR may give the 
impression that it is an entirely victim-focused initiative, this conclusion is 
undermined by a number of factors.  Firstly, the scheme is restricted to limited 
categories of victim.  The VRR could, therefore, be more inclusive by accepting a 





There are also a number of specific exclusions from the scheme which serve to 
significantly limit the cases that come within it.  These limitations are not all justifiable 
and appear to be based on a policy decision on what type of decisions should be 
covered by the scheme.  For example, the scheme excludes cases where some charges 
have been discontinued and others are continuing, or some suspects are being 
prosecuted and not others.   
 
Furthermore, the VRR is not as responsive to victims’ procedural justice needs as it 
should be.  The VRR allows victims only a limited voice in the review process with 
victims being restricted to requesting a review.  The level of victim participation and 
engagement is actually quite low; the VRR does not encourage victims to enter into a 
dialogue with the prosecutor regarding the case.  Indeed, it does not even invite victims 
to make representations or submit additional material which may be relevant to the 
process.  As an apparently victim-focused measure it should provide more meaningful 
opportunities for victims to express their voice and should expressly permit this rather 
than relying on victims to decide to submit unsolicited representations.  Providing 
stronger rights to make representations would allow victims to engage with the scheme 
in a much more meaningful way; it would remain for the prosecution to determine 
how much weight should be attached to those representations.  The Scottish model 
provides for this situation more effectively by still permitting reviews if no ‘substantial 
and significant’ charges are continuing.  This would make the VRR much more victim-
focused and give it a greater sense of legitimacy.  
 
If the VRR is to be taken seriously as a means of holding the public prosecutor to 
account, a truly independent tier should be incorporated.  To label the second stage of 
the review process as ‘independent’ is misleading as the review is conducted internally 
by the CPS.  An independent layer, reserved for the most serious and sensitive of 
cases, could increase the credibility of the scheme and place it on a more principled 






Judicial review is broadly coherent and principled as it operates on established legal 
principles which exist beyond the narrow issue of prosecutorial discretion.  Compared 
to the VRR, it adopts a less rigid approach to standing and allows victims to have a 
voice in challenging the lawfulness of the decision not to prosecute.  Although this is, 
of course, collateral to the prosecution process and only endures for the judicial review 
proceedings.  The inherent jurisdiction of the High Court provides an independent and 
neutral forum for contesting the prosecutorial decision and can therefore be seen as a 
more robust method of holding the public prosecutor to account than the VRR.    
 
Judicial review proceedings scrutinise the decision-making in accordance with 
established principles of administrative law that are not controlled by the CPS as the 
executive department who made the original decision.  Judicial review brings the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion within the supervisory jurisdiction of the High 
Court as with other forms of decision-making by public bodies. 
 
The value of private prosecutions is heavily undermined by the unresolvable conflict 
between the power to bring a private prosecution and the public prosecutor’s right to 
take it over.  Law and policy are in conflict in this area.  The law empowers victims to 
bring private prosecutions, but this is fundamentally undermined by the prevailing 
CPS policy to intervene in prosecutions which do not pass the two-stage test for public 
prosecutions.  On one hand, therefore, private prosecution permit victims to have full 
party status to bring their own prosecution.  On the other hand, this participation is 
substantially curtailed by the powers of the public prosecutor.  This conflict will be 
examined further in relation to the second sub-question below.  
 
To what extent do these rights of review encroach on the rights of the defendant 
and the wider public interest?  
 
The second question focuses on the related issue of the extent the mechanisms 
encroach on the rights of defendants and the public interest.   
 
Despite the hypothesis introduced in chapter one that rights of review could jeopardise 




defendants’ rights.  Defendants are still able to rely on the safeguards within the trial 
and appeal processes in the same way as other defendants.  Defendants have limited 
rights to contest the rights of review, particularly in relation to the VRR from which 
they are excluded.   
 
The obvious focal points of the VRR are the victims and the state in the form of the 
public prosecutor.  However, in view of its proximity to the adversarial process, it 
should also take appropriate account of the rights and interests of the defendants and 
how the scheme will impact on them.  There remains, however, a slight risk that they 
may be unfairly disadvantaged by the reversal of a decision not to prosecute and 
defendants are largely dependent on the doctrine of abuse of process to address that.  
The comparison with other appeal procedures has identified a number of measures 
that should be introduced to mitigate the risk of injustice to individual defendants even 
further.  These measures include more clarity around the VRR time limits, being put 
on notice of requests for review, a right to make representations and the incorporation 
of an ‘interests of justice’ requirement into the VRR.   
 
Private prosecutions have the potential to result in defendants being prosecuted when 
the evidence against them is weak or a prosecution is contrary to the public interest.  
This is because a private prosecutor may be pursuing a private agenda and has not 
conducted an objective appraisal of the case in the same way as someone 
professionally detached from it would.  Therefore, there is a risk of prosecution on the 
basis of arbitrary or capricious decision-making.  
 
Allowing victims to have rights of review through the VRR and judicial review can 
be justified as a form of error identification and fault correction.  Both these 
mechanisms permit victims to challenge decisions not to prosecute, but fall short of 
allowing victims to decide whether a prosecution should be brought.  The VRR and 
judicial review are forms of quality assurance measures which provide a means of 
checking and correcting factually incorrect decisions.  As the comparison with other 
appeal mechanisms has shown, it is in the interests of justice and the public interest to 
have such procedures in place.  Obviously if such procedures were over-used and 




could undermine public confidence in the prosecution process.  However, providing 
that this is not the case, the existence of such procedures and the fact that, on occasions, 
decisions are corrected following review should increase public confidence rather than 
diminish it.  
 
The VRR is a useful tool for the CPS to increase public confidence in the organisation.  
The very existence of such a scheme can create the impression of an organisation 
which values and respects victims of crime.  The publication of data generated by the 
scheme which shows that only a small number of requests for review are made could 
be construed as meaning that the majority of victims are satisfied.  Furthermore, the 
low numbers of decisions being reversed could suggest that the majority of 
prosecutorial decisions are correct.  The fact that there is evidence of some decisions 
being successfully reviewed gives an element of credibility to the scheme.  From the 
CPS perspective, there is perhaps an optimum level of successful requests; sufficient 
to demonstrate that the scheme provides an effective checking mechanism yet low 
enough to suggest that the majority of decisions are correct.  However, the reasons for 
low levels of requests could be at least partly due to the strict qualifying criteria and 
because some situations which might result in a request are excluded from the scheme.  
The data could also be affected by how effectively the availability of the VRR is 
communicated to victims.  The VRR is utilised by the CPS as an appealing way of 
responding to criticism of decisions not to prosecute, both to victims directly and 
through the media.  The CPS can use the VRR to give weight to the original decision 
and to demonstrate that it must be correct because it has been verified.  
 
The preceding chapters have shown that private prosecutions are now out of place in 
the contemporary criminal justice system.  In addition, private prosecutions potentially 
conflict with the public interest aspect of prosecutions.  In theory at least, they allow 
victims too much control over prosecutions which are now generally controlled by the 
CPS.  This lack of fit is demonstrated by how private prosecutors are not compelled 
to take into account all of the interests in prosecutions, namely the defendant and the 
public interest, and that they can be used to pursue a private agenda potentially 
contrary to these interests.  The fact that private prosecutions were also hard to locate 




how unsuitable they now are.  In reality, they are not a review mechanism in that they 
do not provide a way for victims to seek review of a decision not to prosecute.  In fact, 
they potentially allow victims to circumvent the decision and bring their own 
proceedings despite the fact that the original decision not to prosecute may have been 
procedurally and substantively correct.   
 
As a result, private prosecutions have a different conceptual basis to public 
prosecutions which are brought by the State as part of its obligations to citizens as a 
form of censure for transgressing the criminal law.  Therefore, they are potentially in 
conflict with the public interest dimension of prosecutions and cannot be justified in 
their current form.  Prosecutions brought by private citizens either need to be abolished 
or reformed to ensure that the State has greater oversight to ensure that prosecutions 
are not brought which are either contrary to the public interest or subject defendants 
to criminal proceedings when there is not an evidentially sound basis for doing so.  
 
The primary research question:  To what extent does the law and policy in England 
and Wales provide victims of crime with a coherent and principled framework 
for challenging decisions not to prosecute? 
 
The final issue is whether the review mechanisms collectively provide a coherent and 
principled framework of rights for victims.  Despite each having some value for 
victims, there are clear shortcomings to each of the mechanisms indicating that the 
VRR and private prosecutions are not intrinsically coherent or principled.  
Superficially, the three mechanisms provide a framework of rights with an internal 
mechanism, an external mechanism and a third procedure which allows the victim to 
bring a prosecution personally.  On closer analysis, however, the three mechanisms do 
not fit together as a well-organised and principled system, but are a collection of 
disconnected measures which have developed separately and inconsistently. 
 
In its current format the VRR is essentially a form of ADR which provides an internal 
route for victims to use, diverting potential judicial review claimants away from the 
courts.  Compared to judicial review it represents a less transparent and less 




promoting the VRR over judicial review as it is a less expensive and less resource-
intensive mechanism which the CPS controls internally.  Judicial review, by contrast, 
takes place externally in the independent, and potentially more unpredictable, forum 
of the High Court.  Unlike judicial review, the CPS sets the parameters of the VRR 
and can determine which cases are eligible for review under the scheme.  The CPS 
could potentially broaden or restrict the entry criteria if they wish; perhaps in response 
to a growing number of judicial review applications in a particular area.  As the VRR 
acts as a barrier to judicial review, the CPS can effectively raise or lower the barrier 
as they see fit.  The existence of the VRR also provides the CPS with an opportunity 
to either rapidly correct a wrong decision or to produce a more robust review reducing 
the likelihood of a successful application for judicial review.  
  
The relationship between the VRR and judicial review is complicated and not 
representative of a coherent system or framework.  On one level, the VRR appears to 
provide a form of ADR to be exhausted before resorting to judicial review.  In this 
sense, it is understandable that the courts expect victims to use the VRR in the first 
instance.  However, the VRR is effectively a barrier to judicial review and there is 
certainly not a natural progression from one mechanism to the other.  The procedural 
requirements and focus of the two mechanisms are also quite different.  Both require 
victims to have standing to use them, but the rules are different with the requirements 
of the VRR more rigid than the standing rules for judicial review.  The VRR also has 
specific qualifying criteria for what types of decisions not to prosecute can be 
reviewed under the scheme; this is potentially more restrictive than under judicial 
review.  As a result, there are some common situations which are specifically excluded 
from the VRR which could be subject to judicial review.  For example, a decision to 
caution or to prosecute a particular offence or person would be excluded from the 
internal scheme, but could result in a claim for judicial review.  As the VRR originated 
from the observation by the Court of Appeal that victims should have an alternative to 
judicial review, it is unjustified that the scheme is so restricted.  Judicial review 
remains the residual route when the VRR cannot be used.  Essentially, the two 






A recurring theme of this thesis has been the extent to which private prosecutions are 
an aberration in a system which is structured around prosecutorial contests between 
the State and the defendant.  They originated from an era when prosecutions were 
brought on a different conceptual basis to what they are now; offending was against 
the victim rather than society generally.  Although judicial review and the VRR do 
share certain common features, this commonality is not extended to private 
prosecutions.  The VRR and judicial review both provide a means for victims to 
instigate a review of a decision not to prosecute, but neither allow victims full control 
of the decision-making process and both exist outside the prosecution itself.  Whereas 
judicial review and the VRR provide a means of identifying and remedying errors in 
prosecutorial decision-making, private prosecutions allow victims to bring a 
prosecution without reference to factors such as the lawfulness or correctness of the 
original decision or the rights of the other interests in a prosecution, namely the 
defendant and the public interest.   
 
The hypothesis set out in chapter one that the law and policy of England and Wales 
does not provide a coherent and principled framework for victims of crime to 
challenge decisions not to prosecute is therefore proven.  Rights of review, however, 
is an area which would benefit from further research.  
 
 
10.3 Further research 
 
As there is only limited research on the rights to review decisions not to prosecute in 
England and Wales, this would benefit from further research.  In particular, the 
following could be valuable to the further evaluation of the rights of review: 
 
1. Empirical research with victims who have participated in the Victims’ Right 
to Review to extent our knowledge of victims’ understanding of review 
mechanisms and the extent to which they feel that their procedural justice 
needs have been met.  
2. Qualitative interviews with CPS lawyers could be a useful method of 




reveal, for example, that the existence of the review mechanisms has changed 
their practices and attitudes, such as making them more risk adverse in their 
prosecution decision-making. 
3. Research into private prosecutions brought by victims of crime would 
illuminate the extent to which victims use private prosecutions as a way of 
contesting decisions not to prosecute and whether prosecutions are brought by 
them in evidentially weak cases or contrary to the public interest. 
4. Further comparative research on how the VRR has been implemented in EU 
jurisdictions could identify further ways of improving the scheme in England 
and Wales.  
5. The thesis has alluded throughout to the implications more widely for the role 
of victims in the criminal justice system that have been, or might be, affected 
by allowing them the right to review a decision not to prosecute. While they 
were not central to the claims made, or debated, in this thesis, those 
implications remain ripe for some further exploration.   
6. Comparison with other appeal mechanisms has been a useful way of evaluating 
the rights of review and this could be developed further to examine whether 
such mechanisms are consistent with one another; this could include, for 
example, the rights of victims to request reviews of decisions of the Parole 
Board.  
 
Overall, therefore, this thesis concludes that although the law and policy in England 
and Wales does not provide victims with a coherent framework of rights, there is 
evidence that the VRR and judicial review of such decisions can be properly 
accommodated within the criminal justice system without compromising the rights of 
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